



The Spearhead

1ST QUARTER EDITION: FY23

TROOP TRANSPORTATION

Lack of Availability in IBCT

JOINT OPERATIONS

Air Mobility

SOLDIER HIGHLIGHT

US Army 2022 Drill Sergeant
of the Year

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Desk...

An Appeal to
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Business Process
Reengineering

& More!

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1ST QUARTER EDITION: FY23



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WELCOME TO THE NEW SPEARHEAD NEWSLETTER!

By the Spearhead Editorial Team

The overall theme for the Transportation Corps for 2023 is "The Year of Army Watercraft." In keeping with the realm of modernization you will find in this issue various articles centered around modernization and a focus on the LSCO environment.

We are also excited to highlight the great things our units and Soldiers have accomplished throughout this quarter.

Our goal is to continue to make this a multi-faceted publication that reaches those performing vital transportation functions on a daily basis.

We are always accepting articles submissions from all ranks and components. Along with modernization efforts we want to tell stories highlighting Soldiers, units, unique assignments, and lessons learned. The Transportation Corps has

so much to offer and learn from and we want to ensure valuable information does not get overlooked.

Thank you for all those who have submitted articles and those who are working on articles and ideas to submit. We hope you enjoy this issue!

-The Spearhead Editorial Team

FROM THE DESK OF...

The 33rd Chief of Transportation



Team Transportation,

This has been an incredibly exciting quarter for the Transportation Corps. From the superb execution of operations by Transporters in tactical units around the globe, to the development of Transportation Professionals here at the Transportation School, to forward progress on all things modernization, the Transportation Corps is hitting on all cylinders.

This issue of *The Spearhead* captures just a small slice of the incredible work being done by members of our Corps on a daily basis.

A few highlights:

In October, after almost two years of construction, we successfully launched the Maneuver Support Vessel Light (MSV-L) prototype and it is now undergoing builder trials on the West

Coast! This vessel marks the first modernized platform to enter the fleet in more than two decades. The future of the Army Watercraft field has never been brighter.

We have continued to make great strides in our schoolhouse initiatives over the last quarter. Of particular significance, we are actively improving our Warrant Officer PME, bridging the gaps in our current structure.

Our officer accessions process continues to produce superb results. I would like to con-

sioned Lieutenants that have successfully completed Logistics BOLC and are prepared to report to their units. Make no mistake: the future of the Transportation Corps is in good hands with these young leaders.

The Transportation School also launched a new podcast series called "Coffee with the COT". During our first episode in November, we met with SFC Jose Barada – a graduate of the Training with Industry (TWI) program who shared his experiences during his year working with UPS. You can find this podcast and other great content on the U.S. Army Transportation Corps Facebook page.

I am also excited about our upcoming critical task sites selection boards (CTSSB) June–August 2023. These boards are critical to ensuring we are training current and future Transporters on the most critical tasks they will perform in their specialties. For more information on participating in the upcoming CTSSBs, please see page 32 of this issue of *The Spearhead*.

Lastly, I'd like to take the time to wish everyone and their Families the very best for the new year and to thank you for all your hard work and dedication to the Transportation Corps!

***"VIGOR industries
successfully
completed the
assembly, and launch,
of the Maneuver
Support Vessel Light
(MSV-L) prototype"***

gratulate and recognize the 196 cadets from ROTC and West Point who branched Transportation this fall! CSM Brown and I had the privilege of celebrating and meeting with the West Point cadets during their branching event in early December.

We have also executed several Regimental Induction Ceremonies for the newly commis-

SPEARHEAD!

MOBILITY MEANS LETHALITY AND SURVIVABILITY!

SPEARHEAD!

FROM THE DESK OF...

The 15th Transportation Regimental Command Sergeant Major



Teammates,

Greetings and happy new year from Fort Lee. As we come to the end of an amazing year, I want to thank you for your unwavering dedication to our Corps, our Army and our nation. We're extremely fortunate to be surrounded by such an elite group of Officers, Noncommissioned Officers, Soldiers and Civilians.

It's been nearly a year and a half since I've assumed the role as the Transportation School CSM and based on the notes, e-mails, and conversations it's refreshing to know I still have your steadfast support.

Although last quarter was amazing, next quarter will be even better. Largely because of the significant events the upcoming quarter will reveal. First, we've already started the nomination process for TC of

"I ask that you seek challenging assignments in order to prevent gaps within our formations."

the Year Award candidates. This is a great chance to highlight both individual and organizational contributions made to the force by our transportation professionals. Additionally, we've started the process to recognize teammates with a more enduring impact on the Corps, through the TC Hall of Fame and Distinguished Member of the Regiment nominations. Finally, in January we will identify the TC Instructor of the Year.

One of my personal key focus areas will be talent management. We at the Transportation School are nested with the Army's effort to align the right people, to the right assignment, at the right moment in their career. With that being said, we need your assistance. I ask that you seek challenging assignments in order to prevent gaps within our formations. Specifically, in positions such as First

Sergeant, White House Transportation Agency, Drill Sergeant, Recruiter, Enlisted Aide, Security Forces Assistance Brigade, Training with Industries, and AIT instructor.

On a different note, I'd like to recognize MSG Daniel Castanon, MSG Kendrick Daniels, MSG Wendi Jeter, MSG Kevin Jones, MSG Jason Quintero, MSG Michael Wambsgans, MSG Mindy Williams, and MSG Shawn Wood. These Transporters were selected to attend the United States Army Sergeants Major Academy (Class 74).

"I'd like to recognize...Army Sergeants Major Academy (Class 74)."

Thanks again to you and your families for your unwavering support and sacrifices to our Corps, our Army and our nation.

SPEARHEAD!

NOTHING HAPPENS UNTIL SOMETHING MOVES!

SPEARHEAD!

FROM THE DESK OF...

The 6th Transportation Regimental Chief Warrant Officer



Team Spearhead!

Happy Holidays to all! I hope you have been able to enjoy your Holiday Season so far and that you are looking forward to getting a chance to get together with family and friends to continue the celebrations. I only ask two things, please do it safely and please keep those brothers and sisters out there who are unable to be with their family at this time, for whatever reasons, in your thoughts.

I have been in the seat for about 18 months now and have had the opportunity to get out and see some of the amazing things our Transportation Corps Warrant Officers are doing. I had a chance to attend a Force Flow Conference for the first time and I was amazed at what our Mobility Warrant Officers do on a daily basis and the value

they bring to an organization; you are truly an asset to the team and a force multiplier.

We are continuing to move the ball forward when it comes to Warrant Officer (WO) Professional Military Education, a lot of great modernization efforts are on the way, at all levels, from the courses taught at the Career College to those taught at the Transportation Schoolhouse. There are going to be some significant changes coming in the next few years bringing WO education to the next level.

We have launched our first modernized Army Watercraft platform in over 2 decades, the Maneuver Support Vessel (Light) (MSV (L)). It is currently on the west coast doing some early building and acceptance trials. It will make its way around to the east coast in

early 2023. Another exciting effort helping modernize the Transportation Corps!

I hope to get the opportunity to continue to get out and see all the great things our WOs are doing and look forward to upcoming events that give us a change to interact. As I have said in the past, Leaders and Soldiers everywhere are looking at you to set the bar, and the Transportation Corps Warrant Officers continue to set it high!

SPEARHEAD!

“WO PME

Modernization...Significant changes coming, bringing WO education to the next level”

WE MOVE THE ARMY!

SPEARHEAD!

THE ARMY'S RACE

Mobility Warrant Officer Basic Course Runs the Army 10-Miler



Congratulations Warrant Officer Basic Course Class 002-22 on your completion of the 38th Annual Army 10-Miler

Instructor, CW3 Smith at the ATM finish line with the Mobility Warrant Officer Basic Course (WOBC) class 002-22.
(Photo by Karla Smith, Arlington, Va.)

SOLDIER HIGHLIGHT

U.S. Army's 2022 Drill Sergeants of the Year Take the Coveted Belt

By Gary Loten-Beckford

The 2022 U.S. Army and U.S. Army Reserve Drill Sergeants of the Year were announced during a ceremony Sept. 15 at Fort Jackson, S.C. After four days of grueling competition, Staff Sgt. Krista Osborne, an 88M motor transport operator drill sergeant with Bravo Company, 2-10th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Chemical Brigade at Fort Leonard Wood, Mo., and Staff Sgt. Loren Pope, a drill sergeant with 1st Brigade, 98th Training Division (Initial Entry Training) at Fort Benning, Ga., earned the title of Drill Sergeant of the Year.

Osborne is the fifth female to ever win the Active Duty Drill Sergeant of the Year. Staff Sgt. Jill Henderson was the first, winning the competition in 1993. The last female from any component to win the competition was U.S. Army Reserve Sgt. Maj. Melissa Solomon, who is currently the deputy commandant at the U.S. Army Drill Sergeant Academy.

"It is the greatest honor to be selected as TRADOC Drill Sergeant of the Year, I've worked so hard to represent not just female drill sergeants but females across the Army," said Osborne. "With this win it's not just for me but for all women looking to compete," added Osborne.

Every year the DSOY competition physically and mentally challenges the Army's best drill sergeants. While they are tested on their physical and tactical abilities, they are also tested on their ability to assist, instill and lead by example, the primary tenants for all drill sergeants.

"The Drill Sergeant of the Year is the best of the best, well rounded in all aspects of being a noncommissioned officer," said Command Sgt. Maj. Scott Beeson, the U.S. Army Center for Initial Military Training Command Sergeant Major. "They are the pillars of the drill sergeant enterprise in transforming civilian volunteers into Soldiers."

Pope said the competition was harder than he imagined, but he was



Active Duty Drill Sergeant of the Year Drill Sergeant Krista Osborne, 88M motor transport operator, received the coveted Drill Sergeant Belt

(Photo by Hunter Rhoades, U.S. Army Center for Initial Military Training, Fort Eustis, Va.)

able to feed off his fellow competitors.

"I highly recommend for Reserve Drill Sergeants as well as Active Drill Sergeants to bond, we're all working toward a common goal which is to be better drill sergeants," said Pope.

The Drill Sergeant of the Year goes beyond the competition and title. The Drill Sergeant of the Year plays an active part in the development of current and future Soldiers as well as drill sergeants going through the U.S. Army Drill Sergeant Academy, Drill Sergeant Duty, and programs of instructions and updates to TRADOC regulations.

Sgt. 1st Class Travis K. Burkhalter, the 2021 Drill Sergeant of the Year, said it was a little bittersweet to hand over the title, but gave some advice to Osborne as she takes over her new role.

"My hope is that the new Drill Sergeant of the Year continues the hard work within the Drill Sergeant culture," said Burkhalter. "The most

important aspect to being the Drill Sergeant of the Year is drive, you have to be a self-starter by getting out there and pushing yourself," Burkhalter added.

Osborne said she is up to the task and is looking forward to the opportunity to directly impact the entire Army's initial entry training.

"As the Drill Sergeant of the Year, I'd like to visit with each of the Centers of Excellence to ensure there's consistent training in the Initial Entry Training environment, there shouldn't be different standards," said Osborne. "I'd like to get out and speak with as many drill sergeants through forums and seminars to help make the drill sergeant program better," Osborne added.

About the Author:

Gary Loten-Beckford, Public Affairs Specialist, U.S. Army Center for Initial Military Training, Joint Base Langley-Eustis, VA.

JOINT OPERATIONS

Air Mobility

By MSG John O'Brien, TSgt Jesus Hernandez and TSgt Brendon Walsh

Joint assignments provide a unique opportunity for Soldiers to work together with Airmen, Sailors and Marines under the same command. Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC) are a joint command and the component command for Special Operations under each Combatant Command (COCOM). Each TSOC has a mobility section with Army and Air Force Transportation Officers and NCOs that manage the entire process of deployments and redeployments within their theater. This article is intended to share some of the lessons learned in this joint assignment.

A key to any successful operation is thorough planning, preparation, and rehearsals. Many Soldiers who have deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan are accustomed to the short response time of the Air Force in CENTCOM. That is not the case in other theaters, units must plan air missions further in advance. When the Air Force Operations Center plans a mission, they request diplomatic clearance for every country they plan to fly over and include any hazardous material (HAZMAT) on the request. Each country has a different lead time and after planning the mission it may not be possible to add hazardous material without restarting the diplomatic clearance process and potentially delaying the mission. Additionally, any hazardous materials that are incompatible in AF MAN 24-604 will require waiver under chapter 2 or 3, or DOT SP 9232 for commercial aircraft. These are approved by TRANSCOM or the COCOM, usually with a General Officer endorsement and only with adequate justification.

A common mistake we have seen from Soldiers is not accounting for the aircraft configuration

when planning the cargo. For example, unless they have cutout, ISU-90s can only use a few of the available pallet positions on a C130. Cargo should also be weighed and marked with a pallet ID and center of balance. The Air Force's Expeditionary Center has a useful mobile app for calculating center of balance and required restraint.



U.S. Air Force Expeditionary Center Apps

For any unit deploying cargo by air, the Joint Inspection (JI) is a critical part of the process, and likely the most stressful part for the deploying unit. The Joint Inspection is when a mobility force inspector works with the deploying unit to ensure that the cargo is airworthy, properly marked, and all the required documents are correct. Army Transporters are often involved in the process, either in a Movement Control Team (MCT) or Inland Cargo Transfer Company (ICTC) functioning as the Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Group (ADACG) or as a representative of

the deploying unit. At an ADACG or Aerial Port the JI takes place in the call forward area, but at a deployed area it can take place at any suitable location.

Whether at an aerial port or somewhere else, in most cases the Joint Inspection will be done by an Airman with the Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) of 2T2, Air Transportation. Just like 88Ns, their tech school is at Fort Lee, VA. Unlike 88Ns, which work multiple modes, 2T2s only work air transportation and spend most of their career working in various positions at aerial ports. Not all 2T2s are Joint Inspectors. To become one requires that they complete HAZMAT inspector and joint inspection training, on the job training and be evaluated by Joint Inspector Instructor. For deployments outside an Air Force aerial port, the Air Force's Contingency Response Groups can send a JI team to the deployment location. Each Theater Special Operations Command also has assigned 2T2s that can travel to deploying Special Operations teams in their theater.

The biggest challenge to any JI is often hazardous material, because it presents the greatest risk to the aircraft and passengers. It is imperative to identify all HAZMAT to the inspector because any improperly packaged HAZMAT could damage the aircraft or lead to an in-flight emergency. All cargo is subject to inspection and

“For any unit deploying cargo by air, the Joint Inspection (JI) is a critical part of the process”

JOINT OPERATIONS

Air Mobility



Senior Airman Daniel Wiggins conducts joint inspection on an M2 Bradley

(Photo: Staff Sgt. Joshua King, www.dla.mil/About-DLA/Images/igphoto/2002056205/)

once inspectors find undeclared hazards, they often give greater scrutiny to the rest of the load. For unit redeploying back to home station, it can be convenient to schedule a US Customs inspection at the same time as the JI.

Below is a useful checklist that would help ensure a successful Joint

“The biggest challenge to any JI is often hazardous material, because it presents the greatest risk to the aircraft and passengers.”

Inspection for deploying units. If any of these are missing, the cargo could

be frustrated or the entire mission delayed.

- Aircraft load plans
- SDDGs for every hazardous item
- Joint Hazard Classification (JHCS) or Interim Hazard Classification (IHC) for every type of ammunition.
- Air Transportation Test Load Agency (ATTLA) certification for any large or non standard equipment
- DD1385 Cargo Manifest
- DD1387 for every piece
- DD1387-2 for every piece containing sensitive items or munitions

The Joint Inspection is the final critical step before any air deployment and the culmination of the unit's pre deployment planning. In our experience, Soldiers can often build a pallet find a center of balance but lack training on the overall process and the additional requirements for the inspection. Air Force inspectors don't want to

see a mission fail any more than the deploying unit does but play a critical role in mitigating risk to the aircraft and ensuring a safe flight.

About the Authors:

MSG John O'Brien is currently assigned as the J4 Senior Enlisted Leader in Special Operations Command Europe. He holds a Bachelor's degree in Global Logistics Management from Arizona State University and is a graduate of the Army's Master Leader's Course.

TSgt Jesus Hernandez and TSgt Brendon Walsh are currently assigned as Air Transportation NCOs in the J4 at Special Operations Command Europe.

TROOP TRANSPORTATION

Lack of Availability in Infantry Brigade Combat Teams

By Major Tyler Thornton

Proposal

To address the lack of troop transportation availability in the Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT), the United States Army needs to develop a removable troop transportation installation kit that mounts to the M1077 flatrack. This flatrack will load on the back of the Load Handling Systems (LHS) and allow all logistics units in the IBCT to transport 20 Soldiers per vehicle. The Composite Truck Companies (CTCs) will continue to provide area support for the rest of the division but will no longer be the primary means of troop transportation for the IBCTs. This new capability will give logistics commanders the capacity to carry 20 personnel per LHS: equating to a 180 Soldier capacity in the forward support company (FSC) and a 560 capacity in the brigade support battalion's (BSB) distribution company in a single lift.

Issue

The ability of a maneuver element to execute operational and tactical movements into advantageous positions rests on the responsiveness of reliable transportation assets. Currently, the US Army's Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) do not have the organic troop transportation assets needed to conduct necessary troop movements around an organization's area of operation. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 emphasizes the importance of executing maneuvers over significant distances because it "builds friendly combat power and sets the conditions for the disintegration of the enemy's anti-access and area denial systems and the exploitation of the resulting freedom of maneuver." The application of this maneuver is not possible under the current task organization.

Up until 2014, the FSC and the BSB could accomplish this mission because of their organic Medium Tactical Vehicle (MTV) troop

transport assets. Each support company was assigned MTVs and vehicle operators to execute the required troop movement. But in 2014, there was a change: the MTVs were removed from every FSC and distribution company and placed in the composite truck company (CTC) assigned to each Division Sustainment Brigade. Under the current table of organizational equipment (TOE), each FSC attached to a light infantry battalion is now only assigned six MTVs, none of which are assigned to the distribution platoon. Instead, they are in the field feeding section and the maintenance platoon.

The size of the Army's CTCs makes responsiveness and flexibility difficult. The CTCs provide direct or area transportation support to the division. This company is one of the largest in the Army, with an assigned strength of over 260 Soldiers, forty medium tactical vehicles (MTV), and 40 palletized load systems (PLS) under the command of a Captain and First Sergeant. The CTCs are assigned to the sustainment brigade, and because they aren't embedded in the IBCT, they lack the responsiveness and integration needed to conduct sustained and responsive operations.

Transportation movement requests (TMRs) are submitted through the IBCT's support operations (SPO) office and often must be requested with at least 72 hour notice to execute. This movement request is commonly denied in a tactical environment due to competing support priorities, and the customer unit is expected to move with its own assets. If the TMR is approved, whether in a garrison or a tactical environment, the coordination between the CTC and the customer on the day of execution becomes difficult. There is very little room for flexibility or deviation from a mission request if the situation on the ground changes. Additionally, communication and in-transit visibility during the mission are difficult due to differences in communication platforms and differing standard operating procedures.

Organic troop transportation assets at the IBCT level will alleviate these complications, whether located in the BSB or the FSC. The "rapid mobilization, deployment of combat configured forces, and entry operations from multiple locations into austere, complex environments" is another importance asserted in TP 525-4-1. This requires organic transportation assets: assets that are flexible and robust enough to respond to sudden changes in mission requirements without the burden of coordinating with an external CTC.

Recommended Approach

The Army should develop a troop-carrying installation kit that mounts to the M1077 flatrack. This kit will resemble that of the MTV: side panels, troop seats, cargo cover, and troop strap. But rather than only carrying 14 personnel, which is the capacity of the MTV, this reconfigured M1077 can easily hold 20 personnel. Some Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) and Key System Attributes (KSAs) will make this development essential and feasible for all distribution organizations.

The first KPP for this M1077 installation kit is that it must only require attachments to the portions of the flatrack used for tying down equipment and attaching containers. Modifying the structure, design, or components of the M1077 will not be required. This will ease installation for maintainers and won't need any welding or permanent affixion. The sustainment unit can remove this kit to convert the flatrack back to its original state. This will allow the operators to switch the flatrack from a cargo configuration to troop carrying configuration as needed.

This product's second key performance parameter is that it must allow an Load Handling System (LHS) to carry 20 personnel on one flatrack. This capacity will mean that the FSC in a light infantry battalion, with its 9 LHS systems as-

TROOP TRANSPORTATION

Lack of Availability in Infantry Brigade Combat Teams



M1120 Oshkosh HEMETT LHS: Solution to add troop transportation kit to the flatrack

(Photo: Oshkosh M1120 LHS Heavy High Mobility Truck | Military-Today.com)

signed, can move 180 Soldiers in a single lift. That is equivalent to one and a half infantry companies. If these kits are used in BSB's distribution company, then the IBCT can now move 560 soldiers with just the BSB's assets: more than the equivalent of an entire infantry battalion. It would require half of their fleet and operators to accomplish this with the CTC, but at the cost of responsiveness and flexibility.

The first KSA for this installation kit is that it should be able to be purchased through every organization's shop office as a Class IX part. This will allow the items to be received and installed by the maintenance section and will not add any end items to the property book. Units can order as many or as few as they need, depending on their mission requirement.

The second KSA is that the design should resemble and operate like the MTVs with troop seats mounted in the back. This will limit additional training and shorten the learning curve for sustainment organizations so that it can be quickly installed and exercised. All drivers and riders can take the troop movement process from the MTV and

HMMWV and apply it to the LHS.

For the last KSA, this installation kit should not only be removable but also can collapse and fit in the storage compartments located on the flatrack. This will help decrease motor pool and unit storage clutter and means that the vehicle operator can use the same flatrack for cargo and troop transportation without storing the conversion kit elsewhere.

DOTMLPF-P Impacts

If this materiel solution is implemented, a few required changes will be made across the DOTMLPF-P spectrum. The first will be to change the BSB's Distribution Company and FSC's doctrinal tasks. With the new troop-carrying ability of the LHS, the mission of the Transportation Company and each subordinate transportation platoon in the BCT will change to reflect this new capability. The Composite Truck Company's mission will change from being the primary personnel movers for the BCTs to a supplementary role if additional

transportation requirements are needed. The CTC's primary mission can be Echelons Above Brigade (EAB) organizations or area support for the installation and surrounding location.

The second required change will be in the Army Logistics University (ALU) leadership training. Company and tactical-level leadership will require adjusted training when planning to move their organizations. This new capability doesn't complicate their mission but does require additional planning due to the increased mission. If the LHS is utilized for troop transportation, it requires a second lift to move the supplies initially designed for the LHS. This cost-benefit and risk analysis are what the platoon and company-level leadership will practice at the ALU.

Thirdly, increasing troop transportation missions will require security in contested environments. BSB and FSCs must ensure enough Convoy Escort Teams (CETs) are trained and certified to accommodate the influx of TMRs. Effective and lethal convoy protection is critical for an FSC or BSB's survivability in conflict. Successful organizations are encouraged to build depth in their CETs to increase convoy throughput and minimize driver burnout.

The last update required is a policy change. Army safety and military installation policies must be updated if organizations want to improve their transportation throughput and add these troop-carrying flatracks to the LHS trailer. Additionally, coordination between the US TRANSCOM and the Department of Transportation (DOT) will need to ensure that troop-carrying LHS systems are legal on all highways around the United States.

Operational Concept

The M1077 installation kit should be able to be purchased through the GCSS-A by a company's supply team and installed by vehi-

TROOP TRANSPORTATION

Lack of Availability in Infantry Brigade Combat Teams



M1078 with troops seats similar to kit that would be added to a flatrack

(Photo: M1078 LMTV Light Utility Truck | Military-Today.com)

cle operators or maintainers. This flexibility would allow sustainment organizations to shift between troop or cargo movement in an operation. In practice, the vehicle operators can either remove the kit when not needed or drop the troop transportation flatrack on the ground and replace it with an empty one if cargo transportation is required afterward. The unit will be able to store these flatracks in the motor pool or at the Field Trains Command Post (FTCP) or the Company Trains Command Post (CTCP).

This new capability will give the FSC Commanders and the Alpha Company Commander the capacity to carry 20 personnel per LHS. This impact magnifies when the total amount of LHS systems in the IBCT is factored into the equation. The FSC for a Light Infantry Battalion is assigned 9 LHSs. That gives the FSC enough room to move 180 Soldiers, equivalent to almost two infantry companies. This means the maneuver battalion commander can now conduct a ground assault convoy (GAC) with his internal assets. If this capability is applied to the Transportation Company in the BSB, with its 28 LHS assigned, 560 Soldiers can be moved on the back of the LHSs at the BSB level, the equivalent to one

maneuver battalion. This capability will require advanced notice so that all LHS systems are available, but communicating this requirement inside the IBCT rather than coordinating with an external CTC will be easier for the sustainment leaders to coordinate.

Interim Solution

There is an interim solution available to organizations looking to solve this problem sooner.

The Army could manufacture an adapter for that M1083 installation kit to fit onto the M1077 flatrack to convert it to troop-carrying capacity. The M1083 MTV is a long-bed version of the MTV and has an installation kit to allow troop transportation. The bed of the M1083 and the size of the M1077 are nearly identical. This will bypass the acquisition process and enable troops to begin riding on the back of an LHS. The consequence of this solution is that it relies on the mechanics' expertise to develop an adapter for the installation kit that fits the M1077. Also, this adapter might not be accepted due to safety concerns.

Conclusion

Inflexibility and a lack of responsiveness in troop transportation in the IBCT is a significant issue. With the development of a troop-carrying installation kit mounted on a LHS, maneuver commanders instantly benefit from the increased mobility at the tactical level. Most importantly, the light infantry soldier can benefit from the same mobility and flexibility provided to the airborne, stryker, and armored operational units.

About the Author:

Major Tyler Thornton is a Logistics Officer and attending the Army's Command and General Staff College.

Thornton was born in Killeen, TX. He grew up in a military family and graduated through the Reserve Officer Training Corps from The Citadel where he earned his commission as a Second Lieutenant in the U.S. Army Ordnance (OD) Corps in 2011.

Thornton's previous assignments include Mobility Officer, Maintenance Control Officer, Executive Officer and Squadron's S4 as a Lieutenant. Upon promotion to Captain, Tyler served as Assistant S3 and Forward Support Company Commander in the 25th Infantry Division. Most recently, Major Thornton served as an Assistant Professor of Military Science at the Virginia Military Institute.

Thornton's military education includes the Combined Logistics Captains Career Course (Commandant's List), Ordnance Basic Officers Course, Lean Six Sigma (Green Belt), PMP Certification, Airborne School, and Air Assault School. Captain Thornton's civilian education includes a Bachelor of Science in Health Exercise and Sports Science.

AN APPEAL TO SURVIVABILITY

Time to Equip and Train Logistics Formations to Fight and Survive in LCSO

By Maj. Heath A. Bergmann

In 2020, Army Futures Command published Army Futures Command Concept: Brigade Combat Team Cross-Domain Maneuver – 2028, describing how future brigade combat teams (BCT) will conduct operations against near-peer threats. This publication's framework for modernization depicts how the Army will organize, train, educate, man, and equip itself to fight under the multi-domain operations (MDO) concept. BCTs are employed within the MDO construct to conduct range of military operations across the conflict continuum, from deterrence to large-scale combat operations (LSCO). Operating with 'semi-independence', BCTs fighting in a LSCO environment are likely to face resource constraints that make them more vulnerable to culmination. The lethality and survivability of logistics platforms are critical to preserving the endurance and extending the operational reach of maneuver formations. Regrettably, logistics formations within BCTs lack organic crew-serve weapons systems and the skills required to fight and endure during LSCO. Therefore, the Army must look to equip forward logistics formations with the tools and faculties to ensure lethality and survivability to sustain the operational tempo of the brigade combat team.

Multi-Domain Operations and Large-Scale Combat Operations

Training and Doctrine Command defines MDO as "how the U.S. Army, as part of the joint force (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, or Space Force), can counter and defeat a near-peer adversary capable of contesting the U.S. in all domains (air, land, maritime, space, or cyberspace), in both competition and armed conflict." Importantly, MDO drives the Army's operational and organizational structures, and modernization efforts. Within MDO, "conducting LSCO presents the greatest challenge for BCTs and represents the most significant readiness requirement."

Executing logistics operations

within a kinetic battlefield during LSCO requires resupply executed across contested and extended lines of communication. Sustaining the operational tempo of the BCT demands logistics formations generate their own security and fight through enemy contact to defeat threats. Without proper weaponry and training, logistics formations are vulnerable to degradation and defeat, compromising the operational reach, freedom of action, and endurance of supported units. A logistics package (LOGPAC) failure to reach a supported element can jeopardize the tactical mission by causing the supported formation to reach a point of culmination prematurely.

Current Mitigations

In their current structure, brigade support battalions (BSB) and subordinate forward support companies (FSC) within BCTs are not equipped and trained to fight independently and survive across contested battlefields. At combat training centers these formations have

"In their current structure, brigade support battalions (BSB)...are not equipped and trained to fight independently and survive across contested battlefields"

had to improvise, receiving external augmentation from within the BCT, or redirecting inadequately trained sustainment crews to protection platforms. Neither of these ad hoc solutions is without cost. In the for-

mer, commanders at echelon must compromise flexibility, firepower, or protection in other areas. In the latter, distribution assets are simply unable to carry doctrinally required basic loads, potentially compromising the unit's ability to conduct one of its core missions: resupply to alleviate this deficiency and sustain the endurance of BCTs, three critical areas require remedy.

The Issues

Army BCT logistics platforms, particularly the M978A4, Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck Fueler, and the M1075 / M1120, Palletized Load System / Load Handling System, families of vehicles lack organic crew-serve weapons platforms such as turret-mounted M2s, MK-19s, M240Bs, or M249s. Additionally, distribution and forward support companies are not allocated protection platforms to accompany LOGPACs. There are no turreted platforms listed in any modified table of organizational and equipment for these most forward logistics formations. Crew-serve weapons systems are in short supply inside these formations in general, with the doctrinal employment of these limited assets assuming a dismounted and stable area weapon used to defend perimeters instead of a turreted system securing mounted maneuver.

Lack of institutional training further exacerbates this dilemma. Enlisted logisticians receive insufficient training on the employment of crew-serve weapons during initial entry training (IET). Further, neither logistics officers nor non-commissioned officers receive training and certification in a mounted maneuver during professional military education (PME). In situations where the priority of fires may provide an opportunity for the protection of LOGPACs, logisticians across all ranks lack the call for fire skills necessary to employ indirect fires. Finally, compounding the paucity of equipment and skill development is the state-side training calendar,

AN APPEAL TO SURVIVABILITY

Time to Equip and Train Logistics Formations to Fight and Survive in LCSO

where operational BCT logistics formations simply do not have the white space to conduct mounted maneuver training and complete the gates to exercises such as convoy live fire. Meaning even if logistics platforms had turreted crew-served weapons platforms, Soldiers were skilled in employing these systems, and leaders could orchestrate mounted maneuvers and employ direct and indirect fires; current operational tempo and requirements to support combat arms training exercises make collective logistics maneuver training nearly impossible. In short, BSBs and FSCs rightfully sacrifice their readiness to ensure that supported combat arms formations can train free from the constraints of inadequate sustain-

“Creating logistics formations that can fight and survive in a contested LCSO environment requires profound change”

ment.

The Proposal

Creating logistics formations that can fight and survive in a contested LCSO environment requires profound change. The first in a series of changes must occur within the Army’s organizational design and doctrinal framework. The Army must update the table of organization and equipment (TOE) to reflect organizational changes in equipment and capabilities for BCT logistics formations. This revised TOE must direct either the addition of protection vehicles (with requisite crew) or require logistics platforms to

include a turret and crew-serve weapon system. Given the addition of this equipment, the amended TOE should direct that these logistics formations can secure themselves while conducting LOGPAC operations. Lastly, a revision of the organizational design of BSBs and subordinate FSCs necessitate changes across Army doctrine to account for the employment of these new capabilities.

The second series of changes must occur in both the institutional and operational training realms. Within the institutional Army, the program of instruction (POI) for all officers, NCOs, and initial entry logistics series Soldiers require revisions to include mounted land navigation and maneuver, crew-serve weapon systems employment, and call for fire training. Operationally, logistics and supported unit planners within BCTs must carve out adequate calendar space or incorporate logistics formations into maneuver training to ensure ample time for logistics formations to build proficiency in the areas of mounted maneuver and employment of fires.

Most profoundly Army logisticians must adopt a new mentality that embraces proficiency within both the maneuver and support realms; a frame of mind that truly embodies the idea of warrior logisticians.

A significant weakness in this proposal is that its entire premise hinges on a material solution. Without fielding protection platforms or turreted crew-serve weapon systems to forward logistic formations, there are no cascading requirements to change doctrine or reimagine training for the security of LOGPACs. The execution of this proposal is sequential and necessitates the appropriate platforms and tools be fielded to formations and institutions before any significant changes are made to doctrine, POI, or unit training plans.

Lastly, it is important to acknowledge the challenges of adding requirements to institutional

POIs. Time is a limited resource, and new requirements must come at the expense of some existing requirements. The discussion here is one about tradeoffs and risk. Fortunately, a significant portion of the POI across logistics IET and PME is directly replicated in everyday garrison operations and can be trained ‘on the job’. Conversely, as discussed above, support requirements and operational tempo make collective logistics training extraordinarily challenging. Therefore, Soldiers and leaders must receive this training in an institutional setting free from competing requirements, enabling time for instruction and replication. The skills gained in this institutional setting will pay dividends in the operational setting, where experience and expertise can help maximize limited collective training opportunities.

“The Army Vision calls for the Army of 2028 to employ “modern manned and unmanned platforms”

The Unmanned Vehicle Conundrum

The Army Vision calls for the Army of 2028 to employ “modern manned and unmanned” platforms, to include “ground combat vehicles, aircraft, sustainment systems, and weapons.” The appeal of unmanned resupply convoys has attracted the attention of the Army’s Combined Arms Support Command, where some have projected a “fully automated convoy system” to be employed later this decade. There are generally two arguments in favor of unmanned systems. The first argues that unmanned systems will free Sol-

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diers to complete other tasks. The second, and more popular, revolves around the protection of the force. In other words, the use of unmanned vehicles will reduce the risk of injury or death to Soldiers in the event of enemy contact. In essence, we are talking about force protection.

The difference between force protection and survivability is often lost in the discussion about unmanned systems. Force Protection refers to “preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against DOD personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information.” However, force protection and survivability are not synonyms. Survivability is defined as “a quality or capability of military forces which permits them to avoid or withstand hostile actions or environmental conditions while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission.” The last part of this description is critical; survivability demands fulfillment of the mission. In a LCSO environment, survivability must take precedence over force protection. This, of course, does not mean the abandonment of prudent risk. But it does mean that future logistics formations must fight through contested battlespaces to reach their objective. If leveraging unmanned platforms can

enhance survivability, then the Army should requisition and employ these assets to complement logistics formations. But if unmanned systems simply heighten force protection at the expense of survivability, then these platforms may be counterproductive during LCSO.

Conclusion

Modernization and the pivot from counterinsurgency to LCSO brings complexities and dilemmas to the battlefield unseen since World War II. The future battlefield will see the Army contested by near-peer enemies across all domains, with the idea of a linear battlefield unlikely to match reality. BCTs will face resource constraints in this emerging environment while operating in non-contiguous battlefields distant from traditional supply nodes. To ensure victory, Army logistics formations must be capable of fighting and surviving across contested lines of communication. To this end, it is time we equip forward logistics formations with the tools and faculties to ensure lethality, survivability, and sustainment of the operational tempo.

“The future battlefield will see the Army contested by near-peer enemies across all domains, with the idea of a linear battlefield unlikely to match reality”

About the Author:

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Leader-Follower Technology

(Photo: Office of the Chief of Transportation)

BUSINESS PROCESS REENGINEERING

EBS-C Aligns with TRANSCOM TMS

By Christopher M. Lindstrom

Co-Author Colonel Matthew A. Price

Emerging requirements in data processing and transmission are ever-increasing, and the Army must keep pace with current and future technologies to ensure Soldiers remain ready to “deploy, fight and win our nation’s wars.”

Integrating modernization across the Army’s existing Enterprise Business Systems has become a priority of effort throughout the Army’s strategic planning goals. Enterprise Business Systems-Convergence (EBS-C) is leading the Army’s modernization efforts, and support from the transportation community is vital to overall mission success.

Through Business Process Reengineering, the Army has aligned EBS-C reengineering of its logistics and financial processes with the Army’s Global Force Information Management initiative and with U.S. Transportation Command’s Transportation Management System to ensure integration with strategic transportation enterprise. The de-

sired outcome of aligning these initiatives is integrated processes and data to support Army-at-Rest and Army-in-Motion decisions, deployments, redeployments, and in-theater sustainment and distribution.

As the Army increases readiness from installations to the tactical edge, the requirements and approaches supporting EBS core defense business systems must be modernized to improve business execution, data and data analytics value, and cloud computing advances while reducing ownership costs.

The business systems required to support the Army’s future vision of strategic and tactical readiness are underpinned by the EBS that serves as the backbone of sustainment and financial management operations. This includes the five Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems the Army employs to manage finances, supply, maintenance, and readiness reporting from tactical to national levels: General Fund Enterprise Business System, General Fund Enterprise Business System – Sensitive Activities, Logistics Modernization Program, Global Combat Support System-Army, and Army

“The pending end-of-service life for the Army’s current ERPs...has provided an opportunity to converge Army EBS into a common, modernized platform that will more effectively enable Multi-Domain Operations in Large Scale Combat Operations”

Enterprise Systems Integration Program Hub.

The pending end-of-service life for the Army’s current ERPs, coupled with the ongoing mission to support increasingly complex operational requirements, has provided an opportunity to converge Army EBS into a common, modernized platform that will more effectively enable Multi-Domain Operations in Large Scale Combat Operations.

EBS-C was chartered in March 2020 by the Under Secretary of the U.S. Army to begin planning for delivery of a modernized warfighting capability that enables integrated and auditable sustainment operations from the strategic support area to the tactical edge of the battlefield. EBS-C is now managed by a multi-functional capability team comprised of a group of skilled professionals from 26 different organizations, including transportation and distribution experts from Headquarters, Department of the Army; G-4, Surface Development and Distribution Command; and Theater Sustainment Commands.



Soldier staging equipment for onward movement during Lightning Forge

(Photo: <https://www.flickr.com/photos/soldiersmediacenter/47994150048/>)

BUSINESS PROCESS REENGINEERING

EBS-C Aligns with TRANSCOM TMS



Soldiers work on railhead in preparation for transport to Fort Polk, Louisiana

(Photo: <https://www.flickr.com/photos/soldiersmediacenter/46179051125/>)

Together with support from the Army Program Executive Office Enterprise Information Systems' product management office, this team has conducted a high-level Business Process Reengineering of processes common in the sustainment and financial systems that transportation Soldiers and civilians use every day.

As a Multi-Functional Capabilities Team (MFCT) led by the Army's Chief of Ordnance and governed by the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller, the commanding general of Army Materiel Command, and the Army's Chief Information Officer, the EBS-C effort partners with the Transportation community and more than 400 Army-wide stakeholders across the finance, logistics, human resources, and acquisition communities.

Through these partnerships, EBS-C is ensuring the Army identifies an industry solution capable of converging current EBS platforms which specifically impact the future of the Transportation Corps.

In 2021, over an eight-month

period, EBS-C BPR workshops brought together more than 400 of the Army's best and brightest experts to assess the current state of Army operations against industry best practices and design a desired or future "to-be" state.

The BPR process may generate doctrine, organization, training, leadership, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) change recommendations. This high-level BPR set the stage for the Army to move into a BPR-supported system design effort in FY22 and FY23, which will include regular workshops focused on reimagining and improving many aspects of Army business processes, with a specific focus to drive an integrated "factory-to-foxhole" supply chain capable of enabling multi-domain operations.

The Army expects to provide several benefits to the Transportation community built into EBS-C. By aligning with USTRANSCOM's ongoing Joint Transportation Management System BPR and integrating Army-specific equipment data, material descriptive data, financial records, and

distribution planning, transportation planners from unit level to operational level will see synchronized, transparent, real-time views of what needs to move, when and where, with earlier visibility into supply and maintenance planning actions.

Transportation data management is expected to see major improvements under EBS-C. Convergence of tactical transportation planning with equipment data will provide real-time visibility of entire fleets and their readiness status at echelon and eliminate manual entry or data transfer to build Organizational Equipment Lists or Unit Deployment Lists.

EBS-C must deliver a human-centered user experience that enables performers of sustainment processes to focus on their core competencies rather than "feed the system." EBS-C is incorporating Human Centered Design (HCD) principles, focused on simplifying the sustainment processes' performer's experience by reducing the need for user interactions, simplifying workflows, and implementing intuitive hardware and software user interfaces.

"Modernization is a continuous process requiring collaboration across the entire Army," according to the 2019 Army Modernization Strategy (AMS): Investing in the Future, which describes how the Total Army, including all Service components and Army Civilians, will transform into a multi-domain force by 2035; meet its responsibility as part of the Joint Force to provide for the defense of the United States, and retain its position as the globally dominate land power.

The Army's modernization efforts include finding a way to field cutting-edge technology to formations to conduct multi-domain operations, bringing the Services together to test new operational concepts and digital technologies, and ensuring the Army becomes more data centric and capable of operating in contested

BUSINESS PROCESS REENGINEERING

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Bradley Fighting Vehicles crossing the Danube River during Saber Guardian

(Photo: <https://www.flickr.com/photos/soldiersmediacenter/48132728103/>)

environments to prevail on the future battlefield.

In a Message from the Secretary of the Army to the Force dated February 8, 2022, Army Secretary Christine E. Wormuth states: "The work that is being done in Project Convergence to bring our sister Services together to test new operational concepts and digital technologies is the kind of innovative approach (the Army) needs to win the future fight."

Rather than making vehicle operators into data entry specialists, BPR focused on the user experience to consider where and how all performers of processes interact within EBS-C. Equipment operators and material handlers may be passively generating data for a material solution through automated processes and hardware to transparently capture physical actions without operator involvement. Material solution users may be directly processing transactions. Process performers in non-transactional planning roles may be consuming and analyzing information in external ana-

lytic tools. User experience and HCD considerations will be integrated directly into BPR workshops to reshape the core processes with "People First," not just as a software task to build a User Interface at the end.

The EBS-C motto to be "As commercial as possible, As military as necessary" drives how the MFCT and Program Executive Office-Enterprise Information System teams re-think and revise how they currently execute operations so the EBS-C effort can leverage, to the maximum extent practicable, commercial off-the-shelf solutions.

EBS-C offers a holistic view that examines how well people, policy, processes, and technologies integrate across organizations. While increasing organization efficiency, it will also provide integration of equipment and inventory material data for tactical transportation planning, development of organizational equipment lists, cube and tonnage requirements, and special handling requirements. Currently, all this data might be housed in different systems, but under one roof, EBS-C can expect to remove barriers to work and naturally integrate transactions with work pro-

cesses.

This is an exciting time for EBS-C to assist the Army in its modernization efforts. In doing so, it welcomes participation from all teammates and stakeholders. Input is also needed from the Army's operational force – across all three components, and the civilian workforce – as EBS-C continues to implement solutions and drive change.

About the Authors:

Chris Lindstrom is the Operations Deputy Director for Enterprise Business Systems-Convergence (EBS-C) leading the reengineering of the Army's ERP systems to converge and modernize the defense business systems operating environment to provide a modernized warfighting capability that enables integrated and auditable sustainment operations from the strategic support area to the tactical edge of the battlefield, enabling decision-making by Soldiers, the civilian workforce, and leaders at echelon. After earning a bachelor's degree in Electrical Engineering and a master's degree in Computer Engineering, Lindstrom started his career at National Cash Register (NCR) as an integrated circuit engineer, where he was introduced to Process Engineering and Total Quality Management (TQM). Building on a passion for reengineering and continuous improvement, Lindstrom has transformed organizations in multiple industries including government entities at the federal and state levels.

Colonel Matthew A. Price is the Executive Office for Enterprise Business Systems-Convergence, an Army program aimed at converging the Army's Defense Business Systems by 2032. An Orlando, FL native, he began his military career in April 1992 in the Army Reserves until he received his commissioning as an Ordnance Officer from the University of Florida ROTC program. His civilian education includes a Bachelor of Science degree in Environmental Engineering (Univ. of Florida), Master's degree in Business Administrative (Saint Martin's University, Washington state), Military Arts and Science Master's Degree (School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth) and Master's in Strategic Studies from the Army War College.

POWER PROJECTION

Immediate Power Projection from an Intermediate Staging Base

By CW2 Erik Hodge and CW2 Kiara Shishido

With the recent activation and employment of forces forward to quell aggression, assist and evacuate the American Citizens, Green Card Holders and Refugees from Afghanistan, 1st Brigade Combat Team (1BCT), 82nd Airborne Division was called upon, once again. Much like the employment of the Immediate Response Force (IRF) of 2020, and lessons learned during the 2nd Brigade Combat Team (2BCT) OIR deployment and redeployment, there are seams and gaps in planning, conducting and finalizing movement of Paratroopers and cargo. The scope of time, effort, work and supervision for any movement is often miscalculated and the implied tasks often cause a short suspense for all Commanders. Using the 82nd Airborne Division as a microcosm of the Army as a whole; we can extrapolate common gaps at the tactical, organizational and strategic levels with purposed solutions. From a Mobility Warrant Officer perspective there are improvement in processes at the tactical, operational, and strategic level.

Regardless of the retrospective analysis corresponding to the execution, 1BCT, Outload Support Elements (OSE) with assistance from the Air Force and Joint Base Charleston, SC (JBC) Support accomplished a logistical feat. In less than 6 days, the OSE successfully deployed over 2400 Paratroopers and 1.5 million pounds of equipment to various locations. Fort Bragg has structured elements to support the out loading Brigade during the out load process. These elements consist of both aligned 82nd Airborne Division units and 18 Airborne Corps separates to lead the nodes necessary for the immediate deployment of elements requiring shared understanding of the selected Brigades plan, creating unmatched training opportunities and the ability to globally project power quickly.

Background: Pope Army Airfield (PAAF) was undergoing required maintenance, thus causing a shift for the IRF outload to JBC as an Intermediate Staging Base (ISB). This added logistical requirements that we as a Division, had not calculated into the immediate outload requirement to support fast and agile disposition relative to global response. 1BCT had conducted an abundance of successful Deployment Readiness Exercises (DREs), and with those lessons learned the team charged into the activation.

From the tactical lens, the common understanding of movement requirements at the Company, Troop, and Battery Level of what right looks like and why certain tasks are accomplished in a specific order. During an IRF activation, speed is of the essence to allow for the Commander and COCOM to strategically place desired combat power. Each item that requires transportation requires a cargo movement packet containing the required transportation documentation obligated for movement on any type of strategic asset. A standardized cargo movement packet with the understanding from the fire team level of how to properly complete a common transportation documentation would allow for the ownership of the process at the lowest level. Within basics of transportation documentation, having properly trained personnel who are comfortable with the tasks at hand is a requirement. The low density, high demand additional duty of a certified Technical Transportation of Hazardous Material (AMMO-62) is a federal certification; this individual can certify all hazardous cargo and ammunition for movement on all means and methods of transportation. Though HAZMAT is one of the most important duties, there are other duties tied to the success behind movement.

From the standardization of cargo movement packets to small steps to aid the Commanders prior to activation will allow a smooth

inspection process. As cargo was processed, trends became apparent that at the tactical level, drivers and truck commanders did not understand the requirements and processes for transportation. From a mission executioner's perspective, this was not a failure of the logistics team it was at the unit level. We ask Company Commanders to have accountability, train with, and care for Paratroopers and equipment. We do not properly explain the process and requirements to fit their scope of vision. A better understanding of the "why" prior to full execution will bridge the knowledge gap. As units arrive at the ISB, identifying aircraft chalks within the Priority Vehicle List (PVL) will close the gap within the planning and execution hand off and the convoy commanders will have better concept of aircraft departure. It is pivotal that leaders at all levels understand the plan and the role they play - shaping the out load at the desired speed.

From the Organizational perspective, cargo was rallied for convoy by the OSE Team Move, eighty percent of cargo was convoyed to JBC in serials of twenty-five pieces of rolling stock with an expedited convoy clearance requests (DD1265 and DD1266) approved by state DMC. Prior to departing Fort Bragg the specified tasks of completing and starting movement via the PVL were established to prioritize lift for the most effective employment of combat power. In a standard deployment, cargo would depart with the In-transit Visibility (ITV) Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Tag and a Military Shipping Label (MSL). Due to the emergent need of the equipment, RFID Tags and MSLs were flown to the ISB for application. Upon arrival at JBC, rolling stock would marshal in chalk order based on PVL at the Marshaling and Staging Area (MASA), three miles from the Arrival Departure Aerial Control Group (ADACG) and called forward by the OSE and a Brigade representative for finaliza-

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tion of inspection which included verification of the all dimensional data.

Efficiency and control could be grown with the implementation of "Chalk Guides" which are OSE personnel who understand the system as identified in Army Technical Publication 3-35 (Deployment and Redeployment Manual). The purpose would be to guide the deploying unit through the process. One person associated to one chalk to lead the deploying unit through initial staging at the MASA, movement to the ADACG, though the dimensional verification process, the Air Force Joint Inspection and finally to the ready line awaiting load. The overall task would be based on the amount of inspection lanes available. For continuous operations, multiple shifts would be required, with Non-Commissioned Officers as MASA and ADACG leads. Allowing the standard work flow of at the MASA,


and ADACG to continue while updates are fed to node leadership.

From a strategic lens, this was the first time that we utilized the Airlift Integrated Interface (A2I) system for a non-standard deployment of equipment establishing valuable lessons and implementing non-standard operations into COCOM standard practices. The A2I and Joint Operations, Planning and Execution System (JOPES) work to process and validate lift requirements for Air Mobility Command (AMC). Establishing the ability to project capabilities from an ISB, to locations that are unknown and assembling the package simultaneously insinuates that all roles must be clear and concise to posture. The flexibility in the system would require the purposed change to the FORSCOM Standard Unit Line Number (ULN) Structure. ULNs are collectively built by Unit Identification Code (UIC), geographic locations and dates, any variant in those specifications requires a different ULN.

During this out load, priorities were attempting to be set based off of a specific piece of cargo however, it was not reflecting in JOPES or Transportation Coordinators' Automated Information Movement System (TCAIMS). Utilizing A2I, we cannot simply import a ULN and segregate cargo individually. All cargo assigned to that ULN must be loaded.

The process begins with an annual requirement to validate all rolling stock and containers on hand into TCAIMS. As changes take place units are required to update and submit to FORSCOM to provide a clear picture of a units' capability. When a unit assumes IRF, generic ULNs are assigned and units are once again required to update their Organizational Equipment List and assign all deployable cargo to their Unit Deployment List (UDL) further projecting deployment capabilities utilizing the structured ULN provided.

Current v. Proposed ULN Structure for IRF Combat Packages



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On short notice as it has been seen three times since 2020 on Fort Bragg, a unit is alerted and activated and representatives fail to start the process from the beginning once a mission has been assigned. The submission of the UDL to validate IRF has no mission tied to the UDL. Once a mission has been assigned, it is the unit's responsibility to reassign the cargo needed for that mission by ULN and lift. At this time, the unit movement officer as well as the Mobility Warrant Officer should acknowledge additional ULNs are needed to meet prioritization requirements if Commander's will "cherry pick" cargo to create a load based on the development of the mission as units are pushing into theater. This is not something considered as paratroopers are pushing forward. Instead, units attempt to deploy as cargo was previously designated causing delays as we begin the A2I process and attempt to request strategic lift. This delay also affects the supported Combatant Commander as there is zero visibility of what is on ground once ULNs

are "cherry picked". The utilization of one entire ULN is required. Using the same ULN multiple times cannot be done as there is no visibility of cargo details in A2I to remove items not traveling on the ULN- establishing the wrong combat picture. That process is conducted in TCAIMS. Combatant Commanders do not use A2I to see what is in their battle space.

The standard FORSCOM ULN Structure uses the seventh character as a lift requirement identifier. The standard "XXXXX01" for surface lift, "XXXXX02" for passengers (PAX), "XXXXX03" for C-17/C-5 cargo, which is typically rolling stock and sensitive item (SI) containers, "XXXXX04" Commercially compatible cargo. When deploying in an environment with the current systems in place, the entire "XXXXX03" ULN has to be load planned and inputted into A2I for lift requirement as a whole unit. Meaning, the commander does not have the flexibility to build combat power from multiple and partial ULNs simultaneously. Gun Trucks would have to move with SI containers; at times pushing

Gun Trucks only is required.

ULN structure could be re-structured to increase combat power flexibility, vice deploying all cargo associated to a Company Military Table of Organization and Equipment. The sixth character as "0-9" for rolling stock and "A-Z" for containers. By splitting the cargo that has a C-17/C-5 requirement for lift a Commander could select specific UICs/ULNs to move forward while following the Current Policy and Doctrine Outlined in DTR, JOPES Vol.3, and IAW A2I. The change to ULN structure and character designation would not require adjustments to any current standing products, policy or doctrine. While this shift would cause more JOPES time for the Mobility Officers, Operations Officers, Logistics Officers and Civilian logisticians, the impact to the movement team would allow more flexibility to the Commander on ground in the fight.


About the Author:

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Proposed ULN Structure

ULNs are collectively built by UIC, Geographic Locations and Dates— any variant in those specifications requires a different ULN.



Examples:

XXX1AB3 = 1-325 AIR (White Falcons), Alpha Co, Containers, C-17/C-5 required (SI Container)
 XXX5T01 = 2-319 AFAR (Black Falcons), HHB, surface lift
 XXX3D04 = 2-508 PIR (2-Fury), Delta Co, 747 Cargo
 XXX7C03 = 37 BEB (Green Eagles), Charlie Co, Rolling Stock, C-17/C-5 (TCN/STT)

BORN OF DESERATE NECESSITY

Origins of the Need for The Red Ball Express

By Timothy M. Gilhool—U.S. Army
CASCOM Historian

For U.S. Army Transportation Corps soldiers, one of the most famous episodes in their own military history is the Red Ball Express. A massive undertaking involving the planning, coordination, and execution of massive convoys hauling much needed fuel and other supplies to the rapidly advancing Allied armies in Northern France during the Second World War. The operation has grown much in fame over the decades, with many articles, books, and even a 1952 Hollywood movie to its credit. More recently, the operation was the focus a documentary film from Army University Press. The fact that the majority of the drivers for this operation were African-American soldiers operating in what was a segregated American military at the time makes the mission even more poignant. But for all the martial glory associated with this effort, the Red Ball Express has a dark secret, that it was born not from deliberate planning and flawless execution. Instead, the Red Ball Express is the product of absolute desperate necessity to sustain a massive military advance that what on the edge of collapse.



LTG J.C.H. Lee was a controversial figure during WW2 in Europe. He served as the commander for the ETO COMMZ.

(Photo - <https://militaryhistorynow.com/2018/04/26/meet-john-c-h-lee-the-forgotten-logistical-mastermind-behind-the-allied-invasion-of-europe/>)



African-Americans comprised over 70% of the drivers for the Red Ball Express.

(Photo- <https://atloa.org/logistics-history-the-red-ball-express/>)

A Brief Primer on American Logistics – Today versus during World War II

The current doctrine and more importantly force structure of U.S. Army units employed now in the third decade of the 21st Century is built on the foundations of many hard lessons over the years. The brutal demands and lethality of Large Scale Combat Operations requires units to be self-sufficient to the maximum extent possible. In just the past several years, the Army has aligned division sustainment brigades (DSB) directly under their supported Division, as well as redesignated the formerly separate combat support sustainment battalions (CSSB) as division support sustainment battalions (DSSB) subordinate to the DSB. Since the advent of modular brigade combat teams (BCT) in the mid-2000s, every maneuver battalions have had a forward support company (FSC) in direct support of its logistics requirements. This layered, reinforcing levels of sustainment is deliberate and meant to give maneuver commander the capability to move, repair, treat, and supply their formation at the lowest echelon possible. But in 1944, both this type of

force structure and associated doctrine was not the case.

The U.S. Army at the beginning of World War II adopted the 'Triangular' Division concept for force structure. For the infantry divisions, this meant that three companies per battalion, three battalions to a regiment (in lieu of today's BCT), and three regiments to a division. At the division level, there would be a single Quartermaster company and Ordnance (Maintenance) company for the whole formation. At the regimental level, organic to the unit was a single service company, which provided supply, transportation, and maintenance support to the three line battalions and any other enablers attached to the unit. To add to that company's workload, the service company commander was dual-hatted as the Regimental S-4. This lack of sustainment capability at division and below meant that vast majority of sustainment, especially in the area of movement and transportation, had to be provided by non-divisions units.

Further complicated the matter were the command and support relationships adopted by Supreme

BORN OF DESPERATE NECESSITY

Origins of the Need for The Red Ball Express



but also was close to the deep water port of Cherbourg. It also had a well-developed road and rail network, which had been deliberately not targeted by Allied air power prior to the invasion. Unfortunately for the Allies, though the hard fighting and sacrifices at D-Day in June 1944 secured the operational lodgment, the Germans sabotaged large portions of Cherbourg, rendering it useless for many months. For the all of the summer and most of the fall 1944, all supplies and reinforcements had to come over the beach. Though the Allies had constructed two artificial harbors, known as Mulberries, to assist in this effort, one of them was destroyed after just two weeks, leaving just a single harbor capable of receiving ships for download.

In addition to the sustainment infrastructure challenges, Allied battlefield successes was bringing additional unanticipated pressure on systems and equipment. For over six weeks after the D-Day landings in early June 1944, the Allies had made minimal progress against German defenses. Aided by the local Norman hedgerows (or *Bocage* in French), the German *Wehrmacht* were able to stymie any forward movement. This changed after Operation COBRA in

The Red Ball Express got its nickname from the red circular dot that was used in some civilian transportation networks to designate high priority cargo.

(Photo - <http://edchnm.gmu.edu/abmceducation-dev/understandingsacrifice/activity/riding-along-red-ball-express>)

Allied Commander GEN Dwight D. Eisenhower in the European Theater of Operations (ETO). All sustainment in the theater fell under the aegis of a single organization and single commander – the ETO Communications Zone (COMMZ) and LTG J.C.H. Lee. His only boss was GEN Eisenhower, not the senior American ground combat commander, LTG Omar Bradley. LTG Lee is the subject of a recent (2018) biography by author Hank H. Cox entitled *The General Who Wore Six Stars: The Inside Story of John C. H. Lee*. While credited with many impressive accomplishments both before and during the war, his prickly personality, overt religiosity, and what would be described today as a ‘toxic’ leadership style made the task of sustaining the ETO’s armies even more difficult. That that the senior sustainment officer (Lee) and senior maneuver officer (Bradley) in theater couldn’t stand each other did not bode well for coordinating supply, medical, maintenance, and transportation support in a complex, lethal fight.

A Perfect Storm against ETO Sustainment

When the Allies planned the invasion of France and liberation of Western Europe from occupation by Nazi Germany, their based their decision on where to land on one primary factor – sustainment. The Normandy coast afforded not only long, flat beaches where landing craft could bring large numbers men and equipment ashore,



Army University Press, with support from the CASCAM Command Historians, recently released a documentary on the Red Ball Express.

(Photo - <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Educational-Services/Documentaries/France-44-The-Red-Ball-Express/>)

BORN OF DESERATE NECESSITY

Origins of the Need for The Red Ball Express

late July 1944, the massive American offensive that employed strategic bombers to attack and shatter their defensive lines. This operational success led to the furthest, fastest advance in American military history. Led by LTG George Patton and his Third Army, the Allies blew past all expectations, liberating the French capitol of Paris less than a month later. Detailed sustainment planning prior to the invasion had assumed that the Allies would reach the outskirts of Paris by mid September. Instead, they found themselves hundreds of miles further than planned approaching the German border, and unfortunately, running out of gas.

An Ad-hoc Crisis Response to Something They Should Have Seen Coming

In several of our more recent conflicts, the United States Army has seen the merits of conducting a tactical pause to move sustainment forward on the battlefield. This happened both during the advance of the 3rd Infantry Division in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003, and during the Ground War during Operation DESERT STORM in 1991. Perhaps one of the reasons that this practice was well established in both doctrine and execution was that it wasn't done in France in August 1944. In order to continue the rapid advance and pursuit of the retreating Germans, GEN Eisenhower decided to abandon the planned logistical pause on the Seine River and to continue towards the Rhine River – Germany's last frontier. Why did he do this?

Historians have debated for decades what drove Eisenhower's decision calculus, but part of it may derive from the failure of sustainment command relationships. Sustainment at all levels has the critical responsibility to know in detail their requirements, capabilities, and more importantly limitations. Did LTG Lee and his subordinates clearly articu-

late to Eisenhower, Bradley, and Patton how much fuel they could deliver, or what stresses already existed on the military supply chain? If so, did those senior officers listen, given the dysfunctional professional relationships between COMMZ and the supported combat commanders? Regardless, the result that history records is that American tanks literally ran out of gas on the battlefield.

The response to what some Historians call the 'Supply Crisis of August 1944' is known today more colloquially as the Red Ball Express. The establishment of dedicated one-way routes, the stand-up of dedicated Transportation divisions to manage and track convoy operations, and the incorporation of every available transportation asset are all aspects of the operation. In many ways, the Red Ball Express is the birth of what we would recognize as multifunctional logistics, with Quartermaster Truck companies, Transportation Corps movement control elements, and Ordnance maintenance elements all working under a single command, instead of being stove-piped by their branches as was the practice at the time. The techniques and procedures developed during the operation, along with the efforts and sacrifice of the thousand of drivers who moved the supplies forward, would be replicated later in the war, as well as formally incorporated in Army doctrine. The Red Ball Express would help mitigate, though not eliminate, Allied supply difficulties. By mid September 1944, though, the character of the war in Europe would change again, with Allied defeats in Holland during Operation MARKET-GARDEN and the tougher defenses along the German border. When the important port of Antwerp was finally liberated and secured by November 1944, Allied sustainment challenges would mostly disappear.

So beyond the courage and sacrifice of the men who drove the Red Ball Express, what is the lesson that we should learn from this episode in our History? For Transporters and all Sustainment profession-

als, they must remember that *relationships* are the foundation of bringing support to the Warfighter. Those in the Combat Arms must know and trust both our skills and our professional judgment. This is something you build everyday with every interaction. When the time comes, will you have built the foundations to best support and sustain your units, or will you have to attempt another Red Ball Express?

For more information on the Red Ball Express, the Northern France campaign, and American logistics during World War II, see:

David W. Hogan, Jr., *The United States Army in World War II – Northern France*, Center for Military History, <https://history.army.mil/html/books/072/72-30/index.html>

David P. Colley, *The Road to Victory: The Untold Story of World War II's Red Ball Express*. Potomac Books Inc., 2001.


Hank H. Cox, *The General Who Wore Six Stars: The Inside Story of John C. H. Lee*. Potomac Books Inc., 2018.

Rick Atkinson, *THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT: The War in Western Europe, 1944-1945, VOLUME THREE OF THE LIBERATION TRILOGY*, Henry Holt and Co., 2013

PUBLICATION AND DOCTRINE

ATP 3-35.1 and ATP 4-16 Updates

This year has been busy for the Deployment Standards Branch Team with the publication of ATP 3-35.1, *Army Prepositioned Operations*, Change 1 to ATP 3-35.1, and ATP 4-16, *Army Movement Control*. Both publications are available on the Army Publishing Directorate website (<https://armypubs.army.mil/>). Additionally, the latest revision of ATP 3-35, *Army Deployment and Redeployment*, is scheduled to hit the streets in late Winter 2022/early Spring 2023. The following is a preview of the major changes to the publications.



Coming soon (Winter 2022/Spring 2023).


The ongoing revision of ATP 3-35, *Army Deployment and Redeployment* will update the Army's authoritative doctrine for planning, preparing, executing, and assessing deployment and redeployment operations. It applies to the range of military operations and is consistent with joint (Joint Publication 3-35) and multinational doctrine within the constraints of established higher-level Army doctrine

(ADP 3-0 and FM 3-0). The revision aligns deployment doctrine with ADP 3-0 and FM 3-0 in support of multidomain operations and large-scale combat operations, updates deployment planning and activities at each level of warfare, includes a discussion of the mobilization process from a joint doctrine perspective, details changes to power projection platforms and mobilization force generation installation operations, and includes a discussion of deployment programs.

The Army released change 1 to ATP 3-35.1, *Army Prepositioned Operations (APS)*, on November 28, 2022. Change 1 was an HQDA-directed change to capture new guidance on managing APS ASL CLIX stocks and provide update to the USATA test and diagnostic procedures. The bulk of the April 2022 revision remains as published. ATP 3-35.1 provides doctrine for commanders and staff at all levels on the employment of APS to support Joint and Army force requirements. Both recent updates provide the foundation for commanders to plan and execute APS operations to meet the demands of any expeditionary operational environment. Some updates to the April 2022 version include the addition of the APS-7 Africa Command activity set, a discussion on pre-positioned equipment sets configured for combat to enable rapid combat power build and integration, and an appendix containing an updated list of automated systems that support APS operations.

The Army published its latest revision of ATP 4-16, *Movement Control*, in April 2022. The new publica-

tion better defines the movement control process and identifies the roles and responsibilities of organizations at the theater, corps, and division echelon and how they support large-scale combat operations. It also describes movement control as a process that is not confined to a single unit but executed by a tiered network of organizations that provide a method for commanders to influence movement in their operational area.



The Deployment Standards Team is always looking for ways to improve the publications and make them more responsive to the Force. If you have questions, comments, or suggestions, send us an email @ usarmy.lee.cascom.mbx.dpmo-ds@army.mil

CAREER NEWS

BATTALION COMMAND SELECTION LIST

WARRANT OFFICER PROMOTIONS

SERGEANTS MAJOR ACADEMY SELECTEES

BN CMD CSL

U.S. Army Transportation Corps congratulates 2024 selects

LTC Michael S. Abbott	MAJ(P) Gregory H. Fassett	LTC Travis A. Nedderson
LTC Henry J. Aguigui	MAJ(P) Matthew D. Ferretti	MAJ(P) Eric S. Nelson
MAJ(P) Robert B. Alexander	MAJ(P) Timothy P. Fitzgerald	MAJ(P) Sean A. Nice
LTC James I. Alfaro	MAJ(P) Sheila M. Flagg	LTC Mihails Ovsijenko
MAJ(P) Erik A. Amstutz	LTC Mary Fullenkamp	MAJ(P) Phillip Palomo II
MAJ(P) Eric D. Baca	LTC Jefferey V. Geraci	LTC Vernie Y. Param
LTC April L. Baptiste-Robertson	LTC Jason M. Goldstein	MAJ(P) Celina S. Pargo
LTC Matthew B. Booth	LTC Philip J. Granados	MAJ(P) John M. Paul
LTC Jillian R. Bourque	LTC David M. Gregory	MAJ(P) Jason D. Phillips
LTC Justin N. Bowman	LTC Nathaniel J. Groves	MAJ(P) Howard W. Reardon
MAJ(P) Catory D. Bradley	MAJ(P) Laura A. Hamilton	MAJ(P) Ashley M. Ritchey
LTC Orna T. Bradley-Swanson	LTC Ross M. Hertlein	MAJ(P) Eduardo L. Rivera
LTC John W. Burnett	MAJ(P) Clinton L. Hopkins	LTC Aaron A. Rogers
LTC Lauren A. Cabral	MAJ(P) Andrew S. Horn	MAJ(P) Trevor D. Rowlands
MAJ(P) Hannah K. Caldwell	LTC George E. Horne	LTC Jason A. Russell
MAJ(P) Franklin B. Carr	LTC Jed W. Hudson	LTC Christopher J. Sadoski
MAJ(P) Stephen M. Coley	MAJ(P) Mitchell T. Hunt	LTC Nyraliz Sanabria-Rivera
LTC Nancy A. Colsia	MAJ(P) Alexis D. Jackson	MAJ(P) Angela P. Somnuk
LTC Jason M. Day	MAJ(P) Larry W. Jewett	MAJ(P) Ryan T. Steuer
LTC Kimberly N. Defour	MAJ(P) Julia Johnson	LTC Matthew W. Swim
LTC Jeffrey L. Delp	MAJ(P) Brian C. Jones	MAJ(P) Frank R. Talbert
LTC Jennifer M. Dembeck	MAJ(P) Jonathan J. Kalczynski	LTC Steven C. Taylor
MAJ(P) Michael R. Dembeck	MAJ(P) Kevin M. Matheny	LTC Waldrell J. Thomas Jr.
LTC Frederick T. Dequina	LTC Jessica M. McCarthy	LTC Brian E. Thompson
LTC Matthew J. Derfler	MAJ(P) Erikson A. McCleary	LTC Michael N. Tiffany
LTC Travis S. Drayton	MAJ(P) Michael B. McDaniel	LTC Joshua Unverzagt
LTC Sean P. Dunstan	MAJ(P) Jeremy T. McNeil	LTC Jeremia M. Van
LTC Jason H. Eaton	MAJ(P) Immanuel S. Mgana	MAJ(P) Michael W. Zdrojesky
MAJ(P) Brandon S. Ebel	LTC Jonathan C. Nagle	
LTC Craig A. Falk	LTC Jonathan K. Neal	

WARRANT OFFICER PROMOTION

U.S. Army Transportation Corps congratulates 2022 promotions



CW2 Ronald A. Barker
CW2 Robert A. Hamilton
CW2 Micah J. Innis
CW2 Benjamin R. Tate
CW2 Khadijah F. Gamer
CW2 James M. Hannam

CW2 Christian Leoncamball
CW2 Natalie Taylor-Amaro
CW2 Richard G. Getchell
CW2 John E. Ingram
CW2 Norman L. Stentz
CW2 Samuel J. Vaughn



CW3 Judson D. Albright
CW3 Leshawn G. Cooper
CW3 Robert D. Gardner
CW3 Daniel D. McMillen
CW3 Jay W. Turner
CW3 Olumide S. Awosogba
CW3 Delia S. Fernandez

CW3 Jeffrey T. Johnson
CW3 Trevor A. Morden
CW3 Steven W. Brown
CW3 Jonathan H. Gallon
CW3 James A. Leblanc
CW3 Katrina C. Robinson
CW3 Hee S. Yi



CW4 Paul T. Collins
CW4 Nicholas T. Laferte

SERGEANTS MAJOR ACADEMY

U.S. Army Transportation Corps congratulates Class 74 Selectees

MSG Daniel Castanon
MSG Kendrick Daniels
MSG Wendi Jeter
MSG Kevin Jones

MSG Jason Quintero
MSG Michael Wambsgans
MSG Mindy Williams
MSG Shawn Wood

"CHIEF, HOW DO I...?"


By CW4 Olga Negron

"...Find an Aerial Port Code for my upcoming movement/deployment?"

Did you know that there is a [one-stop shop](#) for all types of "codes" needed for standard deployment processes and you don't need a CAC to access?

There's codes for Aerial Ports, Cargo Type, Container Service Type, Helicopter Configuration, Palletized Transportation Unit Cargo Configuration, Transportation Priority, and Water Ports.

Use this site when you are stuck fulfilling documentations, forms or in the Joint/ Army Defense Transportation Systems. Codes are needed to keep moving the force forward!



Scan Here for Port Codes

SHARE YOUR KNOWLEDGE

Are you an NCO or Warrant Officer with unique and useful knowledge you want the force to know?

Send a quick write-up to with the Subject, "Chief/SGT, How Do I?" to: usar-my.lee.tradoc.mbx.transportation-proponency-office@army.mil

TWI ANNOUNCEMENT

The Training with Industry (TWI) Program is a work-experience program to provide an extensive exposure to managerial techniques and industrial procedures within corporate America to competitively selected officers and non-commissioned officers. Training received is normally not available either through the military school system or civilian university system. Following the participants' tenure in the TWI Program, they are placed in a validated utilization assignment for two years. Participants also incur an active duty service obligation of three for one computed in days.

Transportation Corps FY23 Training with Industry Programs

Officer: 90A CPT - United Parcel Services (UPS), Atlanta, GA

Warrant Officer: 880A - Crowley Marine Inc, Seattle, WA

Officer and Warrant Officer Application Process:

- Interested CPTs and 880A CW3/CW4s interested in applying for TWI please contact the Transportation Proponent Office at:

usarmy.lee.tradoc.mbx.transportation-proponency-office@army.mil

Enlisted:

88H - Virginia International Gateway, Portsmouth, VA

88M - United Parcel Services (UPS), Atlanta, GA

** 88Ns are eligible to apply for either program but must meet requirements to participate in the program

- Eligibility Requirements: NCOES graduate for required grade; Time in service is 8-17 years.

Enlisted Program Key Dates:

Application Deadline: 27 January 2023

Selections will be made by end of March 2023

Notifications: Mid-April 2023

Program Start Date: August 2023

Program End Date: 12 months after Program Start Date

Enlisted Application Process

- Enlisted Applicants must sent packets to HRC, Military Schools Branch, usarmy.knox.hrc.mbx.epmd-ncoes-twi-program@army.mil

Application Consists of: DA Form 4187, Soldier Record Brief (SRB), Letter of Recommendation from a COL in the NCO's current chain of command, Last 5 NCOERs, and TWI Memorandum of Understanding

Application requirement details are located at: <https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/TWI%20Eligibility%20and%20Application%20Requirements>



AWARDS ANNOUNCEMENTS

NDTA Military Unit Awards 2023

Eligibility: Units from the Active Duty, U.S. Army Reserve, and the National Guard can compete.

Submission Deadline: 01 June 2023 to the Regional President (if appropriate) or 15 June 2023 to National Headquarters

For More Information: Visit the [NDTA Awards Handbook](#).



Deployment Excellence Award 2023

Eligibility: Categories for small (Co and below) and large (BN and above)

Competition Period: 01 OCT 21–31 SEP 22

Submission Deadline: 31 January 2023

For More Information: visit the [DEA Portal \(CAC Required\)](#) or contact the DEA Program Manager at 804-765-0917



Transportation Corps "Of the Year", Distinguished Member of the Regiment, and Hall of Fame Awards

Eligibility: Active Duty and U.S. Army Reserve, and the National Guard can compete.

Submission Deadline: 15 February 2023

For More Information: visit [Regimental Awards Program | U.S. Army Transportation Corps and Transportation School | Fort Lee, Virginia](#)



TCRA ANNOUNCEMENT

US Army Transporters,

Start a Local Transportation Corps Regimental Association (TCRA) in your area. Local chapters are the primary vehicle by which the association seeks to promote the Transportation Corps and to enhance the professionalism of Transporters. The national organization provides supporting resources and incentives; the chapters plan and conduct innovative programs tailored to local needs, but designed to accomplish the Association's overall purpose and objectives.

Contact us today at and we will get you started:
chapters@tcragt-association.org



CTSSB PARTICIPATION

TRANSPORTERS WANTED!

On behalf of Colonel Beth A. Behn, Chief of Transportation (COT) and CSM Randy T. Brown, Regimental Command Sergeants Major, we would like to take this opportunity to solicit your support and participation in upcoming critical task site selection boards CTSSBs.

In a continuing effort to keep our CMF 88 Enlisted, Officer and Warrant Officer MOSs current and relevant, the U.S. Army Transportation Proponent/School conducts periodic CTSSBs to identify those individual-level tasks (at echelon) that are critical for our Operational Force Soldiers' job performance and the successful accomplishment of the respective unit's mission(s) during large-scale operations (LSCO) in a multidomain operations (MDO) environment.

The call to be a CTSSB participant is not an easy task and one that will have many challenges associated with it, since what you and your fellow board members decide during the execution of a CTSSB, will affect the Transportation Corps' Soldiers/Leaders and the Army for several years to come.

Participation in CTSSBs demands only the best of the best Transporters and someone who has held a wide variety of positions and possesses vast skills, knowledges and abilities within their respective MOS and AOC. It is also preferred that participants have recent Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations and/or operational deployment experience within Sustainment Brigades, Brigade Support Battalions, or any echelon above Brigade units.

Listed below is list of upcoming CTSSB for FY23:

-88M CTSSB: 26-30 Jun 2023

-88N CTSSB: 7-11 Aug 2023

-88H CTSSB: 21-25 Aug 2023

If you should have any questions about CTSSBs and/or want to know more about becoming a CTSSB participant, please do not hesitate to contact any one of the primary point of contacts listed below.

Mr. Joseph M. Ozoroski, Transportation Training Development (TRANS-TD), U.S. Army Transportation School (USATSCH) Email: joseph.m.ozoroski.civ@army.mil

Ms. Sheila L. Robinson, Highway-Movements Branch Chief, TRANS-TD DEPT, USATSCH

Email: sheila.l.robinson6.civ@army.mil

Mr. Willie L. Hemphill, Watercraft Terminal Operations Branch Chief, TRANS-TD DEPT, USATSCH

Email: willie.l.hemphill.civ@army.mil

CPT Rashida J. Housen, Officer Education System (OES) Team Lead, Highway-Movements Branch Chief, TRANS-TD DEPT, USATSCH Email: rashida.j.housen.mil@army.mil

UPCOMING TC CONNECTS

- **22 1100 EST FEB 23:** CTSSBs / Modernization Efforts / Army Watercraft
 - **17 1100 EST MAY 23:** AIT, PME Training Feedback (T)

Stay abreast of the latest and join the MS Teams TC Connect group at this link:

<https://dod.teams.microsoft.us/l/channel/19%3adod%3afe66526a12ee4af49f260e9bfd914046%40thread.tacv2/General?groupId=a0d46373-04da-4619-9264-009ebffb3e81&tenantId=fae6d70f-954b-4811-92b6-0530d6f84c43>

WANT TO WRITE FOR THE SPEARHEAD?

As the Transportation Corps modernizes our equipment, training, doctrine, and formations, we must continually modernize how we engage the wider Army. The Spearhead seeks new voices and content to reach a multifaceted audience of NCOs, warrant officers, and officers.

This is an opportunity for those experienced voices to shed light on interesting topics and concepts related to Transportation that

The Spearhead follows the same submission guidelines Army Sustainment Magazine uses to include the Permission to Publish, Author Bio, and OPSEC Review Form found below and at: <https://alu.army.mil/alog/submissions.html>

Guidance for Submissions:

- ◆ Identify theme you are writing and whether it's a feature (1000-1500 words) or short article (500-600 words).
- ◆ Write for an audience of SSGs-MSGs, WO1s-CW3s, 2LTs-MAJs. What is the "So What" of your information? How will it help that audience? Keep the Writing simple and straightforward.
- ◆ Do not assume that those reading the article have the background knowledge on the subject.
- ◆ Attribute all quotes to their correct sources.
- ◆ Ensure the article's information is technically accurate.
- ◆ Identify all acronyms, technical terms, and publications.
- ◆ If you've submitted the article elsewhere, please let us know at the time of submission and to which publication it's been submitted.

WHAT DO YOU WANT TO SEE IN OUR NEXT ISSUES?

SUBMISSIONS & IDEAS

- ◆ Submit your article as an MS Word Document (.docx)
- ◆ Submit any photos, images, or charts as separate files in the highest resolution possible (1280 x 720 or higher) (.jpg or .tif)
- ◆ For photos, please include a caption of a specific unit, Soldier, action
- ◆ Submit signed forms (Permission to Publish, Author Bio, and OPSEC Review)

SEND ALL DOCUMENTATION AND FILES TO:

usarmy.lee.tradoc.mbx.transportation-proponency-office@army.mil

Questions? Call:

- ◆ 804-765-7288 / 7902



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