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About you the plane learn three to flying in live the low. with morning, Seconds in the Bill Army. later, Moore's I reached all hell snoring broke down woke loose. to nudge me again. him Some when I things heard you learn to live with in the Army. I reached down to nudge him when I heard the plane flying low. Seconds later, all hell broke loose.
Loud explosions shook the small string of railroad cars, the living quarters for our advanced unit of the 71 8th Railway Operating Battalion. The sharp chatter of machine guns merged with the sound of bullets ripping through the wooden cars.
We scrambled to the shelter of the few remaining walls of a railroad station and returned fire. Tracer bullets from our M1 rifles crisscrossed the night in fiery streams. On my left, I heard the chatter of Ervin Simpson's machine gun.
"We hit him! We hit him!" yelled Bill Moore.
"Naw, we didn't," another shouted. "He's flying away."
"Bet we scared the hell out of him," Simpson added.
Our casualties were few but devastating. Pfc. Thomas Dearing was badly wounded and Sgt. Howard Allen was killed. It was December 26, 1944. We were here in France to run railroads, but this was total war, and everyone and everything were fair game.

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Some members the 718th signal platoon somewhere in France. Seated, from left to right, are Ervin Simpson, Sgt. George Adams, and Bill Moore. Note: All photos in this article, except where noted, come from History of the 718th ROB Transportation Corps.

More draft civilian than notice. life, a year I'd In earlier, the received turbulent in U.S. my civilian life, I'd received my draft notice. In the turbulent days after Pearl Harbor, I'd wanted to join the Army Air Corps, but I had to consider my family's situation. My father was an alcoholic whose life had been shattered by his inability to support us during the Depression. My two sisters were still in school. We were receiving some government assistance, and my mother, a living saint, strived to hold the family together. Our hometown of Oswego, N.Y., had not yet recovered from the Depression. To help my family financially as long as I could, I decided to wait for the draft, went to Rochester, and found a job.

Once drafted, I had a week to wrap up my affairs. On September 30, 1943, 1 reported to Sgt. Decker at New York Central's Rochester station. About a dozen recruits were in our group. After he checked us in, he said, "Welcome to the U.S. Army. We're going to take a train trip, but I can't tell you where." Eventually we got to Camp Upton, a windy barren spot far out on Long Island. We took tests, attended classes, got inoculations, and between the tests did calisthenics and close-order drill. Just when my patriotic fervor was drooping, my name was called out. Next thing I knew, I was on another train, headed for Camp Plauche, New Orleans. In civilian life I had been making optical range finders for warships, but in January 1944 I found out that I had been assigned to the newly activated 7 1 8th Railway Operating Battalion.

U.S. military 2-8-0 locomotive are being prepared for service at the Newport Shops in South Whales, Great Britain, prior to being shipped accross the English Channel. The engines were first road-tested on Britain's Great Western Tailway by ROB and GWR locomotive crews.

The Big Four/New York Central was the sponsor of the 718th. The battalion, originally the 53rd Engineer Railway Operating Battalion Reserve, was made up of engineers, firemen, conductors, yard clerks, and dispatchers in civilian life, but I knew nothing about railroads or the tasks we would face. On February 23, 1944, we arrived at Camp Claiborne, 190 miles northwest of New Orleans. The camp was home to an Army-operated railroad named the Claiborne-Polk Military Railroad. Civilians didn't ride on that railroad. It was 50 miles of jolting tracks through unstable swampland, a fit place for training railway battalions and not much else.

A cadre of demolition experts, whom we called "the wrecking crew," was stationed on the C-P just to cause trouble. They used their skill often, ripping or blowing up track and switches, overturning boxcars, and cutting communications. A group of explosives experts from England added to the mischief. During our training, we handled 50 derailments and wrecks, all the while keeping a sharp eye out for the unlovable creatures from the swamp.

"A" Company installed and maintained the phones and the copper wires strung from pole to pole. I was a floater without a permanent job in "B" Company. One day I was watching a lineman climbing a pole. When he came down, I asked him what it was like up there.

"It's great," he said. "I'm looking down on the whole world, and if the wind is right, the wires sing with music, kind of like a harp."

His name was Ken Rockwell, but everyone called him Rocky. Slim like most linemen, Rocky had sharp eyes that could spot trouble a country mile away. His short reddish hair tried to stand straight up when his hat was off. He smiled easily, and later I would find out that he was a habitual joker. I told my friend from B Company, Max Belgrade, "I'd like to be a lineman."

"Not me," Max replied. "I don't like heights. Hey, why don't you talk to Sgt. Adams, I hear he's an all-right guy."

The sergeant said it was okay for me to transfer to A Company, but the move would have to wait until we arrived overseas - something about the "TO," or the Table of Organization so prized by Army brass, being frozen. That was the first time I heard anyone in authority say we were going overseas. Of course, we'd assumed that we weren't being trained to run railroads in the U.S.

After landing at Utah Beach, the 718th was dispatched to the tiny junction town of Folligny, where it repaired damaged track and rolling stock and established train service to help supply troops moving eastward toward Paris.

On zigzagging Camp July Claiborne 15, 1944, around the in the two 718th South trains, left on Camp Claiborne in two trains, zigzagging around the South on different routes (supposedly to confuse any spies), but arriving at the same terminal, Camp Miles Standish, Mass. By July 23, 1 had joined the long line of GIs moving up the swaying gangplank of the USS Mount Vernon. The ship loomed so large that it blocked our view of Boston Harbor, where American patriots dumped English tea in 1 777, and I wondered when I would touch American soil again.

The Mount Vernon was fast. On August 1, 1944, in just five days, we docked in the Firth of Clyde at Greenoch, Scotland. We were hustled aboard a waiting train and headed south. Our journey brought us to the village of St. Mêlions, on the English-Welsh border, where we waited for a number of days until being moved to Southampton, where a ship would take us across the English Channel. At dawn on August 15, we waded ashore on Utah Beach in Normandy, scene of the massive and bloody Allied D-Day invasion of Nazi-held France two months earlier.

We were taken south by truck, and by the end of the next day we had set up quarters at Folligny, a small town in Normandy with a large yard that connected the Atlantic port of Cherbourg with the rest of the French system. The 7 18th' s mission was to take control of the territory from Folligny south to Rennes. This included responsibility for maintaining the single track from Pontabault to Mayenne and from Ponterson to Fougeres, and double track from Folligny to Dol. There were French railroaders around the stations and yards, but we couldn't depend on them to run our trains, especially those going into combat zones. Once things settled down, we did pull the French railroadmen back in, but they always worked under U.S. supervision, and none of them ever worked for the signal platoon.

Before the arrival of the railway battalions, hundreds of motor trucks, known collectively as the "Red Ball Express," were driving day and night, transporting supplies to forward dispensing points called dumps. These convoys of trucks caught the fancy of the press, which gave them a great amount of enthusiastic coverage. This became a source of irritation with us, because the railway battalions got so little recognition. One boxcar held as much freight as 10 trucks did, and soon we were carrying the bulk of the supplies. And we had another advantage: the steam locomotives we used burned coal, not the precious gasoline needed for military vehicles.*

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* In its 81 days of operation, the Red Ball Express hauled an average of 5,086 tons per day; by November 1944, ROB trains in France were hauling 50,000 tons per day. Spearhead of Logistics. A History of the U.S. Army Transportation Corps (Washington, D.C., 1994), pp. 238, 247.

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Sgt. Adams had followed through on his promise to transfer me into the signal platoon of A Company. My training would be strictly on-the-job, but the sergeant did give me one piece of advice: "Always keep your knees away from the pole, so that your spikes don't rip out, because if they do, you're gonna burn that pole." In lineman's lingo, "burning" meant free-falling down the pole.

From the tech supply man, I received my lineman's gear: climbing irons, safety belt, long gloves, and pliers. The irons, or spikes, carried your entire weight as you jabbed them into the pole and used them like the rungs of a ladder. Because a lineman had to keep his knees and hips away from the pole, his arms were fully extended and his hands were around the pole. At the top, the lineman snapped his belt around the pole, freeing his hands to work. The spikes, of course, had to stay firmly driven in the wood if the lineman was to avoid being burned.

As with U.S. railroads, the French had trackside telephones. They used a positive block system, which meant that a train did not leave a station until the train ahead of it had passed the next station, as confirmed by a dispatcher. We linemen repaired copper wires damaged by bombs, artillery, and sabotage. We installed GI field phones connected to the copper lines by lead-in wires for our dispatchers. Our battery-operated field phones were encased in brown leather with a carrying strap. (The German phones were black.) We often carried phones aloft to check out the copper wires. Our phones had to be highly reliable; we didn't trust the French ones. As Rocky put it, "Those Frog phones only work for Frogs," using an uncomplimentary GI term for a Frenchman.

The condition of the yards at Folligny and Mayenne was bad, with demolished cars and torn-up track and poles that had to be repaired. On August 25, Paris was liberated, and on September 15, we leapfrogged eastward past Paris to our new headquarters at Bar-le-Duc, about 70 miles from the German border. We were responsible for handling trains between Sommesous and Commercy and from Revigny to the city of Verdun, famous from World War I days. From that time on, our battalion was on the cutting edge, always close to the German line. Too close for comfort, some said, but comfort was not part of our mission.

The rushed ing American liberated north southern to 7th link Army, up France, with after Gen. having liberated southern France, had rushed north to link up with Gen. George S. Patton's 3rd Army on the same day that we arrived in Bar-le-Duc. But then the American, British, Canadian, and Free French armies ran smack against the north-south Siegfried Line that stretched along the German border from near Basel, Switzerland, to Kleve, in northern Germany. Hitler had fortified the Line with 20,000 bunkers, trenches, and tank dugouts, making it a hard nut to crack.

During this lull, the 7 1 8th reverted to a semblance of regular Army life. Our cooks set up an outdoor chow line, serving food that was edible, if you were very hungry—and we were. Since there were no showers or wash sinks, we used the old GI substitute, our steel helmets. But there were benefits. We no longer did calisthenics or close-order drills. Saluting became rare and "chicken-shit" officers even less evident.

The route of the 718th signal platoon as it made its way to the Rhine River. The linemen worked in small groups, repairing telephone wires that had been destroyed in battle, and lived mostly on a train that moved behind the Allied advance.

Our headquarters company was kicked out of the building it had occupied near the railroad station to make way for a military hospital. From then on, the 718th took to the rails. We converted French and German baggage cars and coaches into living quarters. When it was time to move, our cars were coupled to a locomotive and pulled to a new location. Sgt. Adams had already begun to implement a practice of spreading his linemen throughout the 718th's territory in units of two to four men. For me and Carroll Jensen, a big blond from Minnesota, that meant moving closer to the German lines.

We got to Conflans-Jarny and found "C" Company dispatchers working out of a shack near the bombed-out train station. We asked them why there were only a few civilians on the street. "It's those big guns at Metz 12 miles away," one dispatcher explained. "The Germans could shell the ass out of this place any time they want."

Jensen and I needed a place to sleep (my partner didn't like being called Carroll because it sounded like a girl's name). To the rescue came Lt. Jones of the 3rd Army, who was the marshal responsible for finding housing for transient GIs. He found us a third-floor room that had windows, with an eagle-eye view of the city. About 0300 hours, I woke to the sound of explosions, so many that they rolled together into one continuous rumble. Through the window I saw bright flashes that seemed a couple blocks away, and I felt a rush of excitement. For about half an hour, I continued to watch the show of explosions, which never came close to our building. Jensen never woke up, and when the barrage ended, I went back to bed.

Five C Company men received commendations related to that attack. I never heard what they had done besides avoided getting killed. Jensen and I were very busy for several days, repairing communications disrupted by the attack. The guns of Metz were still active, though sporadically, and at any time a shell might come toward us, screaming overhead. If the sound slowly diminished, we knew it had passed us by. If the scream died suddenly in the sky above us, the shell was coming down, and we ducked for cover.

The route of the 718th Railways locations and Depots.

It rolled of wasn't 10 cars. into long Conflans- But I before was Jarny soon our in off battalion our as train Sgt. rolled into Conflans-Jarny in our train of 10 cars. But I was soon off as Sgt. Adams detailed six of us linemen to join an advanced detachment to depart for Benestroff in the Alsace-Lorraine region. The Sarge conceded, "The situation's a bit shaky there. One report said Hitler is considering a counterattack through that area. Stay on the alert and keep in touch."

Our train was distinguished from a regular train by the presence of two flat cars, each with a little shack on one end. James Lindsey, the head lineman, and Harlon Singleton occupied one shack. The other, called Uncle Tom's Cabin for a reason I never knew, was the home to four privates, Bill Moore, Homer Edington, Ervin Simpson, and me. From the breezy deck of our flat car, we had a good view of the passing countryside of green farmlands, hills, and trees. It would be a nice place to live in peacetime. Now, however, it was an empty land, exhausted by war and holding its breath for the next onslaught.

A Gl looks at the remains of a demolished diesel locomotive following the wreck at Messancy where an ammunition train lost its brakes and smashed into a ration train despite the best efforts of Engineer Joe Cushman to outrun it.

With its roofless walls and mounds of rubble, the Benestroff railroad station was desolate. Our train was parked on a siding nearby. On the ground were German rifles, American Mis, and enough ammunition strewn around for a small war. Casualties had recently happened here, because soldiers do not willingly give up their guns. Many of us picked up the M 1 s and carried them through the rest of the war.

After Thanksgiving 1944, we began to hear about a fierce battle being fought to the north. Having retreated eastward toward Germany after the D-Day invasion, the German Army suddenly turned west, counterattacking the Allies. The attack came at a time when Allied generals were confident that the war had been won. We were concerned that some men of our battalion might be transferred, but lucki none of us was. The railroads were appaently too vital to the progress of the war. Many GIs who were sent to that action what became known as the Battle of the Bulge—died in the heavy snow and freezing cold.

But the war came to us the morning after Christmas when a German plane, flying low on a strafing run, shattered our sleep in the railroad cars, killing Sgt. Allen and badly wounding Pfc. Dearing. Both were from C Company. As 1945 dawned, our train rolled north, leaving the dead of Benestroff behind, for Luxembourg City and then Arlon in Belgium. We hadn't quite finished our meal at Arlon on January 10 when Sgt. Adams came running. I had never seen him run before so I figured something important was going on.

"Rockwell, Weeks, get your gear and report immediately to Capt. Reider on that diesel."

"What's up, Sarge," I asked.

"A wreck at Messancy."

The rived I had diesel from seen locomotive, the in Europe. States, was recently After the what first arrived from the States, was the first I had seen in Europe. After what seemed like a long time, we came upon an awesome scene. Fires were burning in a long line of boxcars, and explosions were hurling debris high into the air. Choking smoke enveloped us.

The diesel backed away until we could breathe more easily. We started to walk closer, but changed our minds after looking into some square holes in the snow and finding cases of unexploded ammunition that had been catapulted from the wreck. Rocky and I dropped a line from the nearest pole and hooked up a field phone. Then we joined a group gathering around Capt. Reider. The crew told us what had happened.

Engineer Sgt. Joe Cushman of the 718th had started the ration train, nicknamed the "Three Star Special," up the four-mile-long, 3 percent grade near Messancy. He knew that an ammo train was up ahead, but it should have been miles away. So he and his crew were surprised when they heard in the distance emergency blasts from a train whistle. Joe sounded his own horn in reply and proceeded cautiously. When they heard the whistle again, and closer, he braked the ration train to a stop.

Suddenly they saw it. The ammo train had lost its brakes and was racing downgrade toward them on the same track. Joe threw the diesel unit into reverse, backing the ration train down the hill, but the gap was closing.

Cushman shouted to his firemen, "Signal the crew and jump."

They did, but Cushman stayed at the throttle, hoping to use his train as a brake to save both trains. It was the courage of one man pitted against a runaway bomb. Joe Cushman lost.

(left) The author and his steel helmet that doubled as a washbasin and shower. Courtesy of Joe Weeks (right) Patch worn by the men of the 718th.

After we had listened to the story, Capt. Reider said, "I'm sorry Joe didn't make it. He was a real hero."

In an attempt to save as much of the rations as possible, our diesel had been assigned to retrieve those cars. The ammo train was a complete loss. The two trains were locked together by the force of the crash. Someone had to uncouple the undamaged ration cars from the burning, exploding ammo-filled ones.

As the crew coupled our diesel to the end of the ration train, Capt. Reider told them, "I'll make the cut. Watch for my signals." That amazed me because Reider was responsible for repairing trains, not running them. But he was in charge and evidently was not willing to order one of the crew to do it.

Reider took off, running along the long line of boxcars toward the burning ammo train. He disappeared in a burst of smoke. When the smoke cleared, he signaled the diesel engineer to ease the tension on the coupler chains, a dangerous move because even a slight movement of the cars could trigger more explosions. Fortunately it didn't, and Reider dove under the pancake-shaped European car buffers to lift off the chains. Just then there was a big explosion. Minutes seemed to drag by until he reappeared, running, and signaled the diesel to pull the train away. Many of the rations were saved and the 718th had two heroes.

Joseph Cushman (posthumously) and Anton J. Reider received the Bronze Star for bravery beyond duty. I was proud of them and of my battalion. What we were doing was as critical to the war as fighting on the front lines. What's more, I was becoming something I never expected to be, a railroad man.

By Adams Germans the middle didn't had of retreated, leave January the 1945, and linemen Sgt. the Germans had retreated, and Sgt. Adams didn't leave the linemen hanging around. He sent Rocky, Simpson, Homer Edington, and me to Neuf Chateau, Belgium. Our task was to maintain or repair about 30 miles of telephone wires. Headquarters sent us a gas-motor car from the States. We soon found out that this particular motor car should have been left back in the repair shop. Its top speed was about 20 mph instead of the 40 for which it was designed.

A couple of days into our assignment, Rocky and Homer were up on a pole. "Let's leave the car on the rails," Homer said. "We'll only be a couple minutes." Soon afterward, we heard the whistle of an approaching train. Simp and I tried but couldn't lift the motor car off the tracks. By the time Homer and Rocky ran up to us, the train was in sight.

"Let's outrun it," Simp shouted.

We piled on, and Rocky gave the bum little car full throttle. Looking back, I saw the approaching steam locomotive loom bigger and blacker, its pilot like a huge mouth reaching out to devour us. A shiver of fear swept through me, but just as quickly faded under the pressure for immediate action. Our battalion had starting using some Belgian and French train crews, and the Belgian engineer was frantically trying to stop his train, but that would take an eighth of a mile. When the locomotive was 25 yards away, we knew it was hopeless. Someone hollered, "Bail out," and we jumped as if our lives depended on it. We hit the ground tumbling and suffered only minor scratches and bruises.

Seconds later the train overtook our vehicle, pushing it about 250 yards, but, amazingly, the motor car's wheels never left the tracks. Using crowbars, we pried it away from the pilot. The car ran as well as before, which was terrible. The four of us agreed not to tell Sgt. Adams about the episode. He would have berated us with one of his favorite expressions: "Don't you screw-ups know there's a war on?"

Our next mission at Gouvy was to re-open a rail line that had been damaged extensively, so that we could run trains into Germany. Bombs had twisted rails into pretzels and snapped poles like toothpicks. Hasty repairs had left some sections of track unsafe at normal speeds. Slow orders had been issued for those areas.

On March 3, 1945, our detachment moved the first Allied train across the border to Bleialf, Germany, removing mines and bombs scattered along the right of way. At the end of that month, Capt. Ralph Bean, our detachment commander, announced that the 718th would be moving deeper into Germany. On April 1, I left Gouvy with an advance party in a convoy of 10 trucks. All of the railroad bridges had been destroyed across the Rhine River, a major natural barrier to the Allied advance into the heart of Germany. Our battalion had drawn the assignment of moving sup plies east of the river for the 1st, 3rd 15th Armies. For two weeks, we trucked food, gas, and ammo across the Rhine on a pontoon bridge constructed of mnay interlinked floating sections. The strong current had pushed the bridge into the shape of a bow. Crossing it produced a swaying, jolting ride that was even worse than riding the Claiborne-Polk back in Louisiana.

As the 718th approached the Belgian-German border, rails were twisted into pretzels and the right of way mined, posing a constant hazard to linemen and operating crews.

Relief Regiment 347th came Engineer erected on April General a new 14 when Support railroad the 347th Engineer General Support Regiment erected a new railroad bridge over the Rhine at Mainz, about 35 miles west of Frankfurt. The main span of 2,221 feet was completed in less than 10 days. As the first train was poised to cross over it, Gen. Patton led the dedication ceremony, naming the structure Roosevelt Bridge. We all wore our steel helmets out of respect for, or fear of, "Old Blood and Guts."

As soon as the bridge was opened, Sgt. Byrd gathered a crew of eight linemen.

"We're gonna run a cable over the Rhine," he said.

Bill Moore, Rocky, Simp, and I were part of the crew. Always outspoken, Rocky asked, "How we gonna do that, Sarge? Tie it to balloons?"

A pair of 65-ton Whitcomb diesels pulls the first supply train across the Rhine River at Mainz at 1505 hours on April 14, 1945. The main span was built in less than 10 days.

There was a little laughter.

"No, wise guy. We're using the bridge."

"How big a cable, Sarge?" Bill asked.

"About 50 pair [of wires]. Let's get going."

On the west end of the bridge, we mounted a huge reel of cable on a stand, from which the cable could be unrolled.

"It's too heavy for us to pull across," Moore said.

"Yeah, I know," Byrd said. "We're going to use Lt. Ragsdale's idea."

"Now I know we're in trouble," said Simp.

The bridge structure in total was 4,500 feet long. It would require several rolls of cable, spliced together. Lt. John Ragsdale's suggestion was to attach the cable to one of the trains crossing the bridge.

"That's stupid," Rocky said as we set up the first reel.

We attached the cable to the last car and as it began to roll off the reel, it looked as if the idea was going to work. But then the cable snagged on some track spikes and was ripped to shreds. We dropped it into the Rhine.

The view shows the railroad bridge that had been destroyed by the Germans.

Our next attempt was to use a rail motor car. We had thought that it wasn't strong enough, but it pulled the cable easily, and we were able to control it to avoid snagging. After splicing the sections together, we stapled the cable to the ties, and we had railroad communications over the Rhine.

By April 1945, the 718th was handling a minimum of 1 5,000 tons of freight daily. To move this volume, we started using German train crews supervised by GIs. Our battalion' s territory had become a critical trunk line for the Military Railway Service, running supplies not only to the three armies, but delivering traffic to four forward battalions.

On April 25, my birthday sped by with no celebration except a box of cookies and a letter from my mother. However, April 28 and 30 were really days on which to rejoice, first for Italian dictator Benito Mussolini's execution and then for German Chancellor Adolf Hitler's suicide. On May 7, Gen. Alfred Jodl signed Germany's formal surrender at Reims, France.

The war had come to a close. But our battalion could not rest yet. Millions of Allied troops still needed rations and transportation. On August 15, 1945, the battalion ceased operations in Germany, turning over its territory east of the Rhine to the 752nd ROB and west of the Rhine to the French railway. On September 1, 1945, we left Mainz, riding high-style in actual railroad coaches. Our destination was Dijon, home of the famous mustard. Henceforth, the individual members of our platoon would move homeward across the Atlantic "by the numbers." Under the Adjusted Service Rating, or the Point System, soldiers, airmen, and Marines were awarded points toward discharge based on overall length of service, length of overseas service, marital status, number of dependent children, and battle credits accumulated. I had four stars for serving in four battle zones.

All of the men of the 718th were awarded a Meritorious Service Unit Plaque by headquarters for "noteworthy devotion to duty in the operation of military railways in a combat zone under dangerous conditions." Two men had paid the supreme price for their devotion, and others had been wounded. That was not many among the more than 1 million casualties suffered by the American forces, but it still hurt when it was close to home. Those wounds took time to heal, for me and I'm sure for the other men, after we returned to the States and began to pick up the pieces of our former lives.

Troop Movements on the American Railroads During the Great War

By Ross H. McLean

The American Historical Review, Vol. 26, No. 3(April 1921)

Image of US Soldiers on a Train durring WWI. (Photo Credit: U.S. Army)

THE Spanish-American War demonstrated the necessity for reform in the War Department's methods of dealing with the important problem of military transportation. During that emergency there seems to have been very little real co-operation between the railroads of the country and the government. It was not until July 18, 1898, more than three months after war was declared, that the Transportation Division of the Quartermaster's Department was created and charged with the supervision and control of all rail and water transportation.¹

A few years after the Spanish-American War, the Quartermaster General's Office and the transportation companies began to coordinate their efforts and to work together more cordially and more effectively than in I898. In 1905, and again in 1912, arrangements were made regarding the-handling of troops and supplies. Throughout 1914 and 1915 it seemed probable that the United States would find it necessary to intervene in Mexico, and during the latter year, in order to avoid the possibility of a recurrence of the conditions of 1898, the officer in charge of the Transportation Division of the Quartermaster General's Office appeared before several transportation associations and outlined the plan of mutual co-operation which was practically the one later put into effect. On October 26, 1915, upon the recommendation of the Quartermaster General's Office, the Secretary of War suggested that the American Railway Association establish a "committee on military transportation to whom the department could look for any information that might be desired as to the railroads of the United States and with a further view to co-ordination between the railroads and the WVar Department in the transportation of troops and supplies of the United States."² Shortly afterwards a " Special Committee on Co-operation with the Military Authorities " was appointed by the American Railway Association, and Fairfax Harrison, president of the Southern Railway, was named chairman of the committee. During the winter of 1915-1916 the committee was in frequent session with the officers of the Transportation Division of the Quartermaster General's Office and a general plan of co-operation was agreed upon.³

The trouble with Mexico became more and more acute and on June 18, 1916, the Secretary of War, through the governors of the various states, called into the federal service the greater part of the organized militia and of the National Guard.⁴ The special committee of the American Railway Association met at once in the office of the Quartermaster General, in Washington, with Lieutenant Colonel Chauncey B. Baker, who represented the Quartermaster General, and the plans formulated during the previous winter were immediately placed in effect. Competent railway officials were placed at the headquarters of the four territorial departments of the army, at each mobilization camp of the National Guard, and in the office of the Quartermaster General in Washington. These officials, or general agents, as they came to be called, acted as advisers to the officers of the Quartermaster Corps on all questions affecting the railroads. Upon notification that an organization was about to leave camp for the border, the camp quartermaster consulted with the general agent at the camp, telling him the strength of the organization, the approximate date of departure, the number and kind of cars required, etc. The general agent then set about assembling all railroad equipment other than tourist sleeping-cars, in time for the movement. The assignment of tourist cars for troop movements was handled from Washington—by the Transportation Division of the Quartermaster General's Office, assisted by a representative of the Pullman Company at the capital. By the adoption of these methods the War Department and railroads alike hoped to prevent a repetition during the operations in Mexico of the congestion which occurred during the war with Spain. That they succeeded is generally agreed. Both the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War commended the special committee for its splendid co-operation with the government, and the President warmly congratulated the American Railway Association on its patriotic efforts.⁵

From the beginning of the Great War in 1914 many persons in the United States realized that this nation might at any moment become involved in the struggle. Common prudence dictated the necessity of preparation. It was this motive which led to the creachairman of a Committee on Transportation and Communication. Its function was the organization of the transportation facilities of the country for the rapid transportation of the large bodies of troops and the enormous quantities of supplies which would be needed if the United States should enter the war.⁶

February 16, 1917, at the request of Mr. Willard, the executive committee of the American Railway Association met in New York City and decided to enlarge the Special Committee on Co-operation with the Military Authorities and to designate it as a Special Committee on National Defense. Though not officially a part of the Council of National Defense nor of its Advisory Commission, it was closely associated with the latter and was sometimes regarded as a subcommittee of the Advisory Commission. Its function was the organization of the railroads for mutual co-operation and co-ordination in case of emergency. Fairfax Harrison, who had been chairman of the Special Committee on Co-operation with the Military Authorities in I9I6, was named chairman of the new committee. Four district committees, eastern, central, southern, and western, were established, corresponding to the four military departments of the United States, with whose commanding generals they were to co-operate in connection with the work of the Council of National Defense. The chairmen of these district committees, with Mr. Harrison as general chairman, constituted a special executive committee.

The new Special Committee on National Defense met in Washington March 1, 1917, in conference with the Secretary of War and representatives of the General Staff and the Quartermaster General's Office. At this meeting Colonel Baker, representing the Quartermaster General, presented a definite plan for co-operation between the government and the railways. The railway committee on March 2 decided that the district committees should get in touch with the military commanders of their respective departments as soon as possible. It was also decided that in case of any large troop movements the transportation should be handled under the same plan as in 1916. The central office of the executive committee in Washington was put under the charge of George Hodges, a man of wide railroad experience, who had been in immediate charge of the transportation of troops in 1916. By the first of April the organization was practically complete. The railroads were the first great industry of the United States to perfect an organization to co-operate with the military authorities and to offer its services to the Secretary of War.⁷

The emergency for which the railroads had been preparing came on April 6, 1917, when the United States declared that a state of war existed with the imperial German government. The following day the Council of National Defense directed the chairman of the Committee on Transportation and Communication to call upon the railroads to organize for the utmost despatch in the movement of freight.⁸ In answer to the chairman's summons, nearly fifty railway presidents, representing the transportation interests of the entire nation, assembled in Washington April 11, 1917, and resolved to "co-ordinate their operations in a continental railway system, merging . . . all their merely individual and competitive activities in the effort to produce a maximum of national transportation efficiency ".⁹ To accomplish this object the railway executives empowered the American Railway Association's Special Committee on National Defense to formulate and direct the carrying-out of a policy of operation for all the railroads. The four district subcommittees composing the Special Committee were increased to six to agree with the territorial departments of the army, which had on April 2 been likewise increased.10> Fairfax Harrison remained general chairman of the committee.

An executive committee of five members was chosen from the general committee and Mr. Harrison was appointed chairman with authority to select the four other members. Daniel Willard, representing the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense, and Edgar E. Clark, of the Interstate Commerce Commission, were ex officio members. This committee, which came to be known as the Railroads' War Board, directed the operation of virtually all the railroads of the United States; no less than 693 railroads, controlling over 260,000 miles of track and employing almost 1,750,000 persons, agreed to carry out its orders. During the summer and autumn of I9I7 the War Board attempted to secure higher efficiency and better utilization of the available transportation facilities by co-ordinating their efforts and sinking, so far as the existing laws permitted, their competitive individual interests."¹¹

The creation of the Railroads' War Board in the spring of 1917 was "probably the most important and revolutionary step" taken in the history of American railways to that time. By placing the operation of all their facilities under the direction of a single committee of five for the period of the war, it constituted them, with certain limitations, a single continental system. " At the same time, it placed the services of this great railway system unreservedly at the disposal of the government. . . . Perhaps the most significant feature of the matter was that this act on the part of the railways was purely voluntary. No law required it. Another of its very significant features was that the step was taken without any prospect of especial consideration or compensation having been held out by the government."¹² This was in decided contrast with the situation in Etfgland, where the government at the very beginning of the war assumed control of the railroads by law. While the English railroads transported troops and munitions free of charge, their earnings were guaranteed by the government.

Subordinate to the Special Committee on National Defense and acting under the direction of its executive committee were several subcommittees. The more important of these were the Commission on Car Service and the subcommittees on Military Transportation Accounting, on Military Passenger Tariffs, and on Military Freight Tariffs. This organization, thus established with permanent headquarters at Washington, with its staff of experts and employees, with subcommittees both in Washington and in many cities throughout the country, was maintained wholly at the expense of the railroads.¹³

The organization described above was designed to control the operation of the entire continental system of railways, and it was as much concerned with the private shipper and traveller as with the government. To handle the problem of troop transportation there was built up at Washington in the office of Fairfax Harrison, general chairman of the Railroads' War Board, a small but very efficient organization known as the Troop Movement Force, which was placed under the immediate direction of George Hodges, assistant to the.general chairman. Mr. Hodges had been in charge of the troop transportation for the railroads in i9i6, and the system used then was expanded and adapted to the greater emergency. The functions of the central bureau of the Troop Movement Force were briefly these: to gather all necessary information regarding equipment needed and available; to arrange for the transfer of equipment from one road or section of the country to another; to expedite the return of empty cars; to keep informed as to threatened conditions of congestion, and to make provisions for avoiding it; and, generally, to assist in every way practicable in the smooth operation of troop trains.1' In time, this central bureau in Washington came to be divided into three sections: a routing section, which arranged routes subject to the approval of the Quartermaster General; a transportation section, which controlled the arrangements for the actual movement of troops over the railroads involved, and kept in touch with all that concerned troop transportation by means of daily reports from the transportation general agents, and a Pullman section, which apportioned the available tourist cars to the various troop movements under authorization for their use from the Quartermaster General. Liaison between the central bureau and the War Department was maintained through an officer of the Quartermaster Corps and a railway representative. Representatives or general agents of the American Railway Association, designated by the Special Committee on National Defense, were stationed at each of the six departmental headquarters of the army, in the office of the governor or adjutant general of each state, at the headquarters of the Construction Quartermaster, and at each mobilization and concentration camp, cantonment, and port of embarkation. At each place were two general agents, one reporting to the Troop Movement Force and the other to the Military Transportation Accounting Subcommittee. The latter assisted the departmental and camp quartermasters in making out transportation requests, bills of lading, and the like. The former was assigned as a transportation expert, and it was his duty to keep in touch with the quartermaster at his post, to see that all trains and cars were provided when needed, that loading was properly done, and in general to translate into terms of action the transportation necessities of the army.¹⁵ The railroad companies throughout the country were each directed by the central bureau to designate a "troop reporting official", who should be responsible for the carrying out by his company of orders from Washington or from the general agents. These "troop reporting officials" were entrusted with the cipher code used by the Troop Movement Force in reporting the movements of trooptrains.¹⁶

December 28, I9I7, the government assumed control of the railroads and on the thirty-first the members of the Railroads' War Board resigned. Their subcommittees were either taken over by the United States Railroad Administration, or dissolved, and their functions were assigned to other parts of that organization.¹⁷ The Troop Movement Force, however, did not at once become a part of the new administration, and for some months its members continued their work as before and were still spoken of as American Railway Association representatives. The government's assumption of control over the railroads occasioned no alteration in the functioning of their organization. May 24, I9I8, the Troop Movement Force became the troop Movement Section of the Division of Transportation of the United States Railroad Administration. George Hodges, who had been in charge of the work since its initiation, was appointed manager, and the functions of the section were defined as the arrangement for, and supervision of, the details of the movement of troops, with their impedimenta, routing, provision of equipment, etc.¹⁸

The authority to order the movement of troops was vested in the Secretary of War, who exercised his power through the General Staff, the co-ordinating agency of the War Department. Orders, once approved by the Chief of Staff, were issued by the Adjutant General of the army. During 1917 and the early part of 1918 all matters relating to troop movements were handled by the Operations Committee of the War College Division of the General Staff. In the reorganization of the General Staff, February 9, 1918, this committee was consolidated with the Equipment Committee of the same division under the name of Operations Division. It was charged with the cognizance and control of army operations and was placed under an officer designated as the Director of Operations, who was an assistant to the Chief of Staff. Among the duties of the division were the movement and distribution of troops and the determination of all "overseas priority ". Brigadier General Henry Jervey was appointed Director of Operations, and the great troop movement of I9I8 was carried out under his supervision.

After orders for the movement of troops and their equipment had been issued, the duty of providing the means of transportation devolved upon the Quartermaster Corps.¹⁹ The Transportation Division of the Quartermaster General's Office handled all matters pertaining to transportation, whether on land or sea, and through its Land Transportation Branch it supervised all movements of troops and quartermaster supplies by land.²⁰ During the early months of the war the Land Transportation Branch, when advised of a projected troop movement, at once notified the department and camp quartermasters concerned as to the route to be used; it also informed the Troop Movement Force of the American Railway Association. The latter organization then issued instructions regarding the date of the movement, the assembling of railway equipment, etc., to its department and camp general agents directly concerned, who co-operated with the local quartermasters in arranging the details of the movement. The routing and movement of parties of fifty or less might be ordered by any officer in charge at the point of origin; the movement of larger parties within a department was controlled by the department quartermaster, while all interdepartment movements of more than fifty men were authorized at first through the Quartermaster General's Office at Washington, and, after the organization of the Inland Traffic Service in January, 1918, by the Troop Movement Section of that agency. After October 10, 1917, routings were issued by the Troop Movement Force of the railroads, subject to the approval of the Quartermaster General.²¹ August 4, 1917, the Embarkation Service was created in the office of the Chief of Staff and charged with the co-ordination of all shipments of munitions and supplies of every kind and of all troop movements whose ultimate destination was Europe.²² Department and division commanders were ordered not to send any organization to a port of embarkation until the details connected with the movement had been arranged directly with the commanding general of the port or with his subordinates.²³

The very serious congestion on the railroads in the autumn of 1917 led to the taking over of the railroads by the government on December 28, as noted above. On the same day the Storage and Traffic Division of the General Staff was created and placed under Major-General George W. Goethals. January 10, 1918, in an effort to centralize and co-ordinate all army transportation, General Goethals appointed Mr. H. M. Adams, an experienced railroad man, director of inland transportation,²⁴ and instructed him to organize a Division of Inland Transportation (called after May 1, 1918, the Inland Traffic Service), which should have jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to the routing and transportation, inland, by whatever means of transport, of all troops and property.²⁵ The new organization had to do primarily with the transportation of supplies, and its activities in connection therewith cannot be dicussed here. In this article we are concerned only with its relation to the movement of troops and their "unit equipment ". Generally speaking it assumed the place formerly held by the Land Transportation Branch of the Quartermaster General's Office. The officer who had been in charge of that branch since December 1, 1917, became assistant to Mr. Adams on January 18, 1918, and exercised direct supervision over the handling of troops.²⁶ A Troop Movement Section was established in the Division of Inland Transportation, and after February 26 it was placed under an officer who had formerly been located in the office of the Quartermaster General as civilian representative of the American Railway Association. The principal function of the Troop Movement Section was to act as achannel of communication between 'the Operations 'Division of the General Staff, the Embarkation Service, and the Troop Movement Section of the railroads. After movements had been ordered by the Operations Division through the Adjutant General, the department or camp quartermasters requested the Troop Movement Section of the Inland Traffic Service to supply routings, dates of movements, equipment, etc.; this information it secured from the railroad organization, and if it approved the routings proposed it informed the military authorities interested as to the routes to be followed, the availability of Pullman and coach equipment, and the scheduled dates for the movements. The Troop Movement Section of the railroads issued the same instructions to the railroads interested and to their department general agents, who informed the camp general agents.²⁷ The responsibility for carrying out instructions rested entirely upon the railroads and the local military authorities were not permitted to change a plan once decided upon nor to interfere with the operation of a train.

During 1918, when an ever increasing number of troops was During 1918, when an ever increasing number of troops was being shipped overseas, a monthly conference was held at which the Operations Divisionthe Embarkation Service, the Troop Move ment Section of the Inland Traffic Service, and the Troop Movement Section of the railroads were all represented. At this conference a tentative schedule for the next month was arranged. The Operations Division stated what organization it desired to move overseas; the Embarkation Service stated the probable amount of tonnage available; and the railroad officials indicated the amount of equipment they had on hand and to what extent they would be able to co-operate. The date at which an organization was desired at the port of embarkation or at the embarkation camp was fixed by the commanding general of the port. The Land Transportation Branch of the Quartermaster General's Office continued to handle all transportation matters not determined by the Inland Traffic Service, but its work was taken over more and more by the latter and on June 15, 1918, it was abolished.²⁸

The movement of troops with their impedimenta, of selective service men, and recruits may be divided into five phases: first, the movement of the Regular Army from the border to various camps; second, the movement of the National Guard to its training camps; third, the movement of the men of the National Army from their homes to the cantonments; fourth, intercamp movements to meet the needs of the service; and lastly, the movement of organizations from the camps to ports of embarkation.²⁹ This arrangement is not only a convenient one, but it is in the large sense strictly chronological.

The active military forces of the United States, at the outbreak of war, numbered 200,157.³⁰ These men were distributed at various army posts throughout the country, in outlying possessions of the nation, and in China; approximately 50,000 were on or near the Mexican border.³¹ In May it was decided to concentrate the border troops at a comparatively small number of camps, principally in the North and East, where the various regiments might be utilized as nuclei for larger organizations, recruits from depots be added, and training for overseas service begun. The first movements recorded by the Troop Movement Section of the railroads began on May 18, 1917, when various regiments on the Mexican border began to entrain for other points. By June 4 this movement, involving the transportation of approximately 25,531 officers and men, was completed. Owing to the relatively small nuahber of men involved and their experience in travel the task of moving them was performed with great ease by the railroads. The longest journey during this period was that of the 1913 men of the 23d U. S. Infantry, who travelled 2624 miles from El Paso, Texas, to Syracuse, New York; the shortest was that of the 1306 men of the 13th Cavalry, from Fort Bliss, Texas, to Fort Riley, Kansas, a distance of 943 miles. These organizations took with them all their baggage, organization property, and animals. Where conditions warranted it, the troop property and animals were loaded on a special train with only a few soldiers; in other cases the troop-train was composed not only of tourist sleepers for the men and baggage— and box-cars for their impedimenta, but also of flat-cars for vehicles and stock-cars for the animals.

It was at this time that the troops for the first convoy were concentrated at Hoboken for transportation to France. Not one of the eight organizations comprising this first combatant force to cross the Atlantic travelled less than 2000 miles to the port of embarkation. One regiment of infantry travelled 2679 miles from Douglas, Arizona; the others came f rom various points in Texas. The 11,234 men concerned travelled an average distance of 2392 miles to their destination. The first units to leave the border were the supply companies of the four infantry regiments, which entrained on May 31; the infantry regiments and the other units entrained June 2-3, and by June I0 the last train had arrived at Hoboken. The Troop Movement Force of the railroads made all the arrangements for this movement, which has been characterized as the longest long-distance movement of troops that had ever been made at one time in the United States to that date.³² It was a record often surpassed during the next seventeen months.

July 3, 1917, the President issued a proclamation calling into the service of the United States the National Guard of thirty states. The same proclamation provided that on August 5 the entire National Guard of the nation should be drafted into the military service of the government.³³ At this time the National Guard consisted of sixteen tactical divisions. Orders were issued for their concentration, for organization and training, at as many camps, all of them located in the southern half of the country. The movement of the state troops to camp involved the transportation by rail of about 343,223 men, and extended over a period of eleven weeks, from August 4 to November 23. The entire movement was made by the railroads upon the schedule outlined by the War Department; at the suggestion of the Troop Movement Force it was twice suspended for brief periods during the movement of increments of the National Army to their cantonments.³⁴ The greater part of this movement of the National Guard was completed before the middle of October, 1917; in November the New England regiments still in camp in the North were ordered to Camp Greene, North Carolina. In general, when a unit of the National Guard moved from its home state to camp it carried with it all its organization property, vehicles, and animals. Heavy -tentage in most cases was shipped direct from depots to the training camps and not carried by the separate units. Statistics are not at hand for the complete movement of the Guard, but up to October 11, 1917, there had been transported to camp 294,752 officers and men.³⁵ The average distance travelled was 770 miles; in the South, as a rule, the NationalGuard went but a short distance to camp, while the men from the Northern states often travelled great distances—the Montana National Guard, for example, journeyed 2645 miles to Camp Greene, North Carolina.

In August, 1917, the War -Department authorized the formation of a seventeenth National Guard division, the Forty-second, from units selected from twenty-seven states. This division was concentrated at Camp Mills, Long Island, in the latter part of August, 1917. Those units possessing vehicles, engineer, signal corps, and other heavy equipment, transported it to Camp Mills and shipped their animals to Newport News. Other units of this division, being newly organized, had no animals, technical or other equipment beyond quartermaster supplies, to carry with them.³⁶

The movement of the National Guard was still in progress when the first detachments of the new National Army left their homes for the cantonments on September 5, 1917. The process of mobilization, under the Selective Service Administration, may be divided into three stages: the requisition, the call, and the entrainment. During 1917 all requisitions and all calls were made for "the run of the draft ", i.e., for men, either white or colored, who were physically qualified for general military service. Practically all of these men were sent to one or another of the sixteen National Army cantonments provided for the purpose. But during 1918 new conditions arose and men with certain physical, occupational, or educational qualifications were requisitioned. Moreover the number of stations to which men could be sent was increased to include every post in the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, and Porto Rico, as well as hundreds of schools and colleges. After the calls to be issued under a particular requisition had been allocated to the states which were to contribute to the levy, induction telegrams were issued from Washington, calling on the respective states for the entrainment of their quotas. The railroads were then consulted, the camp commanders notified, and the proper supply bureaus informed. Upon receipt of a call, each state headquarters proceeded to allocate the call for that state among its local boards.

"The time set for entrainment was generally made by the local boards an occasion of formality and ceremony, and in most communities it took on the marks of a public festivity." There were public addresses, parades, and demonstrations at the railroad stations. It was this public celebration on the day of entrainment which had much to do with popularizing the draft; for " the general sentiment of military patriotism came thus to be associated in an open and emphatic manner with the processes of the draft ".³⁷ Prior to July 31, 1918, drunkenness among drafted men en route to camp had occasionally led to disorders resulting in damage to railroad equipment and other property. On that date certain changes were made in the Selective Service Regulations which provided for the wearing of a brassard in lieu of a uniform by all draftees, thereby making it illegal to sell liquor to them; for the appointment of leaders for each contingent; and for the distribution of regulations governing drafted men en route to camp. These changes resulted in the practical elimination of all further trouble.³⁸

The 4531 entraining points and (in 1918) the hundreds of stations to which the selectives were sent complicated the entrainment problem tremendously. Before a call could be issued the Railroad Administration required fourteen days' notice to enable it to compile and print the train schedules for the movement (which was usually distributed over a five-day period), and to make the necessary arrangements with the railroads. In 1917 the entrainment schedules were all compiled and published by the several passenger associations of the country, and a representative of the American Railway Association was placed in the office of the governor or adjutant general of each state to adjust any difficulties that might arise.³⁹ During 1918 the United States Railroad Administration supervised the preparation of the schedules and replaced the " A. R. A." man by a " military representative " of its Traffic Division. These schedules, which were most elaborate, were prepared for each call in every state. Each gave the number of the call, the dates set for the movement, the camp to which the men were to go, the county, county-seat, and entraining station, the number of men from each county, the route to be followed, the time of departure, and the arrangements made for providing meals.⁴⁰ Copies of each schedule were placed in the possession of the railroads concerned and of every one of the local boards at points of origin. As a result of this careful attention to detail, the mobilization proceeded so smoothly that few persons in the community at large realized the enormous task which was being performed.

The Provost Marshal General in his reports on the operation of the Selective Service System⁴¹ expresses the utmost admiration of the work of the railroads throughout the war. "No more difficult transportation problem ", he says, " could be conceived "; their work " was so satisfactorily performed that less than a dozen complaints were received during the whole year" of 1918. At times they were called upon to handle as many as 50,000 selected men in one day, and to transport within a single month over 400,000 men for the selective service system alone. Their performance on November II, I9I8, was especially noteworthy. Calls had been issued and all arrangements completed for the entrainment of some 250,000 men during the five-day period beginning on that day. At 10.25 A.M. on Monday, November 11, the United States Railroad Administration was advised by telephone that the Secretary of War had cancelled these calls. "In 35 minutes they had notified all the railroads of the country; had stopped further entrainment; had reversed such contingents as were en route; and were restoring the men to the original points of entrainment. This achievement ", continues the Provost Marshal General, " stands out as a marvel of efficiency and is but an indication of the co-operation which they constantly rendered."

The total number of men called under the selective service system was 2,801,358. According to the records of the Provost Marshal General's Office 2,755,476 of these men were transported to camp by railroads controlled by the United States Railroad Administration.⁴² The average number of miles travelled by each man was 388; the entire mobilization therefore involved the equivalent of 1,069,124,688 miles of travel by one passenger. It is estimated that the movements required for the mobilization under the selective draft represented about one-fourth of the entire troop movement for the War Department.

By the middle of October, 1917, the greater part of the National Guard troops had reached their training camps in the South, and nearly 450,000 selected men of the first draft had been transported to the sixteen National Army cantonments. The movements of the Regular Army already described involved about 36,765 men. Beginning about the first of August, 1917, large intercamp movements of the Regular Army began, in the course of which organizations were ordered from their stations to more convenient camps and concentration points, and recruits were transported from various depots throughout the country to the camps. One small group of recruits, for example, was ordered from Vancouver Barracks to Waco, Texas, a distance of 4078 miles. In September and October training cadres of 961 men each were ordered transferred from the Regular Army to each of the sixteen National Army divisions.⁴³ During the autumn of 1917 some 50,000 men of the Regular Army were transferred from their stations in the North to more comfortable winter quarters in southern camps. As time went on the intercamp movements of the regulars increased in frequency and by January 1, 1918, approximately 308,000 had been thus moved about the country. It was the general policy of the Operations Committee always to move troops from the West towards the ports of embarkation, but it was not always possible or practicable to do so.

About the middle of October, I9I7, the Operations Committee began to transfer from each National Army cantonment sufficient drafted men to bring the corresponding National Guard division to full strength. In this connection an interesting situation developed in the South. In September it began to appear that if the three southern National Guard divisions-the 30th, 31st, and 39th—were to be brought to full strength by men drawn from Camps Jackson, Gordon, and Pike, the corresponding National Army cantonments, these latter camps would each be left with more colored than white troops, which was deemed highly undesirable. To concentrate all the white men from these three cantonments at one would leave the other two with no white men and all their negroes. The problem was finally solved by distributing the entire colored draft throughout the country in such a way that the ratio of whites to colored was everywhere preponderant; by filling up all the National Guard divisions with National Army men from the corresponding cantonments; by concentrating at Camp Jackson all the remaining white men in Camps Jackson, Gordon, and Pike, and forming of them an "All-Southern " National Army division (the 81st); and by forming at Camps Gordon and Pike two composite National Army divisions (the 82d and 87th) of men drawn from all the remaining National Army cantonments except Camp Lewis. To accomplish all this necessitated the transportation of between 105,000 and 1 10,000 more men than had been anticipated by the Operations Committee.⁴⁴ Beginning about December 15 many National Army troops were transferred to camps where Regular Army organizations were being recruited to full strength. In the last ten weeks of 1917 approximately 175,000 drafted men were moved from one camp to another.⁴⁵

During 1918, as the army continued to grow in size, these intercamp movements increased in volume. The practice of drawing on the drafted men to fill the National Guard and Regular Army divisions continued. In March the Operations Division began to draw on the depot brigades of the National Army for men for various special and technical services-for corps and army troops, for engineer regiments, field signal battalions, replacement organizations of various kinds, medical and veterinary units, the Quartermaster Corps and Ordnance Department, and for the United States Guards. Then men of the Medical Department, either as individuals or as organizations, were constantly moving to and from the medical training camps at Fort Riley, Fort Benjamin Harrison, and Camp Greenleaf; aero squadrons were leaving the aviation mobilization camp at Waco, Texas, for various flying fields, and during the summer and autumn of i9i8 there was a steady stream of men to and from the National Army training detachments at various educational institutions throughout the country.⁴⁶ These intercamp movements involved about 42 per cent. of the total number of men transported by rail between January 1 and November 11, 1918.

No accurate statistics are available regarding the number of men who travelled on furlough during the war, but that extremely heavy demands were made upon the railroads by the furloughs granted at divisional camps for week-ends and holidays is obvious. At Thanksgiving and at Christmas, 19I7, the number of men on leave was well above 100,000 in each case. As for the number of men regularly on leave, the general agent at Camp Meade, for example, estimated that about 11,500 men (about 30 per cent. of the total strength of the camp) were granted passes or furloughs durinig the week of February I0.⁴⁷ At Camp Sherman 30 per cent. of the 32,900 men in the camp were granted leaves of absence for Christmas, 1917, and it was the custom at that camp to grant week-end passes to 25 per cent. of the men in each unit.⁴⁸

The movement of troops to the ports of embarkation for transportation overseas was necessarily conditioned by the War Department's plans regarding the composition and strength of the expeditionary forces, and a brief discussion of these plans is requisite for a complete understanding of the problem. At the outbreak of the war and for some time thereafter the War Department had no definite plan of operation.⁴⁹ At the request of both the British and French governments, however, it was decided to despatch as soon as possible base hospitals, ambulance units, railway engineers, and other auxiliary troops, who could be utilized at once by the allied armies, and throughout the remainder of I917 noncombatant troops formed a large proportion of those sent overseas. But in June, 1917, at the urgent insistence of the French, a small division of combatant troops was sent abroad, and by January 1, 1918, two complete divisions and parts of three others were in France. July 10, 1917, General Pershing transmitted to Washington his " general organization project " for the A. E. F., which called for a force of twenty combat divisions and ten replacement divisions, organized in five corps of six divisions each, with the proper proportions of corps, army, and service-of-the-rear troops.⁵⁰ This force, about 1,328,448 men, was to be in France "in time for an offensive in 1918"⁵¹

September 11, 1917, the War College Division in a memorandum for the Chief of Staff discussed the problem of raising sufficient men by September 1, 1918, to meet General Pershing's request. Instead of five corps, they planned to create seven corps of six divisions each with the necessary corps and army troops. The last corps would have but four divisions. Apparently their idea was that it would be possible to transport overseas four corps by April 1, 1918, the fifth corps by June 1, the sixth by July 1, and the seventh by August 1. Such an army would have numbered 1,675,000 men. On October 7, 1917, General Pershing sent to the War Department a "Priority of Shipments Schedules" in which was shown the order in which he desired the troops for the expeditionary forces despatched to France. The schedule did not apply to the special and technical troops furnished the French and British, nor did it cover the replacement drafts, aviation troops, and headquarters personnel. Its purpose was to provide a proper balance between all the various elements of the expeditionary forces. The existing situation, he said, was difficult because the service-of-the-rear troops in France did not bear an adequate proportion to the combat troops already there or expected in the near future. The schedule outlined a plan of shipment by "phases ", of which there were six in all. Each phase, except the last, consisted of one corps of combat troops and the proper proportion of service-of-the-rear, corps, and army troops. He desired 50 per cent. of the service-of-the-rear troops to precede the combat troops in each phase and the remaining 50 per cent. to be shipped with the first half of the combat troops of that phase. The six phases called for 275,200, 267,490, 246,248, 231,743, 21O,100, and 16,618 men respectively and the total number was 1,247,399. Without specifying any particular date, General Pershing indicated his desire to have the first four phases-about 1,020,000 men—in France in time for the 1918 offensive. This date was usually set at June 1, 1918.

Throughout the winter of I9I7-I9I8 an effort was made by the Operations Division to have the shipment of troops conform as closely as possible to the "Priority of Shipments Schedule", but various things conspired to make this difficult. In March, 1918, Pershing cabled that altogether too many combat troops were reaching France in proportion to service-of-the-rear (service of supply, "S. 0. S."), corps, and army troops.⁵² But the chief difficulty was the shortage of ocean tonnage, especially cargo tonnage, for obviously it was inadvisable to ship troops to France unless we were prepared to maintain them there. The limited production of certain necessary supplies and the limited facilities for embarkation and especially debarkation still further complicated matters. In February, 1918, the situation looked so black that the Director of Operations believed it would be virtually impossible to transport the first three phases-819,000 men-to France by August 1, 1918; it might be practicable, he thought, to send over about 300,000 men in addition to the 275,000 men of the first phase which he anticipated would be in France by March 1. But as a basis for requirements and estimates on the part of the supply bureaus he suggested a "tentative strength table" calling for the presence in France of 837,000 men by June 1, I,051,000 by August 1, and 1,372,000 by December 1. In other words, the hope of fulfilling General Pershing's plan for an army of five corps in France in time for an offensive in 1918 was postponed until 1919. On February 25, 1918, the plans and recommendations of the Director of Operations were approved by the Secretary of War.⁵³ This is really the first " official plan'" for the raising and transportation of the army.

The success of the German offensive which began March 21 was so great that the War Department was led to attempt what five weeks earlier had been considered impossible. Ships were procured, men and supplies were provided, and the greatest troop movement in history began. The complete story of that achievement cannot be told here, for its success was dependent rather upon shipping than upon the railroads. But it must not be forgotten that every man shipped abroad had to be transported by rail to the port of embarkation before he could go aboard ship and that frequently detachments travelled farther by rail to reach the port of embarkation than they did by army transport to reach the port of debarkation in France or England. Between the first of May, 1917, and the eleventh of November, 1918, the Troop Movement Section of the railroads supervised the transportation to the various ports of embarkation of 2,174,455 men. Of these 1,758,033 or 81 per cent. of the total, were transported to Hoboken and the embarkation camps serving that port, 250,404 men, or about 12 per cent., to Newport News, and the rest to other ports.54 Of the total number carried to the ports of embarkation during the nineteen months of the war 76 per cent. (1,653,470 men) were embarked for overseas in the seven months from April to November, 1918. The shipment of troops continued to follow the " Priority of Shipments Schedule"' of October, 1917, but with the emphasis upon combat troops and at no time during the war did the number of auxiliary troops or " S. 0. S." troops attain the proportions desired by General Pershing. So far as divisions were concerned the first three phases had been completed by the middle of June; by August 12 the combat troops, at least, of five phases were overseas, and the Operations Division was planning to send the sixth and seventh phases of combat troops. By November 11 these seven phases had been completed. July 18, 1918, it was decided to increase the American Expeditionary Forces abroad to at least eighty divisions (about 3,360,ooo men) by June 30, 1919, and the succeeding drafts were all calculated upon that basis.⁵⁵ But the signing of the armistice November 11 halted the fulfillment of these ambitious plans. At that time there were approximately 3,757,624 men in the United States Army; of these some 2,086,000 had been transported overseas and 1,671,000 remained in the United States.⁵⁶

The limitations of space forbid any detailed discussion of the movement of troops to the ports of embarkation. It must suffice to describe the method by which troops were despatched from camp to seaboard. In the first place the Operations Division of the General Staff drew up from time to time "priority lists " designating certain units for service overseas and giving the contemplated dates of their movement from mobilization camps to ports. These programmes, made after conference between the embarkation officials, the Inland Traffic Service, the Troop Movement Section of the railroads, and the Operations Division, General Staff, usually covered shipments from camps to ports for a period of one month in advance. They directed the various departments to prepare the troops thus designated for overseas service, and when they were ready, to notify the Director of Embarkation at Washington. A copy of the list, subject to change, was forwarded to the port of embarkation, where it was turned over to the " dispatch office ". That office then sent to each organization listed a letter of instructions and the embarkation and debarkation regulations. When a reply was received stating that the organization was fully equipped, or equipped except for certain shortages that could not be supplied, the Director of Embarkation was notified. He in turn informed the Adjutant General, who telegraphed the department or camp commander to forward the troops when their presence was desired at the port. As soon as space was available at the embarkation camps, or on transports, and provided the organization stood in the proper place on the priority schedule, it was ordered to port on the authority of the commanding general of the port of embarkation. The general agent of the Railroad Administration notified the Troop Movement Section at Washington of the movement and the latter then arranged the routing and train schedule to conform as closely as possible to the desires of the dispatch office. " The movements of the troops to the ports were so timed as to fit in with all other rail movements throughout the United States so as to avoid congestion and an excessive demand for equipment during a limited period."⁵⁷ The various authorities of the port who were interested in the movement were also informed and were thus enabled to make the necessary preparations for the reception of the organization upon its arrival. The general agent and the local quartermaster at the starting point were responsible for the assembling of equipment and the arranging of all the details of departure.⁵⁸

Such was the process followed in the case of troops not in divisions. With divisions the procedure was somewhat different. When a division on the priority list was reported nearly ready to entrain for the port, the dispatch office telegraphed for the division liaison officer and at the same time ordered into the embarkation camp the advance debarkation and billeting detachments and the advance school detachments, which usually preceded the division abroad.⁵⁹ Before the great troop movement began in April, 1918, an attempt was made to have the various elements of a division entrain in the order General Pershing desired them to arrive in France.⁶⁰ The first units to depart for the seaboard were generally the engineer regiment and field train, field signal battalion, and sanitary squadrons; then came the division headquarters, followed at a little interval by the headquarters train and military police, the remaining divisional trains, half the medical complement of field hospitals and ambulance companies, the bakery and butchery company, and base hospital. These were followed by the two infantry brigades, the machine-gun battalion and artillery brigade in the order named, and the remaining auxiliary units brought up the rear. The 32d Division, for example, observed this arrangement quite closely in its movement from Camp MacArthur, Waco, Texas, to Camp Merritt, New Jersey. The movement began January 10, 1918, and was not completed until February 13. To transport the 24,874 men in the division required fifty-eight trains, each averaging fifteen cars and carrying 428 men. The distance travelled averaged 1969 miles per train and was covered in five days and eight hours, at an average rate of 15.3 miles per hour.⁶¹

As general agents, camp quartermasters, entraining officers, and railroad officials became more experienced in the handling of trooptrains they constantly bettered their previous records. One or two examples of what they accomplished will not be out of place here. On June 19, 1918, the gIst Division began its movement from Camp Lewis, Washington, to Camp Merritt. Between that date and June 30, sixty-four trains were despatched eastward carrying the 27,085 men of the division. The last train arrived at its destination at 9:00 P.M., July 6. These sixty-four trains were sent over thirteen different routes, the average distance travelled by each train being 3205 miles. Running at about twenty miles per hour each train required an average time of six and a half days to make the journey across the continent. The average number of cars per train was thirteen; of men 423.⁶² Perhaps the best performance of the war in the field of transportation was the movement of the 18,819 men of the 8th Division (less its artillery brigade) from Camp Fremont, California, to Camp Mills, Long Island, in October, 1918. The first train left camp at 9:00 A.M., October 18; the other hour and a half intervals from 9:00 A.M. to 4:30 P.M., at the rate of six trains per day; the last train left at 4:30 P.M., October 24. These forty-two trains averaging 448 men and 13.8 cars to the traversed the 3444 miles to their destination at an average rate of speed of 20.2 miles per hour. The average time per train was seven days and three hours. The efficient co-operation of all concerned in the movement made possible the despatch of all the trains on the minute scheduled, with the exception of two, which were respectively four and five minutes late. As a result of a competition in loading inaugurated among the train commanders, few trains after the second day required more than five minutes from the time of arrival of the troops in the entraining area to the last man entrained. Fifteen trains were loaded in less than three and a half minutes each.⁶³ The utmost secrecy was maintained in the despatch of troop-trains to ports of embarkation and all telegraphic reports regarding their movements were transmitted in cipher. While railroad officials had been authorized as early as September 13, 1917, to notify accredited Red Cross representatives at points where troop-trains were scheduled to stop, on December 11 they were instructed not to impart this information in the case of trains moving toward a seaport.⁶⁴ This restriction remained in force until October 12, 1918, when it was removed by order of the Director of Operations.⁶⁵

As regards equipment it was at first the policy of the War Department to send troops to the ports of embarkation completely equipped with both personal equipment and organization property. This was not always practicable, however; the artillery units almost without exception took no guns with them, and horses or mules, when taken, were usually sent to Newport News for shipment to France. In November, 1917, General Pershing was insistent that all divisions and other units sent to France should be completely equipped with the authorized transportation, at least, before leaving the United States.⁶⁶ The instructions to the ports of embarkation directed that all equipment so far as practicable be shipped on the same vessel with the organization to which it pertained,⁶⁷ but the heavy troop movements in the summer of 1918 made this procedure difficult if not impossible. July 5, 1918, Pershing cabled that confusion existed due to the fact that organizations were still arriving without their equipment. He recommended that the organizations should be embarked with their equipment on the same transport; if that were impossible, organizations should be stripped of their organization property in the United States, the property turned into depots and subsequently shipped in bulk without reference to any particular organization: it would thus become available for general issue.⁶⁸ The second alternative was adopted August 10, 1918; thoops were ordered to take with them overseas only individual equipment and clothing, field ranges and organization records.⁶⁹ Until July 11, 1918, each enlisted man was entitled to carry with him a barrack bag with extra equipment, the weight being limited to seventy-five pounds; after that date his clothing and equipment were reduced to that carried on the person. Officers' baggage also was reduced, company officers being allowed to take only 150 pounds instead of the 250 pounds previously authorized.⁷⁰

From May, 19I7, when the Troop Movement Section began its work, until November 11, 1918, the railroads of the country transported 8,714,582 men, an average of 502,764 per month. The maximum was reached in July, 1918, when no less than 1,47,013 men were moved. Retween September 5, I9I7, and the armistice 2,287,926 drafted men were entrained at 4531 separate points in larger or smaller units and moved on schedule to their stations, in many cases upward of a day's journey, and in all cases were fed in transit.⁷¹ It would be difficult to overestimate the amount of detail involved in routing, scheduling, moving, and feeding these men. It required II,959 special troop-trains, each averaging 875.4 miles, to transport 5,046,092 men, in addition to the drafted men referred to above and the 1,380,564 men carried on regular trains. This is undoubtedly the greatest long-distance troop movement by land in history. The railroads carried 2,174,455 men into the crowded port terminals for embarkation overseas without interfering with the heavy traffic already being handled through those ports and in the adjacent territory. During one period of thirty days more than twenty troop-trains each day were brought into the port of New York. During the entire period of the war there were but sixteen train accidents involving death or injury; but thirty-nine men were killed and 335 injured. Of the total number of men moved during the war about 26.2 per cent. were draftpd men on their way to camp; 24.9 per cent. were troops moving toward the ports and the remaining 48.9 per cent. represents the mobilization of the Regular Army and National Guard, and the intercamp movements.

To accomplish so vast an achievement required the use of aproximately 70,413 sleeping-cars, 135,756 coaches, 16,285 baggage—and express-cars, and 23,075 freight-cars. The average number of men carried in each special troop-train was 421; the number of cars per train was 12.6 and an average rate of 19.8 miles per hour was maintained. Besides the 11,959 special troop-trains mentioned above it is estimated that 4576 special trains were required for drafted men. It was not found necessary, as in Europe, to utilize freight-cars for the transportation of troops; and in fact it was customary to furnish sleeping-cars in all journeys which extended over twenty-four hours. It was not always possible to do this, of course, but 2,671,074 men, about 30.6 per cent. of all troops moved, were handled in Pullman cars.⁷²

The work of the railroads of the United States in transporting the soldiers of the American army to the camps, from camp to camp, and finally to the ports of embarkation for service overseas, was not spectacular, nor did it receive as much attention as it deserved from the people of the country, for much of it was necessarily veiled in secrecy and the newspapers said very little about it. But it was splendidly done, nevertheless, and it was by no means the least factor in the ultimate success of the United States in the war. That the War Department so regarded it is shown by the fact that in March 1919, it conferred the Distinguished Service Medal upon Mr. George Hodges, manager of the Troop Movement Section, for meritorious services in connection with the movement of troops in the United States.

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Notes

¹ General Orders, no. 122, War Dept., Aug. 18, 1898.

² Report of the Quartermaster General, 1916.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Telegram, Secretary of War to state governors, June 18, 1916.

⁵ Reports of the Q. M. G., 1916, 19I7; Report of the Secretary of War, 1916; Report of the Chief of Staff, 1916.

⁶ First Annual Report of the Council of National Defense (Washington, 1917).

⁷ Rept. of the Q. M. G., 1917.

⁸ First Ann. Rept. of Council for Natl. Defense (Washington, 1917).

⁹ Special Committee on National Defense, Am. Ry. Assn. Bulletin, no. 9, Apr. 16, 1917.

¹⁰ General Orders, no. 38, War Dept., Apr. 2, 1917.

¹¹ Edgar E. Clark, Interstate Commerce Commission, Government Control and Operation of Railroads, Hearing before the Committee on Interstate Commerce, U. S. Senate, 65 Cong., 2 sess., pursuant to S. Res. 171 (Washington, 1918), p. 120.

¹² R. H. Aishton, president of the Chicago and N. W. R. R. and chairman of Central Department Subcommittee of the Railroads War Board, address,. Sept. 14, 1917, before the St. Louis Railway Club, quoted in Railway Age Gazette, Sept. 28, 1917, pp. 547 ff.

¹³ Special Committee on National Defense, Bulletin, no. 9, Apr. 16, 1917.

¹⁴ Id., Bulletin, no. 8, Mar. 27, 1917; also Special Regulations, no. 63, War Dept., Apr. 20, 1917.

¹⁵ George Hodges, Memorandum on Troop Movement Force, Dec. 31, 19I7.

¹⁶ Interview with H. Y. Turner, Troop Movement Section, Mar. 10, 1919.

¹⁷ For a full account of the work of the Railroads' War Board and of the U. S. R. R. Administration one must seek elsewhere. Here we are concerned only with the Troop Movement Section.

¹⁸ Circular, no. 3, U. S. R. R. Adminis., Div. of Trans., May 24, 1918.

¹⁹ Army Regulations, 1913, par. 1000; Field Service Regulations, 1914, par. 388.

²⁰ Rules and Regulations of the Quartermaster General (1915), pp. 209 ff. This paper does not concern itself with the problem of the transportation of supplies, but only with the story of troop movements.

²¹ Bulletin, no. 37, Oct. 10, 1917, of executive committee of Special Com mittee on National Defense, Am. Railway Assn.

²² General Orders, no. 102, War Dept., Aug. 4, 1917.

²³ Adjutant General to commanding generals of all departments and divisions, Dec. 29, 1917.

²⁴ Office Order (not numbered), Director of Traffic, Jan. 10, 1918.

²⁵ Id., no. 151, Director of Traffic, Jan. 15, 1918.

²⁶ Memorandum of Lt. Col. H. S. Ray, for executive officer, Purchase, Storage and Traffic Division, Dec. 5, 1918.

²⁷ Capt. J. D. Cutter to the same, Dec. 12, 1918.

²⁸ Office Order, no. 464, office of Q. M. G., June 15, 1918.

²⁹ Memorandum of George Hodges, Dec. 31, 1917.

³⁰ Mobilization Table, no. 3, Mobilization Section, Historical Branch, War Plans Division of the General Staff.

³¹ Report of the Adjutant General of the Army (19I7), table opposite p. 19.

³² F. E. Williamson, general agent, New York, to Maj. D. A. Watt, adjutant, port of embarkation, Hoboken, N. J., July 17, 1918.

³³ General Orders, no. 90, War Dept., July 12, 1917.

³⁴ Memorandum of George Hodges, Dec. 31, 1917.

³⁵ Records of the Troop Movement Section, U. S. R. R. Adminis.

³⁶ Report of the Acting Chief of the Militia Bureau (1918), pp. 8-10, 139.

³⁷ Second Report of the Provost Marshal General to the Secretary of War (Dec. 20, 1918), pp. 232 ff.

³⁸ Changes, no. 7, Selective Service Regulations, July 31, 1918.

³⁹ Memorandum of George Hodges, Dec. 31, 1917.

⁴⁰ " Specimen Entrainment Schedule ", Second Report of the Provost Marshal General, pp. 325 ff.

⁴¹ Rept. of the Provost Marshal Gen. (Dec. 20, 1917), p. 26; id., Second Report (Dec. 20, 1918), pp. 239 ff. AM. HIST. REV., VOL. XXVI.—31.

⁴² Second Rept. of the Provost Marshal Gen., pp. 240 ff.

⁴³ Army War College Records.

⁴⁴ Memorandum of Capt. T. W. Hammond, General Staff, for Chief of Staff, Sept. 27, 1917, approved Oct. 4, 1917. Army War College Records Army War College Records.

⁴⁵ Records of Troop Movement Section, U. S. R. R. Adminis.

⁴⁶ Bulletins, nos. 1 ff., Misc. Div., Adjutant General's office.

⁴⁷ Report of general agent at Camp Meade to George Hodges, Feb. 18, 1918.

⁴⁸ Reports of general agent at Camp Sherman to George Hodges, Dec. 10, 1917, and Feb. 27, 1918.

⁴⁹ Memorandum from the office of the Chief of Staff for the Adjutant General, Apr. 6, 1917; comment by General Bliss, acting chief of staff, on memorandum from General Kuhn, May 28, 1917.

⁵⁰ " A. E. F." proj ect of Sept. 18, 1917.

⁵¹ In his memorandum of July 10, 1917, Pershing places his total forces desired at I,Ioo,ooo; Sept. I8, I9I7, he increases this figure to 1,328,448. In his Schedule of Priority of Shipments, Oct. 7, 1917, he names 1,247,399 as his grand total, excluding aviation and replacement troops.

⁵² Memorandum of Gen. Henry Jervey, director of operations, to the Adjutant General, Mar. 27, 1918.

⁵³ Memorandum of Gen. Henry Jervey to the Chief of Staff, Feb. 18, 1918.

⁵⁴ Annual Report of the Director General of Railroads (1918), " Operations ",P. 47.

⁵⁵ Report of the Chief of Staff, U. S. A., to the Sec. of War (1918), pp. 10 ff.

⁵⁶ Annual Report of the Secretary of War (1919), pp. 3 ff.

⁵⁷ Rept. of the Chief of Staff, U. S. A., to the Sec. of War (19I9), p. 40.

⁵⁸ Report of Maj. S. J. Chamberlin, dispatch officer, to the commanding general at the port of embarkation, Hoboken, N. J., Aug. 29, 1918.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Memorandum of Lt. Col. J. R. McAndrews, General Staff Corps, for the Chief of Staff, Dec. 7, 1917.

⁶¹ Records of the Troop Movement Section, U. S. R. R. Adminis.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Report of Capt. C. D. Gorton, entraining officer, 8th Div., to commanding general, 8th Div., Oct. 26, 1918.

⁶⁴ Bulletins, nos. 30, 30A, Sept. 13, Dec. 11, 1917, of ex. com. of Special Committee on Natl. Defense, Am. Railway Assn.

⁶⁵ Memorandum, Gen. Henry Jervey for the Adjutant General, Oct. 12, 1918.

⁶⁶ Pershing, cable no. 279, par. 5, Nov. 10, 1917.

⁶⁷ Director of Purchase, Storage, and Traffic to the Adjutant General, Apr. 19, 1918.

⁶⁸ Pershing, cable no. 1419, July 5, 1918.

⁶⁹ Circular, War Dept., Aug. 10, 1918.

⁷⁰ Id., July 11, 1918.

⁷¹ The figures given here are those of the Troop Movement Section. Second Rept. of the Provost Marshal General (1918), p. 241, says that 2,755,476 drafted men were transported to camp by rail. It is quite possible that many men transported in regular trains were not reported to the Troop Movement Section, which concerned itself primarily with the movement of special trains.

⁷² Annual Report of the Director General of Railroads (1918), " Operations", pp. 46 ff.

Feeding Mars: The Role of Logistics in the German Defeat in Normandy, 1944

By Russell A. Hart

War in History, Vol. 3, No. 4 (November 1996)

Historians have long recognized that logistical difficulties contributedto German defeat in the 1944 Normandy campaign. The Allied aerial interdiction campaign initiated in March seriously hampered German resupply operations across the Loire and Seine rivers into Normandy. The consequent supply shortages not only prevented the Germans from seriously threatening the Allied bridgehead but also undermined German efforts to mount an effective defence. Beyond this general picture, however, historians know littie about precisely how and to what extent logistic deficiencies compromised the German defence of Normandy. This study describes German logistics in the 1944 Normandy campaign and demonstrates that logistic deficiencies were central to German defeat, and that they played a major role in the successful American breakout during Operation 'Cobra' in late July.¹

In 1943 the German army in the west, the Westheer, remained a back water of the German war effort. Under-strength, poorly equipped, and largely immobile, the Westheer possessed only a limited defensive capability. Nor did it possess the logistic infrastructure—fuel, munitions, and transport assets—necessary to sustain major action, let alone to repel an invasion. It was only on 3 November 1943 that Hitler issued his Directive 51 for the strengthening of the Westheer to defeat the inevitable 1944 Allied invasion. Between November 1943 and June 1944, the influx of fresh troops and Germany's latest weapons dramatically enhanced the Westheer's combat power. Directive 51, however, failed to assign logistic priority to the west. Thus there was no concomitant expansion of the Westheer's logistic resources. On the contrary, the German buildup emphasized 'teeth' over 'tail' to the detriment of the Westheer's ability to sustain a protracted defence. Inadequate supply, transport, and service units were combed out to strengthen combat formations. In part, the Westheer's inability to expand its logistic base before D-Day reflected the sustained decline of resources as Germany approached its sixth year of war. To a greater degree, however, it illustrated a traditional German military disdain for logistics.²

The most pernicious deficiency of the German army in its fifth year of war was its progressive demotorization. In 1939 Germany was among the least motorized societies in western Europe. Outside the elite, armoured forces, most of the German army remained a predominantly horse-drawn infantry force. After June 1941, attrition on the Eastern Front inexorably shrank the German motor transport pool and with it the mobility that was instrumental to both Germany's offensive and defensive victories. Up to 1943, confiscation of vehicles from the occupied territories offset Germany's battlefield losses: in 1942 alone, Germany rounded up over 600 000 vehicles. After Kursk, though, attrition progressively demotorized the German army. Between February and April 1944 alone, the German army's deficit of trucks and prime movers increased by 127% and 46% respectively.³

The German motor vehicle shortage was most pronounced in the west, where the largely immobile occupation forces depended on the excellent French rail network for transportation. Few trucks were available in the west to form a strategic transport reserve, and lack of spare parts entailed low serviceability rates. This immobility hindered the combat preparation of the Westheer prior to D-Day. By 6 June 1944 most German formations remained seriously deficient in motor vehicles, and consequently their mobility was limited. This poor mobility made the Westheer dependent on rail transport to redeploy its forces to an invasion site and for resupply operations. At war games in January 1944, the Germans estimated that without the French railroads they would require 40 000 tons of trucking capacity to defeat an invasion, or more than eight times the then available strategic transport reserve. The excess capacity of the French rail system and the existence of canal supply routes, however, convinced the Germans that they could resupply their forces by rail despite anticipated Allied interdiction efforts. Consequently, the Quartermaster General West, Major Otto Eckstein, was not unduly perturbed when in March 1944 the Allies unleashed an aerial interdiction campaign.⁴

However, the Germans seriously underestimated the effectiveness of the Allied interdiction campaign. Between March and D-Day, Allied air power isolated Normandy from the east by destroying all the bridges across the Seine below Paris, while attacks on railroad stations, marshalling yards, engine sheds, coaling stations, rail junctions, repair shops, and rolling stock all but ended train movement into Normandy. From mid-April the air attacks impinged on German troop and supply movements. Consequently an increasing backlog of trains developed throughout the west which delayed the arrival of large quantities of new weapons, construction materials, and supplies. On the eve of D-Day, over 1700 military trains were still struggling toward their destinations. The air offensive's greatest impact, though, was on the flow of fuel to the west. At the beginning of June, trains carrying 3.233 million gallons of fuel, the equivalent of 15% of the entire German stock in the west, were back logged across France.⁵

The Germans took three sets of countermeasures to minimize the impact of the air offensive on their resupply capability prior to D-Day Anti-aircraft batteries moved to protect bridges, communications hubs and rail lines. German rail engineer and bridge-building units were strengthened and redeployed to the Seine in an effort to restore communication links with Normandy. Finally, the Quartermaster General West attempted to expand his strategic truck transport reserve via vigoous confiscation drives among both the military and civilian sectors.⁶

These counter-measures met with little success. Greater anti-aircraft protection could only slow the inexorable destruction of German communications; but it also increased munitions expenditures and hence exacerbated German supply difficulties. Despite steady reinforcement, the German railroad engineer and bridge-building forces in the west were simply swamped by the scale of destruction. Moreover, their efforts to restore communications were poorly coordinated. Three factors compromised the German effort to expand their strategic trucking capacity: the Wehrmacht's overall shortage of motor vehicles, the need to improve the mobility of combat formations, and Hitler's insistence on overexpanding the Westheer. Inadequate production meant that only a limited number of new trucks could be sent to the west during the spring of 1944. These trucks were assigned both to new divisions that Hitler insisted be raised in the west and to existing divisions to enhance their mobility. Since new production was insufficient, the strategic truck reserve had to surrender about 10% of its capacity in May to complete the equipping of these new divisions. Therefore, because of Hitler's insistence on overexpansion, the Westheer was unable to expand its strategic truck transport reserve (see Table l).⁷

Table 1 Expansion of the German strategic transport reserve and decline in serviceability, 1944 (in metric tons)

Date	Capacity	Operational	Serviceable (%)
1 January 1944	9137	7073	71.5
1 February 1944	8856	7225	80.5
1 March 1944	9309	8005	86
1 April 1944	10185	8379	82
1 June 1944	9000	5850	65
1 July 1944	12500	6900	55

Sources: 'Transportraum in der Hand der OB West', Ob. West Qu.1 Br.B.Nr. 01800/44g.Kdos, v. 8.4.1944, Ob. West Qu.1 Br.B.Nr. 02250/44 G.Kdos, v. 8.5.1944, NARA T-314, 11, 7014858 and 7015007.

The Allied air offensive also eroded the German logistic position in the west prior to D-Day. The brake applied by the air campaign to the flow of supplies effectively reduced German stockpiles. The air offensive forced German supply operations off the rails and onto the roads, thereby increasing fuel consumption. To preserve dwindling stocks, the Westheer introduced stringent rationing on 3 June which halted 30% of its motor vehicles and slashed fuel allotted for training. The strategic transport reserve was forced to deliver supplies by road; its serviceability rates declined after April, eradicating the steady improvement initiated in November 1943 (see Table 1). Thus, before the invasion, the air campaign had eroded the Westheer's ability both to redeploy its reserves to an invasion site and to resupply such forces. Clearly, if the Germans proved unable to defeat the Allies on the beaches, they could only fight a protracted defence in the west if unprecedented levels of supplies could delivered from the Reich to the invasion sector.⁸

Thus on 6 June 1944 the German logistic position in France remained inadequate for a prolonged defence. Munitions stockpiles were limited: the Westheer had amassed about three weeks' stocks for its coastal defence divisions, four weeks' stocks for the port fortresses, but only two weeks' stocks for its mobile reserves. The German fuel situation was even more precarious. The Westheer had only seven to ten days' fuel stockpiled for its strategic reserves. While supplies with the front-line troops were adequate for the initial stages of an invasion, if the assault was not quickly repulsed a successful defence demanded the rapid shipment of the reserve stockpiles to the invasion site. Given the attack on the French rail system, completing this mission presented serious problems.⁹

From war diaries it is possible to reconstruct the German logistic sitation in north-western France on the eve of D-Day (see Tables 2 and 3) The defending German 7th Army possessed 18 748 tons of stockpiled munitions, sufficient for about three weeks' combat. Of this total, however, only 38% (7172 tons) was stockpiled in Normandy; the rest was stored in distant Breton depots (see Figure 1). The 7th Army's petrol situation was more perilous. On 1 June it possessed 1.035 million gallons of reserve fuel stocks, sufficient for only two weeks' mobile operations.

Table 2 Seventh Army munitions stockpiled at mainland depots, 1 June 1944 (in metric tons)

Normandy		Brittany		Total
Depot	Stocks	Depot	Stocks
Michel	2109	Martin	1925
Martha	2008	Manfred	2516
Max	1417	Mathilde	2135
		Moritz	2340
TOTAL	7172		11576	18738

Source: 'Versorgungslage A.O.K 7 Stand: 1 Juni 1944', NARA T-312, 1571, 000607.

Table 3 German army fuel stockpiles in mainland Normandy, 1 June 1944 (in thousands of gallons)

Seventh Army depots		Strategic reserve depots
Location	Stocks	Location	Codename	Stocks
St Bertharix	17	Chateaubriant	Bruno	258
Le Mans	38	Domfront	Brigitte	132
Rennes	40	Pontivy	Brigitte	132
Lamballe	11
Landemeau	78
Quimper	8
Pluvigner	34
Flain	67
Herineville	23
St Sauveur	18
Noyers	6
Domfront	5
TOTAL	335			645

Source: 'Versorgungslage AOK 7 Stand: 1 Juni 1944', NARA T-312, 1571, 000607.

The 7th Army's gravest problem, though, remained distribution. On the eve of D-Day its quartermaster had at his disposal only 248 trucks with a lift capacity of 994 metric tons. This was utterly inadequate to meet even minimal resupply needs. Given the effects of the air campaign, the 7th Army was dependent on the delivery of supplies from the strategic reserve depots located around Paris. In the first days of the invasion, however, Allied air attacks closed all the major rail lines into Normandy from the south across the Loire, thus completing the isolation of Normandy.¹⁰

Figure 1 German supply depots and rail resupply routes, western France, June-August 1944.

On 6-7 June the 7th Army began to redeploy its operational mobile reserves to Normandy. To accomplish this task alone, however, required 20 times its available lift capacity. Thus as early as 7 June planned German troop redeployments to Normandy grossly exceeded the available trucking capacity, and the 7th Army's ability to resupply these formations once committed to combat. In these circumstances, the Germans established a fixed policy in an effort to forestall the Allied establishment of an impregnable lodgement. Priority was accorded to getting the troops to Normandy. Once there, the Westheer would worry about resupplying its forces. Given the effective interdiction of rail communications and the inadequacy of the strategic truck reserve, this resupply mission would present the Germans with insurmountable difficulties.¹¹

The priority accorded to troop redeployments exacerbated German resupply difficulties. In consequence, persistent logistical deficiencies plagued the German defence of Normandy. Because of the paralysis of the French rail network, the shortage of road lift capacity, and the priority given to troop movements, the Quartermaster General West could not dispatch sufficient supplies to cover front line consumption. Allied operations (air attack, sabotage, etc.) also inflicted a heavy toll on German resupply operations. During June enemy action destroyed 20% of German supplies en route to the front. Moreover, the aerial threat seriously delayed the delivery of supplies to the combat zone. Resupply operations had to be confined largely to night time. Round-trip resupply operations from Paris to Normandy thus averaged four to five days. Consequently, only a fraction of the supplies consumed at the front could be replaced. Up to 15 June, average daily deliveries of munitions covered less than 15% of daily expenditures. By 28 June only 37% of the munitions dispatched to the 7th Army had arrived. German supplies were even more vulnerable to Allied air attack once in the theatre of operations. Several major German munitions depots were destroyed by air attack in June. Consequently, the 7th Army's stocks rapidly diminish Thus German units throughout the campaign lacked sufficient ammnition for offensive operations.¹²

The German petrol situation became even more critical. Between 9 and 13 June the Quartermaster General West dispatched his entire pet reserve to Normandy. Fuel delivery was made more problematic by the dearth of fuel tankers in France and their vulnerability to air attack Moreover, German fuel depots were primary targets for Allied air strikes. The depot code-named 'Berta' located near Domfront was destroyed air attack on 13 June. A more serious blow was the destruction of the largest German fuel depot in the west, located at Gennevilliers outsside Paris, on 22 June with the loss of 607 000 gallons of fuel. Thus available fuel stocks plummeted. By 14 June the 7th Army had no stockpiled fuel left in Normandy and only 63000 gallons in Brittany, less than one days's supply. Even front-line units were down to a mere two or three days' stocks (sufficient to travel 100-150 km). Thus by the second week of the invasion the 7th Army had become dependent on daily fuel deliveries by rail and road from outside Normandy. Thereafter, only stringent rationing and repeated depredation of other field commands and Werhmacht branches could sustain German mobility in Normandy.¹³

In the first week of the invasion, Allied ground forces reaped considable benefits from the air offensive: the Germans were unable to run a single supply train into Normandy across the Seine and Loire. By 14 June the German supply situation was officially described as 'catastrophic'. During that week the Germans realized that a protracted defence was only possible if rail communications were restored to Normandy. There after, the Germans abandoned their uncoordinated and dispersed rail repair operations and focused on opening—and keeping open—two major rail arteries into Normandy: the Paris-Versailles-Dreux-Surdon line from the east and the Tours—Le Mans—Alençon—Sees—Surdon line from the south (see Figure 1). These two lines served the 7th Army's major depots in the Le Mans—Alençon area. Frantic work reopened thesetwo lines during the second week of the invasion. On the night of 18-19 June rail travel resumed from Paris to Dreux and Verneuil and across the Loire at Tours as far as Le Mans. The Tours St Cyr bridge remainedso badly damaged, however, that it could not hold the weight of fully loaded trains. Locomotives had to be detached on the approach to the bridge, the wagons hauled across and then recoupled. On 25 June the badly damaged Tours Cinq Mars bridge also reopened under similar operating restrictions. The precarious condition of the two Tours bridges, plus the damage inflicted on the rail infrastructure in that area, meant that the southern artery remained only partially accessible. Most trains thus continued to unload south of the Loire until the end of July.¹⁴

While the Germans endeavoured to reopen rail lines into Normandy, they were dependent on the delivery of supplies by road. Despite his best efforts, which included rigorous round-ups, constant attrition prevented the Quartermaster General West from significandy expanding his road transport capacity after D-Day (see Table 1). In fact, during the Normandy campaign the demotorization of the German forces accelerated as automobile losses exceeded deliveries. Allied tactical air forces inflicted a heavy toll on German transport assets moving supplies up from the rail heads and depots to the front. Furthermore, the relegation of resupply operations largely to night-time increased accident rates. In the first ten days of the invasion alone, 20% of the German strategic transport reserve was disabled by air attacks, breakdowns, and accidents. By late June the Germans were losing an average of 30 supply trucks daily. Incomplete figures for June indicate that over 2225 tons of truck transport capacity was lost on resupply missions. These were in addition to losses at the front: in June alone Army Group B lost 4200 vehicles, including 1866 trucks. Despite all their efforts, the Germans were unable significandy to expand their strategic transport reserve during the campaign.¹⁵

The German dependence on road resupply increased fuel consumption, thus aggravating the German fuel shortage. During June the strategic transport reserve alone consumed 800 000 gallons. Allied action also interdicted a significant proportion of German fuel dispatched to the west. Of the 9.9 million gallons sent in June, 1.95 million gallons were destroyed en route to Normandy, a million gallons were destroyed at depots, and more than 172000 gallons were lost in the combat zone. Thus only about 60% of the fuel dispatched in June made it to the front Army Group B made the pessimistic assessment that without a marked improvement in its logistic situation it would run out of fuel between 20 and 25 July.¹⁶

In late June, however, the German logistic situation in Normandy finally began to improve. This was the result of four developments: the reopening of rail movement into Normandy described above; the initiation of ferrying operations on both flanks of the Normandy front increased 'self-reliance' as front-line divisions sent their own truck columns to collect supplies from rear depots; and the division of German supply responsibilities on the invasion front.¹⁷

With the restoration of limited rail communications to Normandy, the Germans were finally able to run a limited number of supply trains into the combat zone. In the latter half of June the Germans ran, on average two supply trains a night to the advanced rail-heads. The restoration of rail communications increased the flow of supplies to the front in late June by about one-quarter. During the week 8-14 July, 17% and 35% of total German deliveries of munitions and fuel arrived by rail.¹⁸

Beginning in mid-June, the Germans also expanded ferrying operations across the Seine. In spring 1944, 17 ferries were operating on the Seine with a cargo capacity of 420 tons. During the first weeks of the invasion the Germans transported additional ferries to the Seine and constructed new ones on site. German naval personnel worked feverishly to establish new dock facilities at Elbeuf for barges carrying supplies down the Seine from Paris. On 18 June the first barges left Paris, unloading at Elbeuf three days later. Thereafter the Seine ferrying operation expanded rapidly, and by July it was delivering about one-fifth of the supplies reaching Normandy.¹⁹

Parallel ferrying activities were also initiated from the Atlantic ports of Bordeaux and Royan to the ports of Brest, St Nazaire, St Malo, and Cherbourg. But due to lack of shipping capacity, Allied air attacks, the distances involved, and supply shortages in western France, the Atlantic ferrying operation never made as significant a contribution to the German resupply effort as did the Seine ferrying. At its height, during the week 8-14 July, Atlantic ferrying accounted for 16% of total munitions delivered.²⁰

With the reopening of rail communications and the instigation of ferrying, the flow of supplies to central Normandy significandy increased. By mid-July half of total German supply deliveries arrived by rail and water. But the major German difficulty remained the transshipment of these supplies from the rear depots, ports, and rail-heads to the front. This difficulty could only be alleviated by combat units collecting their own supplies. From mid-June the use of divisional transport columns on supply-collection missions to army depots and rail-heads became commonplace. The losses suffered by the truck columns employed on these missions exacerbated the increasing immobility of front-line units (see Table 4).²¹

In early July, the Westheer divided logistic responsibility for the Normandy front. Hitherto, the 7th Army had been solely responsible for all resupply operations. Hereafter, Panzer Group West assumed the supply mission on the right (or eastern) flank where it opposed the Anglo-Canadians at Caen. The 7th Army's responsibility was limited to the western flank opposite the American forces advancing on St Lô. This separation eased the administrative strain that the 7th Army's quartermaster had been under.

Table 4 Decline in serviceability rates of trucks and prime movers among selected German mechanized divisions in Normandy, June-August 1944 (%)

Formation	1 June		1 July		1 August
21st Pz. Div.	93	185	67	134	65	133
12th SS Pz. Div.	65	33	54	24
Pz. Lehr. Div.	77	73	77	80	59	55
2nd Pz. Div.	81	73	35	23
1st SS Pz. Div.	—	—	84	69	70	26
average monthly decline %			25	25	15	31

Source: 'Zustandberichte, Panzer Divisionen, Stand 1.6-1.8.1944', General Inspektor der Panzertruppen, NARA T-78, rolls 616, 623-4, 718-19.

During July the German logistical situation on the eastern flank continued to improve, albeit slowly. The Germans managed to run several supply trains through to Dreux and Verneuil nightly, as well as to unload several barges at Elbeuf. By concentrating its resources on only a couple of lines, the German railroad engineers were able to keep the Versailles-Dreux line open despite repeated air attacks. Allied air power also proved unable to neutralize the Seine ferries: they were much harder to hit than bridges or rail installations, and ferrying mainly took place at night. Panzer Group West was thus able to resupply its forces sufficiently to halt all Anglo-Canadian efforts to push south-east and capture Falaise.

On the German western flank, where the 7th Army opposed the Ameicans at St Lo, however, there was no parallel improvement in July. On the contrary, the German logistic situation deteriorated further. Ferrying was less extensive, resupply distances greater, and lateral communications lines less developed. Moreover, the Germans simply proved unable to run as many supply trains into Normandy across the Loire as they could across the Seine. Consequently, in the face of major American offensive action between 3 and 21 July that culminated in the fall of St. Lô, the 7th Army's supply stockpiles dwindled. But it was the German inability to sustain rail deliveries across the Loire that contributed directly to the collapse of the German front at St Lô in late July. The catalyst for an ultimately fatal decline in the 7th Army's supply situation on the American sector of the Normandy front was the renewed destruction of the St Cyr railway bridge and the marshalling yards at the communications hub of Tours on 15 July. Since its reopening in mid-June Tours had become the supply lifeline for the 7th Army. Between 9 June and 7 July, 10 440 tons of supplies passed through Tours by rail, an average of 360 tons a day. This route accounted for about one-third of the total supplies reaching western Normandy, and more than 40% of the 7th Army's fuel. The importance of the Tours supply line can be gauged by the immediate and frantic German effort to repair the bridge by erecting a temporary span.²²

As the Tours supply artery was reclosed, the Quartermaster General West's ability to resupply the 7th Army by road continued to decline as his trucking pool diminished. Due to the few lateral lines of communication in western Normandy, and the greater distances involved, resupplying the 7th Army was more difficult than supplying Panzer Group West on the eastern flank. Moreover, a smaller proportion of the supplies dispatched to the 7th Army made it to the front. Even before the destruction of Tours, the 7th Army had become increasingly dependent on its own truck columns to bring up supplies.²³

The destruction of the Tours supply artery accelerated the decline in the 7th Army's logistical position. The Quartermaster General West could not compensate for the cessation of rail delivery of fuel by increased road delivery. Consequently, in the week after the destruction of Tours, petrol dispatched to the 7th Army fell by 22%. Moreover, the destruction of the 7th Army fuel depot 'Bruno' near Chateaubriant by Allied air attack on 16 July compounded German fuel difficulties. An examination of fuel returns for the LXXXIV Corps on the St Lô front demonstrates a sustained depletion of petrol stocks at the very moment when US forces were preparing to launch Operation 'Cobra', their break out effort (see Table 5).²⁴

Table 5 Comparison of fuel availability, St Lô and Caen sectors, June-July 1944 (in ration allotments)

	6 June	14 June	18 June	3 July	7 July	8 July	10 July	24 July
Caen	3.0	1.5	1.6	1.3	1.3	1.8	1.3	?
St Lô	3.0	1.0	1.3	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.7

Sources: Versorgungslage u. Tagesmeldungen, I SS Pz. Korps, LXXXIV Korps, Pz.Gr. West, 7th Army, Army Group B, OB West, O.Qu. West, NARA T-311, rolls 1-5, 27-8; T 312, 1569-70; T-313, 420-2, T-314, 1568.

The Germans reopened the Tours rail bridge on 23 July. But this was too late to replenish the 7th Army's supplies before the onset of Cobra on 25 July. In the meantime the Anglo-Canadians launched Operation 'Goodwood' (18-20 July) to hold German reserves on the eastern flank. Controversy still surrounds the contribution that Goodwood made to the success of Cobra. But what historians have missed in assessing Good wood's contribution was its impact on German logistics. It was in this realm that its contribution was decisive. The Quartermaster General West was only able to dispatch petrol by road to the 7th Army on one day in the week between Goodwood and Cobra, as his tanker columns were fully committed to resupply operations on the Anglo-Canadian sector after the heavy Goodwood expenditures. The 7th Army only maintained its petrol receipts at 73% of pre-Goodwood levels by employing most of its own trucks to collect fuel from the Le Mans, Alençon, and Dreux rail-heads. Even then, on the eve of Cobra, the German LXXXIV Corps defending the St Lô front only had sufficient fuel to travel 74 km, enough for about two days' heavy combat. In fact, as the Americans unleashed Cobra on 25 July, the first fuel train arrived at Le Mans via Tours, too late to reach the German front-line troops during the decisive first 48 hours in which the German front was broken.²⁵

Evidence suggests that the closure of the Tours rail route had a less detrimental impact on the flow of munitions than on the flow of fuel to the 7th Army. Nonetheless, it did have an important impact on the munitions situation at the front. To increase turnaround time after the destruction of Tours, the Quartermaster General West curtailed the distance that his transport columns were allowed to travel. Thus on 17 July the Germans abandoned deliveries to the 7th Army's largest and most forward munitions depot, 'Michel' at St Sever, 40 km east of Granville. Likewise, 'Mina' and the fuel depot 'Brehmse' were ordered to close on 21 July. Instead, deliveries were diverted to depots further back such as 'Martha', east of Domfront. This quadrupled the distance that divisional transport columns on the St Lô front had to travel to collect munitions, and further strained the German petrol situation. Consequently, German munitions holdings on the St Lô sector steadily declined during July. Between late June and 24 July, Kampfgruppe Kentner's munitions stocks for machine guns and mortars declined by 64% and 75%, respectively. A rare extant munitions return for Kampfgruppe Kuske of the 17th SS Panzer-grenadier Division 'Gotz von Berlichingen' on the St Lô sector on the eve of Cobra also illustrates the extent of the German munitions shortages. The battle group possessed only 1 000 rounds per machine gun, and 30 rounds per rifle—about sufficient for one day of heavy combat.²⁶

Assessments of the success of Cobra have focused almost exclusively on the rapid and effective American execution of the operation in combination with the badly weakened state of the German defence. But close analysis of the density of the German defence on the St LLô and Caen sectors on the eve of Cobra illustrates that there was litde disparity in German strength on the two sectors (see Table 6). Moreover, during August the Germans would successfully stall three Anglo-Canadian offensives where the Germans were far more heavily outnumbered than at Cobra.²⁷

The missing link in the explanation of the success of Cobra are German logistical deficiencies. During Cobra, for the first time in the campaign, such difficulties prevented the Germans from offering an effective defence. It was these problems, as much as combat exhaustion, that made it impossible for the Germans to cordon off the Cobra break-in on 25—6 July as they had all previous Allied offensives. By the first evening of Cobra, the defending German LXXXIV Corps had expended all the ammunition for the 88 mm anti-aircraft guns which formed the back bone of its anti-tank defence. Supply shortages explain why the 7th Army's reserve, the elite and still powerful 2nd SS Panzer Division 'Das Reich', utterly failed to make its presence felt on the Cobra batdefield. On 26 July, the 7th Army reported that the counter-measures by the defending LXXXIV Corps had been 'significandy prohibited' by petrol shortages: that very day Das Reich had to abandon two companies of Panther tanks for want of fuel. By 28 July, LXXXIV Corps's munitions stocks were 'critically low'. When combined with the German numerical weakness, German fuel and munitions shortages prevented the Germans from halting the Cobra breakout.²⁸

Once the Americans had secured a breakthrough, mounting logistical problems and dwindling mobility unravelled the German defence in Normandy. The crisis at the front forced the Germans to resume daylight resupply missions in late July, which caused German motor vehicle losses to snowball. During the first week of August the forward German supply depots were overrun, and thereafter the Germans had no prospect of shoring up the front: German defeat in Normandy became inevitable. The 5th Panzer Army (the renamed Panzer Group West) then had to resupply all the German forces in Normandy from distant depots located near the Seine. The retreating German forces thus rapidly began to run out of fuel across the entire front. From 15 August fuel shortages increasingly stranded 7th Army formations, and for the first time the Germans began to abandon stranded armour en masse. In the last two weeks of August the fleeing German forces abandoned motor vehicles by the thousand. The Germans managed to extricate across the Seine about one third of the troops, one-quarter of the vehicles, and 10% of the heavy weapons that they had committed to Normandy.²⁹

Table 6 Density of German defences of the St Lô and Caen sectors, 25 July 1944 (per kilometre)

Command (sector)	Infantry battalions	Artillery batteries	Armour
1 SS Pz. Corps (Caen)	2	2	19
LXXXIV Corps (St Lô)	2	3	16

Sources: Tagesmeldungen, Kriegsgliederurigen, u. Zustaridberichte I SS Pz. Korps, LXXXIV Korps, Pz.Gr. West, u. Seventh Army, NARA T-312, 1568-70; T-313, 420-2; T 314, 1568.

Clearly, logistical difficulties were a major factor in the collapse of the German defence of Normandy. They prevented the Germans from making a serious threat against the Allied lodgement and undermined the German defence. In the absence of rail communications, insufficient supplies were delivered by road to the front and existing stockpiles were thus rapidly depleted just to maintain German forces at defensive supply levels. Only by reopening one major rail artery into Normandy across both the Seine and Loire and by expanding ferrying activities did a gradual improvement in the German logistic situation in Normandy materialize in late June. During July this improvement continued in eastern Normandy, where Panzer Group West opposed the Anglo-Canadians. The key to this was the Seine ferrying operations and the rail deliverie from Paris to Dreux and Verneuil. From these rail-heads the distance to the front by road was relatively short, and thus a higher proportion of supplies dispatched actually reached the front. In western Normandy, where the German 7th Army faced the Americans, there was no improvement in the supply situation during July. The Germans proved unable to run as many supply trains along the Tours-Alenfon-Le Mans line as they could on the eastern flank. Ferrying along the Atlantic coast was less significant, and the distances involved much greater. Finally, the distance by road from Alen^on to Le Mans and the Breton ports to the front was considerably further too. Hence a smaller proportion of supplies made it to the 7th Army and delivery time was greater. Conse quently, the German supply situation on the western flank continued to decline in July. With the renewed destruction of Tours on 15 July, the German resupply effort for the 7th Army suffered a crippling blow. German efforts to increase deliveries by road to the 7th Army from the rail heads in eastern Normandy were hindered by the greater distances involved and by the launching of the Anglo-Canadian Goodwood offensive on 18 July. The Germans did manage to reopen the Tours line on 23 July, but this proved too late to replenish the 7th Army's supplies before the start of Operation 'Cobra' two days later. Critically short of fuel and munitions, the 7th Army proved unable to halt the American breakout at the end of July, thereby condemning the Germans to defeat in Normandy. In retrospect, the fortuitous destruction of Tours ten days before the initiation of Cobra proved optimal timing for the success of the American breakout bid. If Tours had been destroyed any earlier the Germans could have repaired the bridge in time to bring up fresh sup plies; any later and German supply levels might not have been sufficiently eroded to ensure a decisive breakout.

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Notes

¹The author thanks Jason Coy, Allison Gough, and Mark Grimsley for commenting on earlier drafts of this article. The only study of German logistics is the US Army Historical Division, European Theater of Operations, Foreign Military Studies Manuscript B-827, Maj. Otto Eckstein, 'Activities of the Oberquartiermeister West During the Time of Preparation for Warding Off an Invasion and During the Initial Combats', Germany, 1947, published in Donald Detweiler, ed., WWII German Military Studies (New York, Garland, 1979), XII.

² For an extensive evaluation of the Westheer's weaknesses in late summer 1943, see National Archives Record Administration, Captured German Documents (hereafter NARA) microfilm series T-311, roll 27, frame 7032324ff. Concerning Normandy specifically, see 'Personelle Zusammensetzung', Beilage zu Anlage zu Gen. Kdo. LXXXIV A. K. Ia. Nr. 1808/43 g.Kdos., v. 4/10/1943, NARA T-314, 1604, 001032; and 'Hebung der Kampfkraft der Infanterie', 709 Inf. Div. Abt. Ia Nr. 745/43 g.Kdos., d. 12/7/1943, NARA T-314, 1604, 000731.

³ On the lack of motorization in the German army, see Richard DiNardo, Mechanized Juggernaut (New York, Greenwood Press, 1991) and W. Victor Madej (ed.) German War Economy: The Motorization Myth (Allentown, PA, Game Publishing, 1984). Truck and prime-mover shortages increased from 36093 and 5772 on 1 Feb. 1944 to 82096 and 8423 on 1 May 1944. Werner Stang, 'Zahlenmaterial zur Materiellen Lage der faschistischen Wehrmacht im Zweiten Weltkrieg', Militärgesckichte IV (Apr. 1973), pp. 61-80. See also 'Waffe: Stand 1 Juni 1944', OKH O. Qu., NARA T-78, 168, 000401-403.

⁴ On 1 June 1944 the German mechanized divisions in the West possessed only 39% and 22%, respectively, of their authorized trucks and prime movers. 'Zustandberichte Panzer-Divisionen Stand: 1 Juni 1944', General Inspektor der Panzertruppen, NARA T-78, 623-4. On that date the Westheer was short of 11 447 trucks and 1760 prime movers; see 'Kraftfahrzeuge (ungepanzert) Heer: Western'. OKH Gen. Qu., d. 5/8/1944, NARA T-78, 726, 6076170. For discussion of the spring 1944 war games, see Eckstein, 'Activities', p. 24.

⁵ On the importance of the aerial interdiction campaign to Allied victory in Normandy, see Public Record Office, Kew (hereafter PRO, Kew) AIR 40/1669, RAF Bombing Analysis Unit, 'The Effect of the OVERLORD Air Plan to Disrupt Enemy Rail Communications'; PRO W[ar] 0[ffice] 205/172, 'Pre-invasion Bombing Campaign'; Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II III: Europe: Argument to V-E Day, January 1944 to May 1945 (Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1951); Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939—1945 III: Victory pt.5 (London, HMSO, 1961); Walt W. Rostow, Pre-invasion Bombing Strategy: General Eisenhower's Decision of 25 March, 1944 (Austin, Univ. of Texas Press, 1981); and Maj. O. Jaggi, 'Normandie 1944: Auswirkung der allierten Luftüberlegenheit auf die deutsche Abwehr', Allegemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift, CXXIV (H5) (1958), pp. 333-61. In spring 1944 the Germans had only one regiment of railroad engineers, the 6th, deployed in the West. On the backlog of trains, see 'Vortragnotiz', Anl. zum Ktb. Ob. Kdo. Hg. B Vers. Abt. Ib, d. 3/6/1944, NARA T-311, 1, 7000664. Capacities given are in US gallons.

⁶ In Apr. 1944 the Germans had in the West 3 heavy (60-ton) and 6 light (8-ton) bridging columns; by 17 May the number had increased to 4 and 11 respectively. War in History 1996 3 (4) The number of ersonnel employed on railroad repair activities increased from 1300 on 11 Mar. to 12200 on 3 June. PRO, Kew, W0233/30, 'Report by SHAEF on the Effects of the OVERLORD Nov. 1944, p. 33.

⁷ Between Apr. and Aug. 1944 the Westheer received 11 254 trucks. Despite this influx, Hitler's insistence on overexpanding the Westheer saw its truck shortage increase from 7281 on 1 Aug. 1943 to 11 447 on 1 June 1944. 'Kraftfahrzeuge (ungepanzert) Heer: (Western)', 15 Aug. 1943 and 5 Sept. 1943, OKH Gen. Qu„ NARA T-78, 614, 000552, 000601; 'Kraftfahrzeuge (ungepanzert) Heer: Western', 5 Aug. 1944 and 5 Oct. 1944, OKH Gen. Qu„ NARA T-78, 726, 6076089, 6076170. Between 1 Apr. and 31 July 1944 the 6th Rail Engineer Regiment rebuilt 136 bridges, totalling 16824 metres, a rate of one bridge every day. Tkb. Juni 1944 Ia/Stopi Hg. B, NARA T-311, 28, 7034030; Pz.Gr.Kdo. West Ia/Stopi Meldung la Nr. 2809/44 geh., NARA T-311, 28, 7034003. Of the 10 rail bridges over the lower Seine, one was reopened in June but demolished again in early July, another reopened in early July but was destroyed again before the end of the month, and a further two reopened in late July.

⁸ During early May German fuel consumption increased to 450 000 litres per day. An 581 zu Ktb. Ob. West la Nr. 3898/44 geh. Kdos., v. 16/5/44, NARA T-311, 24, 7028565-7. The economy measures introduced on 3 June grounded all passenger cars with 2-litre engines or larger and cut fuel for training by 15%. 'Betreibstoff Einschränkung', Ob. West Ia/O.Qu. West/Qu. 1 Nr. 027921/44 g.Kdos., v. 3/6/1944, NARA T-311, 29, 7183272. German fuel stocks in the West increased fractionally, from 74.157 million litres on 1 Jan. 1944 to 81.1 million litres on 1 May 1944. Anlage 6 zu Ob. West/O.Qu. West/Qu. 1 Nr. 0700/44 g.Kdos., v. 12/2/44, NARA T 311, 14, 7014621-4; Anlage 6 zu Ob. West/O.Qu. West/Qu. 1/Betr. StofFNr. 02290/44 g.Kdos. v. 8/4/44, NARA T-311, 014, 7015022-3.

⁹ On the German logistic situation on the eve of D-Day, see Eckstein, 'Activities', pp. 14-20, and 'Mun. Bevorratung im Westen', GenStdH/Gen. U./Gr. Mun. I Az. 2359 Nr. 1/011 901/44 geh. Kdos., vom 25/5/44, NARA T-311, 24, 7028940. German mobile reserves on the eve of D-Day possessed between 3.5 and 5 fuel allotments (Verbrauchsatz, abbreviated VS). One VS provided fuel to travel 100 km and was reckoned sufficient for 2 days' combat.

¹⁰ Seventh Army supply return, 1 June 1944, NARA T-312, 1571, 000607. On 1 Jan. 1944 the 7th Army possessed 7450 000 litres of gasoline. This total had dropped to 4 663 000 litres by 18 June. 'Auszüge aus Versorgungs-Tagesmeldungen', Hg. B lb Nr. 0355/44 geh. d. 18/6/44, NARAT-311, 1, 7000704-5. Direct comparison of lift capacities of Allied and German trucks are complicated by two factors. First, the imperial ton is 1.6% larger than the metric ton. Second, unlike the Allies, who rated trucks according to their payload capacity, German classification was based on the weight of a loaded vehicle. Since a vehicle can carry roughly its own weight, the German rating system actually doubles the true lift capacity. Hence an Allied 1.5-ton truck had about the same lift capacity as a German 3-ton truck. Thus the true lift capacity of the 7th Army on D-Day was about 500 tons. 'Starke des Transportraumes für Verlastungszwecke', AOK 7 la Nr. 2702/44 g.Kdos., NARA T-311, 1, 7000677-8. The Allies did not seriously attack the Loire bridges prior to D-Day because the total isolation of Normandy would have identified it as the invasion site.

¹¹ 'Stärke des Transportraumes für Verlastungszwecke', AOK 7 la Nr. 2708/44 g.Kdos., NARA 311, 1, 1000677-8. The priority accorded to troop movements is evident by the discrepancy between supply and troop trains arriving in June. While only 41 supply trains arrived, no fewer than 157 troop trains arrived.

¹² Up to 15 June, the 7th Army expended 5 000 tons of munitions but received only 3000 tons; see 'AuszUp to 15 June, the 7th Army expended 5 000 tons of munitions but received only 3000 tons; see 'Auszüge aus Versorgungs Tagesmeldungen', Hg. B lb Nr. 0355/44 geh., d. 18/6/1944, NARA T-311, 1, 7000704-5. On the destruction of depots, see O. Qu. West, 'Besonders der Ereignisse', 30 June 1944, NARA T-311, 14, 7014553. Incomplete returns for the 7th Army indicate that it lost 654000 litres of fuel, 2 308 tons of munitions, and 2225 tons of trucking capacity during June. Ausfall meldungen', O. Qu. AOK 7 Nr. 9654/44 geh., d. 30/6/44, NARA T-312, 1571, 000841. On the effectiveness of Allied interdiction efforts, see Ktb. O. Qu. West, d. 28/6/1944, NARA T-311, 14, 000550. ge aus Versorgungs Tagesmeldungen', Hg. B lb Nr. 0355/44 geh., d. 18/6/1944, NARA T-311, 1, 7000704-5. On the destruction of depots, see O. Qu. West, 'Besonders der Ereignisse', 30 June 1944, NARA T-311, 14, 7014553. Incomplete returns for the 7th Army indicate that it lost 654000 litres of fuel, 2 308 tons of munitions, and 2225 tons of trucking capacity during June. Ausfall meldungen', O. Qu. AOK 7 Nr. 9654/44 geh., d. 30/6/44, NARA T-312, 1571, 000841. On the effectiveness of Allied interdiction efforts, see Ktb. O. Qu. West, d. 28/6/1944, NARA T-311, 14, 000550.

¹³ O. Qu. West released 924000 gallons of fuel between 9 and 10 June. By 13 June his reserve stocks were down to a mere 7150 gallons. Tkb. Ib Hg. B, v. 10/6/1944, NARA T-311, 1, 000710, NARA T-311, 14, 7014537, and Ultra Intercept, KV8122, 15/6/1944, PRO, Kew, DEFE 3/172. Seventh Army supply statistics are recorded in NARA T-311, 15, 7015185. The Quartermaster General West only had 2 specialized fuel tanker columns at his disposal. For attacks on fuel depots, see NARA T-311, 14, 7014539, and Ob. West la Nr. 5676/44 geh., v. 23/6/44, NARA T-311, 14, 7029783. War in History 1996 3 (4)

¹⁴ On 25 and 27 June the Saumur and Chalonnes (La Possonnière) bridges were also reopened. The following lateral lines were also temporarily reopened in late June: Le Mans—Sable—Sègre—Redon—Quimper and Nantes—Rennes—Dol (23 June); Saumur—Chateau du Loir—Le Mans and Nantes—Angers—Le Mans (28 June). Two-thirds of the troop trains routed to Normandy across the Loire in June were forced to disembark south of the river. 'Seit Beginn der Invasion wurde folgende Wehrmacht—Transporte in Frankreich—Belgien—Holland gefahren', General des Transportwesens West Abt. Ib, n.d., 'Zusammenstellung der Ausladungen der Reichs— u. Basis—züge im Juni 1944', n.d., 'Ausladungen der Einzelnachschubsendungen innerhalb der besetzten West—gebiete', n.d., NARA T-78, 611, 000088, 000089, and 000092; Chef Trspw./vorgesch. Staffel, untided bridge report, 23/6/1944, General des Eisenbahntruppen, NARA T 78, 613, 000340-1; 'Zusammenstellung der in der Zeit vom 1/4-30/6/44 im Armeebereich durchgeführten bewegungen', AOK 7 BVTO, NARA T-312, 1571, 000983; 'Eisenbahn-nachschubtransporte', O. Qu. West/Qu.l/NTBr.B.Nr. 03039/44, g.Kdos., v. 22/6, 23/6., 27/6/1944, NARA T-312, 1571, 000766, 000787, 000834.

¹⁵ 'Auszüge aus Versorgungs-Tagesmeldungen', Ib Hg. B Nr. 0355/44 geh., NARA T 311, 1, 7000704. Heeresgruppe B reported its total losses for June as 1 866 trucks, 33 omnibuses, 103 prime movers, and 2 198 other motor vehicles, a daily average of 75 trucks lost. 'Zusammenstellung der Totalausfälle an Kfz. in der Zeit vom 6/6 30/6/44', Obkdo. d. Heeresgr. B, Anlage 1 zu Tgb. Nr. 11287/44 geh., d. 29/7/1944, NARA T-311, 1, 7000828.

¹⁶ For fuel destruction statistics, see Tagesmeldung O. Qu. West v. 1/7/1944, NARA T 311,15,7015271.

¹⁷ The 7th Army first reported a 'slight improvement' ('Geringe verbesserung') in its logistic situation on 18 June due to the reopening of the two rail lines, KTB O. Qu. West, 18/6/1944, NARA T-311, 14, 000543.

¹⁸Allied estimates were that each German supply train had the equivalent load capacity of 180 trucks. PRO, Kew, CAB44/243, Lt-Col. A.E. Warhurst, 'OVERLORD: D-Day, 6 June 1944', p. 26. The first German supply train entered Normandy on 14 June and the Germans averaged 2.4 trains a day for the rest of June and 2.7 a day in July. General des Transportwesens West lb, 'seit Beginn der Invasion wurde folgende Wehrmacht—Transporte in Frankreich—Belgien—Holland gefahren', n.d., NARA T-78, 611,000088.

¹⁹ The 846th and 850th heavy bridging columns moved to the Seine to construct and operate ferries, and were joined after 13 June by the ferry company of the 86th Amphibious Engineer Battalion. By 23 July the number of ferries operating had increased to 26, with a lift capacity of 603 tons. Between 1 and 10 July an average of 433 tons were delivered daily. In the week 8—14 July, Seine ferrying accounted for 16% and 19% respectively of total munitions and fuel delivered to Normandy. By 1 Aug. Allied aerial reconnaissance had identified 104 vessels operating on the lower Seine. 'Fähren u. übersetzmittel Lagekarte', A.Pi.Füh. 15 Br.B.Nr. 16/44 geh., v. 28/2/44, NARA T-312, 519, 8118913; Ktb. des Ia/Stopi, Ob. West, Mai-Juni 1944, NARA T-311, 28, 7033993 ff.; -Flüßübergange u. d. Seine: Stand 23/7/1944', Anl. zu A.Pi.Füh. 15 Br.B.Nr. 2950/44 g. vom 24/7/1944, NARA T-313, 421, 8714680; 'Seine schifffahrt Stand: 10/7/44', Tkb. d. Ktb. Qu. Abt. Ib, Anl. zu KTB O.Qu.West, Juli 44, NARA T-311, 15.

²⁰ In June 1445900 gallons of fuel were delivered to the West by canal; see 'Wehr machttransporte auf Binnenwasserstrassen', Tätigkeitsbericht des General des Transportwesens West, T-78, 611, 000092.

²¹ In the week of 8-14 July, 26% of total deliveries of fuel and munitions arrived by rail, 28% by water, and 46% by road. Ob. West, 'Versorgungsberichten Stand: 10/6 27/7/1944', AOK 7 O. Qu., NARA T-311, 15, 7015166-472. This near-complete set of daily supply reports compiled for the Quartermaster General West list all the supply convoys and most of the supply trains dispatched to Normandy along with departure points, destinations, and anticipated dates of arrival. They thus provide an accurate picture of the German resupply effort.

²² The Saumur and Tours Cinq Mars rail bridges were destroyed anew some time in early July and a similar fate befell the Nantes rail bridge on 20 July, by which date Chalonnes was again down. Thus on the eve of Cobra only the single-track Port Boulet rail bridge remained open over the Loire. The Allies never attacked this bridge because it was a tertiary route of limited capacity. PRO, Kew, DEFE 3/62, Ultra Intercept XL 3649, 27/7/1944. On the destruction of Tours and its logistical importance see Hg. B lb Br.B.Nr. 0908/44 geh., d. 15/7/1944, NARA T-311. 1, 0000804. The renewed destruction of the Loire rail bridges, especially the Tours St Cyr bridge, was fortuitous in the sense that it was part of the ongoing interdiction campaign and unconnected to the then embryonic Cobra plan.

²³ Between 8 and 14 July 48% and 43%, respectively, of the 7th Army's munitions and fuel arrived by rail and water. After the destruction of Tours, all of its supplies arrived by road. The proportion of total fuel deliveries by road that the 7th Army was forced to collect itself increased from 51% between 17 and 21 July to 86% between 16 and 22 July. Ob. West, 'Versorgungsberichten Stand: 10/6-27/7/1944', AOK 7 O. Qu., NARA T-311, 15, 7015166-472.

²⁴ Ob. West, 'Versorgungsberichten Stand: 10/6-27/7/1944', AOK 7 O. Qu., NARA T 311, 15, 7015166-472.

²⁵ Between 17 and 21 July a daily average of 85 250 gallons was dispatched to the 7th Army; between 22 and 26 July this figure dropped to 62 500 gallons. Ob. West, 'Versorgungsberichten Stand: 10/6-27/7/1944', AOK 7 O. Qu., NARA T-311, 15, 7015166-472.

²⁶On the closure of Mina and Brehmse, see PRO, Kew, DEFE 3/62, Ultra Intercept XL 3573, 26/7/1944. Kampfgruppe Kentner, munitions return, G2 Periodic Reports, First U.S. Army, No. 51, 31/7/1944, Annex 1, Washington National Record Center, Suitland, MD, (hereafter WRNC), Record Group 401, 101-20. 88 mm antitank rounds declined from 146 to 54 per gun between 10 and 25 July; see LXXXIV Army Corps Weapons Returns, 10/7, 25/7/1944, PRO, Kew, DEFE 3/55, Ultra Intercept XL 1897, 13.7.1944, and DEFE 3/62, Ultra Intercept XL 3709, 27/7/1944. Kampfgruppe Kuske, 'Tagesmeldung', 23/3/1944, NARA T-354, 156, 3800792. The batde group's holdings amounted to about 30% of a standard German munitions allotment, which was consumed on average in 5-6 days in Normandy. 'Grosse Munitions Ausstatung (Heer)', Anl. 2 zu Ob. West/O.Qu. West/Qu.l Nr. 0700/44 G.Kdos., v. 12/2/1944, NARA T-311, 14, 70104599.

²⁷ At Cobra the Americans outnumbered the Germans by only 2 to 1. During Bluecoat (30 July), Totalize (8 Aug.), and Tractable (14 Aug.), the Anglo-Canadian numerical superiority exceeded 3 to 1.

²⁸ German depletion of their Flak 88 munitions is identified in PRO, Kew, DEFE 3/62, Ultra Intercept, XL 3568, 26/7/1944. The munitions situation is discussed in USAHD FMS A-968, Genltnt. Otto Elfeldt, 'LXXXIV Corps, 28 July-20 August, 1944' (Germany, 1946), p. 11.

²⁹ The XXX British Corps identified German resumption of daylight resupply missions on 29 July; see PRO WO 171/310, XII Corps, G. Branch (Ops.), 'Intel. Notes, 29/7/1944', War Diary, July 1944, Appendix H. For the 5th Panzer Army's assumption of all supply operations for German forces in Normandy, see Tätigkeitsbericht, Qu. LVIII Pz. Korps, 13/8/44, NARA T-311, 497, 000271. From 15 Aug. lack of fuel stranded many German units. Abend-meldung', Abt. Ila Ob. West, v. 15/8/1944, NARA T-311, 29, 7035569.