We have stood at the threshold of war for nearly three years without the nation itself having formulated any very definite ideas as to what course we would pursue in event of being drawn into the maelstrom in Europe. This neglect is quite pardonable when viewed in the light of our past history, because up to the present period no American authority ever contemplated for a moment any conditions of world war which would draw our troops to the field of battle in Europe. Our course for three-quarters of a century has been to attend quite strictly to our own affairs, relying upon the Monroe doctrine to protect us from foreign aggression on this continent and upon our common sense, good will and righteous intention to save us from war upon any other continent.

The American forces now being prepared for service in France comprise the regular army, the national guard of the States, and the drafted men who are to compose the new national army. The mobilization and movement of all these forces to their stations for training before embarkation to the theatre of war in France constitutes a remarkable tribute to the efficiency of our railway systems, which have never been run as parts of the military organization, as is the practice in Europe. It is a matter of grave doubt whether Government-owned railroads on this continent would have solved the problems of transportation any better, if as well, as has been done by the corporations themselves.

Previous to the declaration of war with Germany, and its announcement by the President, Congress had decided that the regular army was not large enough to carry on its duties in time of peace, including the operations which, for the last five or six years, have demanded so large a force along the Mexican border, and authorized a considerable increase of the army to be added in five annual increments. Only one of these had been added when war was declared. The entire increase was then ordered at once. This reorganization of the army, with all its attendant breaking-up of old organizations and creation of new regiments skeleton battalions, has had to go on at the same time that the national guard was being mobilized in camps in the several States.

The provisions for the calling out of the drafted army necessarily took some time. Meanwhile the movement to assemble the regulars and national guard in convenient organizations for the preliminary training for foreign service was begun. The transportation of these troops from their home stations to the division camps and the transportation of the drafted men to their cantonments, at some of which as many as 40,000 men are to be quartered, required different treatment from anything within the recent experience of our railroads in the matter of troop transportation.

It had been recognized early in the summer, after war was declared, that some more definite and centralized control of railroad systems would be necessary if the troops and supplies essential to war on the part of ourselves and the Allies were to be transported without interruption to their several destinations. In this emergency the railroad organizations were called into conference and there was established at Washington a committee with a highly trained presiding officer to control and direct all the operations of the railroads in so far as necessary to insure a free movement of troops and supplies without congestion in any part of the great systems.

It is a matter of history that five days after the declaration of war against Germany the presidents of the American railroads met at the national capitol and agreed that during the war they would subordinate every other interest to help win the war; that they would eliminate all competitive rivalry and merge their interests under the direction of the American Railway Association's special committee on national defense.

Since that date the operation of all the railroads of the country has been under the direct jurisdiction of an executive committee of five, located at Washington. . Under that committee is a general committee in charge of the details. For the purpose of cooperating with the War Department, its territorial or department divisions of the United State were adopted by the railroads and a committee of railway officials was appointed for each department.

To every army department headquarters was assigned an expert in railway operation, with a corps of assistants placed at railroad centers, on whom rests the responsibility for the movement by rail of troops, munitions and supplies as desired by the military authorities. The experience and efficiency of this railway official, with the authority over all roads vested in him, proved of inestimable value to the War Department.

Various periods were set aside for the use of the railroads with a view to as little interference as possible with the regular passenger and freight traffic. The movement of drafted men of the new national army involved more men, but the movement of the widely scattered national guard was a much more difficult problem for the railroads. The War Department had determined that during the movement of the drafted men of the national army there should be no movement of the national guard. Among the periods allotted for the use of the railroads that between September 24 and October 1 was designated as available for the movement of national guard organizations of the Central Department. The carrying out of this movement affords an illustration of what can be done when all are working to a common, patriotic purpose.

To prevent congestion at the concentration camps or on the railroads it was necessary to perfect a plan covering every detail. This plan showed the location of every national guard unit, the exact time for its entrainment, the railway route to be used, the speed schedule to be followed, and the time of arrival at destination. From five to twelve day in advance of the movement of the national guard every railroad participating in it knew exactly what service it would have to perform. The movement was started on the evening of September 24 and completed on October 1. The railway equipment required 750 sleeping cars, 1,500 coaches and baggage cars, not including freight cars.

How well the plans were made is shown by the fact that the movement was carried out in such a manner that there was not more than one regiment on any one railroad on any one day, and that not more than one regiment arrived at any camp on the same day. During this period eighty-two organizations, in fourteen States, were moved to their new stations. The transportation involved 2,571 officers, 83,751 enlisted men, with baggage, tents, wagons and animals.

Without an accident to a single man, without delay at point of origin, en route, or at destination, without a hitch in the arrangements as originally planned, the officers and men of the national guard scattered in fourteen States were transported by rail in one week to the distant cantonments designated by the War Department. That is a record of which every American has a right to be proud. It is more remarkable in view of the fact that it was made at a time when the railways were handling the heaviest commercial traffic, both freight and passenger, ever known. Just two things made that record possible—organization and cooperation; the organization of our army, the organization of our entire transportation lines into practically a single system; and the hearty cooperation of these two highly developed organizations.

The whole movement of the national guard in the very short time allotted, without causing congestion on the railroads or at the camp destinations, could not have been effected but for the unification of the railroads agreed upon by their presidents and carried out through what is commonly called the railroads' war board. The railway equipment necessary was provided regardless of ownership. Many railroads which were required to furnish cars for the movement did not haul any of the troops. That is practical patriotism which the country should appreciate.

While the preference would have been given by the railroads to this military traffic in any event, the fact that it was not necessary to change the regularly scheduled passenger trains proves that the interests of the traveling public were also carefully considered when the plans were made for the national guard movement. The facts most clearly demonstrated are the advantages to the Government of close cooperation between the military authorities and the railroads, and that heavy military movements can be made without drawing on the resources of the railroads to an extent that interferes to an appreciable degree with regular commercial traffic.

Among the things which must not be discussed now are the embarkation and sailing for foreign ports of the army which is to bear our flag on the European battle fields, nor is it deemed appropriate to announce the routes or movements of organizations on their way to mobilization camps or ports of embarkation.

When the war with Spain began we were entirely without any deep sea transportation service, nor had we had any experience to indicate to us what course we should pursue in creating one. Our subsequent experience was remarkable indeed when we consider the very small losses sustained during nearly twenty years' operation of the army transport service. When one searches the register of commercial ships and observes the number lost at sea during the period of nearly twenty years that the army has been operating its deep sea transportation we must come to the conclusion that our freedom from accident and loss arises not from mere good fortune but from careful preparation and the maintenance of very high standards upon all our Government vessels.

The number of soldiers conveyed back and forth across the wide expanse of the Pacific Ocean, long since passed above the million mark, practically without loss, constitutes one of the most remarkable stories of military experience. Not only have the troops been conveyed in perfect safe but thousands upon thousands of public animals have also been carried on our ships, and all in such comfort that they have generally been deemed ready for immediate service upon disembarkation on the opposite side of the world. We are now confronted with the necessity for transporting even larger numbers than has been heretofore within our experience to the scene of warfare in Europe.

The small fleet of army transports will cut an insignificant figure in this movement, but we shall base all our operations in that line on the splendid experience which has come to us since the war with Spain and the occupation of the distant Philippine Islands. That the problems to be encountered in this great movement will be met by the army in the same manner in which it has met and solved so many other problems may be accepted as certain in the light of our past history.

William Harding Carter.

Transporting The American Army

First official Story of the Marvelous Achievement IS Told in the Simple Words of the Man Who Is Now Getting the Men Home

By Brig. Gen. Frank T. Hines

Chief of Transportation Service

STRIKING FIGURES FROM GERERAL HINES'S FILES.

Transport service of 94,000 tons on the Atlantic and 311,000 tns in the cross-Channel fleet.

On the day of the armistice, Nov. 11, 1918, total Embarkation had been about 2,100,000 troops.

Approximately one-half of the Americans sent to France were carried in British or British-controlled vessels.

the railroads of United States moved more than 12,1000,000 men between May 1, 1917, and April 30, 1919

American troops are now being brought home at the rate of 300,000 a month.

GOVERNMENTAL publicity in peas times may, under certain circumstances, be considered a virtue, but in times of war it may be a crime. Now that the war is over it is possible to go back and follow the good American principle of keeping the public advised of what is going on. There is no longer the need of the close veil of secrecy over the transportation problems involved in the movement of an American Army more than two million men from United States to the battlefields of France.

This war has in the last analysis depended for its successful conclusion upon the unprecedented movement of troops and supplies. It was transportation grand tactics worked out with platoon movements of men in million groups each. Great Britain threw in tits millions from every quarter of the globe before we as Americans saw our need to take part in the great battle for the preservation of the world’s civilization. The English Empire drained its resources from Canada, New Zealand, Cape Colony, and transported half around the globe men and materials, thus setting an example of what the United States could do with a compact country at back.

The entry of the United States into the war on April 6, 1917, found the nation about as thoroughly unprepared for the great task that was confronting it as any of the great nations then engaged in the war.

Among the many things the United States was wholly unprepared to do was that of moving a large force overseas.

Our navy stood third among the great naval forces, but our transport fleet stood last, and our merchant marine was far from equal to the demands shortly to be put upon it.

In the Spring of 1918, when France and Great Britain stood with their backs against the Channel and were holding on with that tenacity which has been the admiration of the world, the United States was proceeding with the modest military program of transporting abroad 100,00 men per month. A situation then developed which made it necessary for the United States to speed up its program and render whatever assistance quickly. On March 1, 1918, General Peyton C. March, Chief of Staff, having just returned from France, held the firm conviction that the then fundamental necessity, both from the standpoint of Allies, was the speeding up of our shipments of troops and supplies, and that these shipments should have priority over everything else. This decision, backed up by careful studies of how to accomplish it, resulted in a policy being adopted and pushed through to completion which finally resulted in the United States raising an army of 3,670,000 men by Nov. 11, 1918, and landing in France ready for service the formidable force of 2,075,000 men and 5,153,000 tons of supplies. No other single policy adopted during the war netted greater results toward the successful outcome.

At the entrance of the United States into the war the Quartermaster Corps was maintaining a small transport service to Panama, in addition to the transport service from Pacific Coast to the Philippine Islands. In all there were six transports in this service and, in addition, a number of small interisland transports. The transportation of troops and supplies for the Expeditionary Forces in France was at the start given over to the Quartermaster Corps. Two primary ports of embarkation were established, one with headquarters at Hoboken, N. J., and the other Newport News, Va., each placed under the command of a general officer. A number of American steamships were chartered for the first convoy as transports, of the North German Lloyd and Hamburg-American piers at Hoboken were taken over.

As the magnitude of the task became more apparent, to enable the Chief of Staff to exercise more efficiently his supervisory and co-ordinating powers, it was decided to place the responsibility for overseas shipments under a special section of General Staff, which was created on Aug. 4, 1917, and known as the Embark Section of the General Staff. This section took over all matters relating to the shipment of troops and supplies from the point of origin to overseas.

As that time large shipments of supplies were being mad by the Allies. The Ports of New York, Newport News, Boston, and Baltimore were used principally for the movement of allied supplies. It soon became apparent that if effective control was to be exercised over move3ments of troops and supplies for our American Expeditionary Forces in France it would be necessary to establish some agency which could effectively control the and co-ordinate not only movements of supplies for the War Department but co-ordinate such movements with commercial shipments and movements of supplies by the Allies.

So, on Dec. 28, 1917, with this object in view, and also for the purpose of effecting more central control over the supply system, there was created a Division of Purchase, Storage and Traffic under Major Gen. George W. Goethals. This division of the General Staff took over, as part of the new organization, the Embarkation Service which had been developed by that time. The task laid upon the army of creating the great transport fleet, at the time when the world was experiencing its most acute tonnage shortage, was a heavy one. At the outbreak of the war our transport service consisted of very few vessels; as a matter of fact, there were seven actually under the control of the War Department. The majority of these were then operated in the Pacific. A start was made by chartering a few of the American merchant steamships immediately at hand, and at the end of June 1917, there were in the service seven troopships were a deadweight of 48,000 tons. From this small beginning there was developed a transatlantic fleet which on Nov. 1, 1918, weight of 3,251,000 tons. In addition to this a cross-Channel service fleet was built up numbering approximately 104 vessels with an aggregate tonnage of 311,000.

When building up this fleet the first great increment established in the matter of troops transport was the seizure and taking over the German interned vessels. These ships came into service during the Fall of 1917, and account for approximately 460,000 tons. In the spring of 1918, the taking over of the Dutch vessels gave to the army an additional 200,000 tons.

In February, 1918, the movement of troops and supplies continued to increase in volume, and the diversity and complexity of the problems of securing additional tonnage necessitated close co=operation with commercial interests and the Shipping Board. This brought about the organization of the Shipping Control Committee, with P. A. S. franklin of the International Mercantile Marine at its head. This committee, in so far as the War Department’s activities were concerned, was charged with the allocation of tonnage, the assignment of cargo vessels to ports, the loading of vessels and repairing of vessels not manned by the navy.

The movements of troops overseas began at the earnest solicitation of our cobelligerents very soon after the entrance of the United States into the war. During the first month of the war, the month of May, there were dispatched abroad 1,718 personnel pertaining to the army: in June 12,000 and by the end of the year 187,800 troops and approximately 7,600 marines had been embarked.

At this point of our operations overseas it was quite evident that the matter of expediting the troops movement to France was imperative. The man power of Great Britain and France had already been put into the line. Negotiations with the British Government disclosed that it would be possible for that Government to increase the number of troop vessels then operating in transatlantic service. Every ship that could be secured, taken from all parts of the globe. Was pressed into service until 180 British vessels were finally engaged in the transportation of the great American Army overseas.

In April 117,000 troops and 1,400 marines were embarked. Movements increased steadily until the month of July, when the record exceeded all expectations, and 306,000 troops embarked for overseas. By the end of October the second millionth man had sailed from the Atlantic seaboard. During the three months, June, July, and August, 1918, 875,700 men were embarked. If May is added to the other months, exceeds 1,121,000. When the armistice was signed the total embarkations amounted to approximately 2,100,000 troops and marines.

So far as known no like problem of the transportation of troops has ever before been contemplated, and no movement of such number of persons by water an equal distance and at a time when enemy submarines were actively engaged in the lines of communications has ever occurred. The performance stands unique in the world’s history. Furthermore, this performance wrought, it is believed, a decisive effect upon the world’s history at one of its great critical junctions.

It is rather hard to comprehend just what is meant when we speak of speak of a force of 2,100,000 men, or the strength of the American Expeditionary Forces abroad on the date the armistice was signed. Some idea of the magnitude of this body of men may be gained when it started that, if this force were extended in a skirmish line the line would be approximately 1,800 mile long, and would reach from London to Berlin, back from Berlin to Paris, and then from Paris to Coblenz and back again, an d enough men would be left over to form a line from New York to Washington. Probably a better illustration can mad by considering that the population of Chicago is two and a half millions, and that of Philadelphia not quite two million. Consider then, transporting either of the two cities named bodily from the United States to France.

Credit for this movement of troops must be shared with the Allies, and the British in particular, as approximately one-half of the troops sent to France were carried by British vessels, or British-controlled vessels. At this same time, it must be recognized that under the pressure of the critical situation on the western front, ways were found to increase the normal loading of our transports by as much as 40 percent, and that transports exceeded those of the Allies both to the extent to which they were loaded and the speed of their turnaround. High commendation must be given the navy, army, and Shipping Control Committee for the splendid team work which has existed in the manning, arming, and operating of troopships. All credit must be given the navy for the efficiency of its convoy system and protection given our troopships on the high seas. Without the protection of the British Grand Fleet and the efficiency of the navy convoy systems through the submarine zone it would have been impossible to carry out the great movement of troops overseas, no matter how efficient the troop transport system was.

There is one part of this overseas movement of troops and supplies that it generally overlooked and that is the extent to which the railroads of the United States have contributed to the successful outcome of the movement. From May 1, 1917, to April 30, 1919, more that 12,100,00 men had been transported by the railroads. To what extent the handling of these men to camps and ports of embarkation has interfered with commercial traffic is known to say that except where special trains have been operated and something unusual has happened to attract public attention, this tremendous movement has taken place without even coming to the attention of the public generally. The amount of co-ordination necessary to carry out satisfactorily this operation will stand not at one of the great transportation movements in our history. Some idea may be gained of its magnitude by considering that, for the number of miles this force has been transported, the average passenger for one mile would be 5,503,000,000.

Ancient of modern history fails to show any approach to the movements of troops which have taken place during this war. The campaign of Xerxes and Alexander were conducted with vast numbers of men, if the records are reliable; yet their movements by sea were limited to negotiating the Hellespont, about as difficult as the North River, or the Aegean, as a magnified Long Island Sound. The Roman legions shone only on land detours, and their longest voyages mad to Egypt appeared to sap their strength. The great Hannibal essayed to conquer Europe, not by taking his troops by the short sea voyage from Carthage to Rome, but instead by leading his vast army overland along the coasts of Africa and Spain and France, to attack the Roman dominions from the Alps. Napoleon, with his genius, was fearful to move troops by sea, and English saw to it that h e never had the opportunity save when he shipped some of his guards to Egypt for the purpose of diverting from trouble at home rather than for potential conquest abroad.

In more recent times ─our own time as it were ─the Japanese first demonstrated that the large movement of troops by sea was entirely practicable, and the records of the battles of Mukden and Port Arthur will show how this subject of military sea transport was thoroughly understood and practiced. Their numbers, however, were but a bagatelle in comparison with the millions moved over the oceanic highways in this European war.

Having solved the problem of putting the troops on the soil of France the War Department is now engaged in the task o f returning the army to the United States. At the time the armistice was signed the total troop capacity of American transport under the control of the United States was approximately 110,000 men a month. It was quite evident that the War Department could not expect the same assistance in the return of the American forces from the allied Governments we had received in sending this force abroad, so it was necessary to devise other means of promptly retuning the American Army.

Immediately after the armistice the Chief of Staff gave instructions that steps be taken at once to increase the American transport fleet. One means suggested was that of converting the most suitable of the cargo fleet as troop carriers, and this work straightaway undertaken. How successful the efforts of the department have been to increase the American troop fleet can best be shown by stating that the troop vessels now operating in the service of returning the American forces from overseas have a total troop capacity of more than 360,000, which capacity will permit of the prompt return of the American forces at the rate of 300,000 a month.

This large increase in the carrying capacity of the American fleet ships has been brought about in several ways; first, the conversion of some fifty-eight cargo transports as troopships; second, the assignment by the navy of battleships and cruisers to the transport services, and third, the obtaining of ten German passenger ships and equipping them promptly for carrying American troops. In addition, to the foregoing the War Department was successful in negotiating agreements with the Italians, French, Spanish, and Dutch for utilization of suitable passenger vessels of their fleets for the return of the American forces.

There has been no problem before the War Department that has received more prompt attention than the return of American forces; every effort has been mad to expedite the fitting out, repairing and turnaround of troops transports. A number of the faster vessels of the transport fleet been able to land their cargo of American troops twice during a month in the Atlantic ports. The transport Leviathan, with capacity of 12,000, is able to move within a given time more troops than were moved by the Spanish Armada.

York Times June 1, 1919

Army Transporation

Marshall R. Pugh, Lt. Col. Engineering Officer Reserve Corps

The Military Engineer, Vol. 16 No. 90 (Nov-Dev) 1924

THE age-old is saying that an army travels on it stomach still holds true. Without food a soldier is helpless; without transportation an army can get no food. The passage of time, however, has made a most important addition to this requirement. When swords, spears, and slings formed the weapons of offense and shields the means of defense, an army could keep on the defensive, so far as weapons were concerned, if properly provisioned. As weapons increased in complexity and power, an adequate supply of munitions became more and more important, so that at the present time, in addition to food, there must be artillery and arms of all descriptions, together with enormous quantities of ammunition, supplies, repair shops and a multitude of other necessities. Without them a modern army may move, but it will be backward and not toward the enemy.

It is in the battle areas that the demand for supplies is greatest and the difficulties of meeting this demand are at a maximum. These notes aim to point out briefly some considerations affecting army transportation in the combat zone.

Modes of Transportation

The transportation of men, equipment and supplies may be effected by four different methods:

(a) Standard Gauge Railroads.
(b) Highways.
(e ) Light Railways.
(d) Cross-country Transportation (caterpillar).

Each has its limitations. A retreating enemy always exerts the utmost effort to destroy and render useless the standard gauge railways and the roads. Bridges are blown up; tunnels made impassable; track and road-bed destroyed. In battle areas, too, the standard gauge railroad and trains form too vulnerable a target. In stabilized warfare it cannot well be operated closer than between 5 and 8 miles from the front. In open warfare the most that can be done with the standard gauge is to push it forward with all speed possible. It cannot hope to keep pace with any material advance.

Highways, like railroads, are also subject to destruction by mines and shellfire and, in addition, they fail under the heavy traffic to which they are subjected. This has, at times, reached a point where the damage done to the road by hauling road stone has almost equalled the benefits due to placing it. Light railways are best adapted to position warfare but they have never yet kept pace with a long-continued advance, because exacting ballast requirements delay construction. Transporting the ballast takes up an important percentage of the capacity of the light railway.

Track-laying vehicles and trailers for cross-country transportation are as yet in more or less of an experimental stage and the Ordnance Department, cooperating with other branches of the War Department, is working upon the problem.

The Railroad

The backbone of army transportation is the standard gauge railroad. When situated and operated beyond the field of the enemy's observation and fire it is termed a supply railway . The vulnerability of the standard gauge railway to hostile fire and the further fact that, in case he retreats, the enemy will destroy it, ordinarily prevents its employment within the battle areas, except so far as the retreating army may be able to use successive portions of what was its supply railway, as it continues to fall back. During an advance, every effort will be made to reconstruct and repair the destroyed tracks and structures, so as to keep the rail-head as close as possible to the front. The saving in truck and light railway transportation and in road maintenance is so great as to justify the most strenuous efforts to advance the standard gauge.

Highways

The highway is the fundamental avenue of army transportation, just as it is of transportation in civil life. In battle areas, just where the need for it is greatest, enemy fire damages it, disabled vehicles obstruct it, and traffic, owing to the impossibility of giving it adequate maintenance, grinds it to pieces. The head-piece shows a section of the Malancourt road through No Man's Land which had been reconstructed by the 304th Engineers, Col. J. Frank Barber, commanding. The work was done at night under heavy machine gun and shellfire, through a wilderness of shell craters and general desolation. Note the great density of traffic.

Left section, Hamonville line for week May 11 to 16. Right section, same line at early stages of construction for week March 30 to April 6. Solid areas, work previously completed. Shaded areas, work completed during week. . White areas, work to be done.

Consider an army corps, composed of two infantry divisions and an artillery brigade, occupying a position at the front. The corps has been advancing, taking over territory captured from the enemy. The roads, in addition to damage by shellfire and to the wear and tear to which they were subjected by the enemy while he was employing* them, are probably further destroyed to the limit of his capacity to injure them. Each of the divisions now taking them over has approximately the following transportation:

• 1,626 Draft Horses.
• 2,093 Biding Horses.
• 459 Carts (ammunition, battery, water, Vire, etc.)
• 108 Boiling Kitchens. ton.
• 527 Wagons (battery, es- 5 Cargo Trucks 3 to 5 escort, medical, etc.)
• 46 Motor Ambulances.
• 53 5 -Passenger Cars.
• 4 Reconnaissance Cars.
• 2 Motorcycles.
• 212 Side Cars
• 63 Trailers (kitchen, cargo, photo, ration, etc.)
• 4 Artillery Bepair Trucks.
• 74 Cargo Trucks 3/4-ton.
• 226 Cargo Trucks V2 to 2-ton.
• 5 Cargo Trucks 3 to 5-ton.
• 30 F. W. D. Trucks.
• 4 Trucks (field lighting and repair).
• 25 Mack Trucks, 5 1/2 -ton.
• 3 Machine Shop Trucks.
• 30 Special Trucks.
• 2 5-ton Tractors.

There is also the corps artillery brigade of three regiments of 155-mm howitzers and one regiment of 155-mm guns together with its transportation and ammunition train of 144 cargo trucks. The corps field remount depot with 400 animals, the air service, anti-aircraft regiment, medical regiment, corps trains, and the engineer service, each with transportation, makes the path of an army engineer, when he takes over a strip of mud, shell-holes, ruts and bumps, termed by courtesy a "road," as rugged as the path to Heaven. He is politely but emphatically directed to make and keep it passable for the above-mentioned animals, carts, wagons, cars and trucks, the while it is ever and anon blown to pieces by shellfire.

The roads in the Fifth Corps Sector, during the push from September 26 to November 11, 1918, were an example of what may be expected. The corps comprised three divisions, one of which was on the Esnes-Malancourt road, which had been 4 'blown entirely out of the ground," some of the craters measuring 48 feet across and 22 feet deep. Another divisional route, the Avocourt-Monttaucon road, was so absolutely destroyed that it was only made passable after 48 hours of the hardest kind of work by the 602nd Engineers, who built a plank road of timber salvaged from enemy dugouts. The dugouts caved in as fast as the timber was removed ; a drenching rain was falling; yet, in spite of these obstacles, they built some five miles of road in two days and nights. They may well be proud of the achievement, which splendidly exemplifies a cardinal principle of military engineering: i.е., get results from resources at your disposal.

The final offensive started November 1. The weather was rainy and a large number of the trucks did not have anti-skid chains. There was a shortage of draft animals; roads on either side of the Fifth Corps gave out; and two or more divisions were compelled to use the same road. On November 6, the last road failed and traffic within the Corps stopped.

The roads had apparently received but little attention by the enemy for a long time and were worn out completely in his retreat. A sea of mud; shellholes; numberless cars and trucks of all kinds broken down, upset and overturned, blocking the roads; such was the picture presented.

Construction and Maintenance

Road construction and maintenance, particularly in battle areas, suffer at the hands of two diametrically opposite classes of troops : first, those familiar with peace time road work, and second, those ignorant of all road work. Those in the first class are generally experts in their line, but they too often

are completely at sea under conditioned. The American road service ordered 345 ten-ton rollers for use in the A. E. F. In July, 1918, they actually had only 23, and at the close of hostilities 53 rollers. Advance area requirements do not admit of much refinement. The writer has, when stone was available, kept a military road in excellent shape by employing a patrol with As fast as traffic rutted the loose stone, the stone was raked into the ruts, and it was surprising how smoothly the road was finally ironed out and compacted by the truck traffic. Had a roller been requisitioned, the road would have been rutted to pieces before it could have possibly arrived.

Fig. 3. Collecting Stone for Road near St. Remy. Signal Corps Photo.

The second class is well exemplified by a platoon of American troops which, under command of a friend of the writer, was assigned to help the French. The French officer threw up his hands, "You do more damage through your ignorance than I can repair." So, a modus vivendi was arrived at. The Americans were lined up along the road in idleness, a corporal or sergeant at either end. Upon the approach of an American staff car the whistle was blown and vigorous work was kept up alongside but not upon the road itself. The staff officer was happy and, as no harm had been done the road, the Frenchman was satisfied.

Following up an advance, a reconnaissance should be made to measure and classify the roads, determining whether each one is good for one- or two-way traffic, and to see whether it is Class A (good for all kinds of traffic), Class В (good for light artillery, ambulances, horse-drawn vehicles and foot troops), or Class С (good only for horse-drawn vehicles and foot troops). Any captured engineer dumps are inventoried, and any material native to the territory, such as quarries, timber, etc., are noted. With this information at hand the administrative order can be framed intelligently and the proper assignment of routes can be decided upon.

Road Foundations

When making a reconnaissance and classifying the roads it should be borne in mind that under intensive traffic in wet weather an otherwise apparently good road may fail completely, owing to the character of the soil upon which it rests, whereas another apparently inferior road may hold up well because it rests on a soil less weakened in bearing power by moisture. This is well shown in Figure 2, which was prepared by the Federal Highway Council. It will be noted that a dry gravel contains 6.8% of moisture and has a bearing power of 91 pounds per square inch. When saturated, it contains 12.1% of moisture and a bearing power which, though reduced, still is good for 35 pounds. Dry cinders, with 4.1% moisture, carry 46 pounds, and, saturated, with 44.0% moisture, they still support 34 pounds per square inch. Look now at sand clay. Dry, moisture content 6.8%, it is good for 55 pounds while, when saturated, even though containing only 16.0% moisture, it has a bearing value of but 1/2-pound!

As a corollary to this, the vital importance of deep ditching and the greatest possible effort to drain the subgrade in certain soils becomes evident, as well as the waste of precious time incurred in so much effort spent upon drainage in other kinds of subsoil not so much affected by water. As the roads wear under traffic, or are damaged by enemy fire, they must be repaired with any available material suitable for the purpose, such as planking salvaged from enemy dugouts. In France, the stone from the houses of ruined villages (Figure 3), old plastering, Avails along highways, all were utilized. In short, military roads, speciallv in battle areas, demand the highest order of engineering skill and adaptability to get results with available equipment and materials. Results, and results only, count.

Light Railways

The light railway was first used extensively on the battle-front during the World War, and was a development of the railways carrying ammunition and supplies to the various French fortresses and of the German industrial railways. As employed by the French they were largely the results of the work of Col. Pechot. The enormous quantities of ammunition used in this conflict outran the capacity of the highway and the truck; so that, supplementing them, the light railway with its small vulnerability, flexibility of location, comparative ease of construction and simplicity of operation, furnished the solution of the problem.

Fig. 4. Destruction of Light Railways, near Royame IX, France. Signal Corps Photo.

Concerning its desirability in stabilized warfare there can be no question. Just how far it may be useful in open warfare is still a mooted point and depends upon the terrain, size of forces engaged and, most important of all, increase in speed of construction over what has been accomplished hitherto. Speed of construction is closely linked with design of rolling stock, inasmuch as top-heavy and rigid engines and cars require for successful operation a much more substantial and, therefore, more heavily ballasted and more slowly constructed track and road-bed.

Track Standards

The American standard of track as used in France consisted of rail weighing 25 pounds per yard. It was either used in 30-foot lengths, spiked to 4" x 6" X 4' 6" wood ties, or made up as a portable track in sections *5 meters long with 8 steel ties to the section, with the rails bolted to the ties. The French rail was but 16 pounds in weight, which was too light, and the head of the rail was too narrow to give the drivers sufficient adhesion. The ties were riveted to the rail, which was not as good as the American method employing bolts for the purpose. For light tram tracks running into batteries and forward positions, 16-pound rail with steel ties is excellent.

To be of use in open warfare, speed of construction must be much greater than anything achieved by the Allies up to the present. The bearing power of wet soils has been referred to in speaking of roads. With the light railway it becomes an even more important factor. The more unstable the soil, the greater amount of ballast required. It takes time to place it and, still more important, it uses up a large portion of available transportation in being hauled to its destination. When brush and hay are available, a great saving of ballast on such soils may be effected by first laying a mat of brush or hay, which prevents the ballast from being forced down into the mud and lost. Steel ties cut down into ballast much more than do wood ties, but in battle areas the advantages of the sectional track are so great as to compel its use. The standards used in the A. E. F. called for 1,026 cubic yards of ballast per mile of track where wood ties were used, and 520 cubic yards where steel ties were employed, there being in each case 6 inches of ballast under the tie.

Fig. 5. Light Railways - IV French Army.

An interesting example of practice in a contractor's railway, 2-foot gauge, is found in one employed in the construction of 18 miles of concrete road between Cleveland and Akron, Ohio, in 1921. The track was made in 15-foot sections, using 28-pound rail and 6" x 6" wood ties. Six men could handle a section, but eight was a better number to use. This arrangement obviated one of the objections to wood ties in battle areas: namely, the noise of spiking and the difficulty of doing so at night in the face of the enemy.

Fig. 6. Light Railway Time-table, Vaudemange to La Vesle.

Then, too, by using ballast beneath and not between the ties, the ballast requirements would be reduced to those for steel ties. About one-third as many sections of track can be loaded on a car, so that the employment of wood ties involves an increase in this direction, but it is more than offset by the saving in ballast and it has been found that wood ties give a much more sturdy track than the steel. When not uniformly supported the wood tie does not bend and " pinch" the gauge. The Hours wood-tie sectional track is most promising and should be given thorough investigation.

Location Requirements

The French were in favor of double-tracking for intensive traffic, but the American preference was to use single tracks in return loops as, in this way, a shell could not put the entire line out of commission. The two single tracks so spread out will, by means of sidings, serve a larger number of batteries and infantry organizations.

In order to estimate the time of construction of a given project and to apportion properly the men to the various tasks, it is necessary to know as nearly as possible the percentage in man days of each kind of work as compared with the total. Obviously, this proportion must vary greatly for different lines or branches, in accordance with the topography, soil conditions, clearing, and other factors.

The estimated and actual percentage of two lines in the Toul Sector of the American front are as follows :

Figure 1 shows two of the progress reports made on mimeographed forms, which were used by the 21st Engineers in keeping a record of the work. In 1917-18, the speed of advance of the armies was from 1.3 miles to 4.4 miles per day. The best day's construction of light railway by us was not quite two miles.

Therefore, it is most urgent that we so design our track and rolling stock and drill our men that the German construction record of 58 miles in 10 days can be at least approximated by the U. S. forces.

Rolling Stock

Rolling stock and road-bed are mutually interdependent. A poorly ballasted and surfaced roadbed is usable only when the rolling stock is adapted for such conditions. This was not the case in the A. E. F. One indignant locomotive designer exclaimed, "You don't want a locomotive, you want a wheelbarrow!" He was right. A motorized "wheelbarrow" would have far more nearly fulfilled battle area requirements, than the high center of gravity steam locomotives (which were, in themselves, beautiful pieces of mechanism) that were sent us for use in France. It is questionable whether steam locomotives have a place under battle conditions.

Fig. 7. Transporting Wounded by Light Railway. Signal Corps Photo.

Even in the sectional wood-tie contractor's railway just mentioned, it was found that an 8-ton steam dinkie was a destructive load on the track laid on a clay shoulder, while the use of gasoline locomotives cut down the track maintenance. Gasoline locomotives are not dependent on supplies of coal and water or pit tracks. This was found to be a serious defect of steam locomotives in combat areas. Locomotives should be strongly built, with a low center of gravity; able to run on hastily built track with its inevitable inequalities, without undue strain on either track or rolling stock; capable of running equally well in either direction, thereby avoiding use of "Y" or turntable; capable of negotiating crooked track and stiff grades, and easily rerailed.

Operation

"An instrument of war, and the 60-centimeter railway is one, should function with regularity and one should be able to count on it absolutely." The French were very particular to work up every detail.

The American trains were operated by telephone and, when two or more trains were permitted to occupy the same block at the same time, all except the first were warned to proceed expecting to find a train ahead at any point in the block.

The French worked out graphical time-tables as in standard gauge railways, an example being shown in Figure 6, the time-table of the light railway from Vaudemange to La Y esle, in the 1st Group, IV French Army. Figure 5 is a map of the lines in this group

The French worked out graphical time-tables as in standard gauge railways, an example being shown in Figure 6, the time-table of the light railway from Vaudemange to La Y esle, in the 1st Group, IV French Army. Figure 5 is a map of the lines in this group.

Fig. 8. Watertown Arsenal 3-Ton Trailer

A citation from the commanding general of the 82nd Division, after 20,000 troops had been moved by light railway, said, "It is a great saving on trucks and gasoline; also a great saving on the men who were saved physical exertion moving about, and were able to apply that exertion in other more important work. It also made it possible for the men to move quickly during the reliefs, where to camp men in unusual stations or move them about in daylight would attract enemy fire and suspicion."

The gasoline consumption of the 35-horsepower and 50-horsepower locomotives used averaged one-tenth of a gallon per horsepower per hour. The ordinary daily fuel consumption was approximately on the basis of the development of one-half the rated horsepower of the engine. In the Argonne this rose to nearly three-quarters of the rated horsepower.

Cross-country Transportation

A vehicle that can do without roads and carry its cargo over hill and dale, field and swamp, has enormous advantages, as may readily be seen. The Ordnance Department is conducting a most interesting series of experiments and tests with such vehicles, which are largely of the caterpillar or track-laying type. Tanks already have their recognized place in warfare, and the adaptation of tracklayers to the artillery is also well advanced, so that the extension of this type of locomotion to cargo carriers is logically the next step. It is obvious that, with modern conditions of warfare, a continuously larger proportion of the transportation will need to be motorized, and that a substantial proportion of it should be independent of roads.

Major A. B. Quinton, Jr., chief of the Tractor and Trailer Section of the Artillery Division, Ordnance Department, to whom the writer is under obligations for information and assistance, is in charge of a most interesting series of investigations and tests of such vehicles. It has been determined that for the general transportation of ammunition, rations, baggage, combat supplies, etc., 114-ton cargo vehicles are best. Inasmuch as some classes of supplies are heavy and some bulky, more than one type of body is required, but it is important to reduce the number of types to a minimum. The vehicle should be able to operate either on roads or across country. For tank units a 5-ton capacity is demanded.

Fig. 9. Mack Roadless Truck. Courtesy of the Ordnance Department, U. S. A.

Unfortunately, up to the present time, the life of the track, while satisfactory when the vehicle is going across country or on dirt roads, is relatively short when travelling on hard roads. The life of the lighter vehicles is prolonged by transporting them in motor trucks when proceeding over such roads. As speeds increase, track losses from friction become very great. At three miles per hour, track losses were found to be only one per cent of the power developed by the engine whereas, at 16 miles per hour, the total rose to 36 «per cent, of which 15 per cent was due to poor lubrication.

Efforts are being made to eliminate the great weight of the link-and-pin construction. Fabric belting and steel cables with shoes attached are among the new track designs being tried out. Trailers are extensively used, for, as Gen. Funston said, "An automobile or motor truck will pull more than it can carry," and track-laying trailers, as well as trailers with adapters, are in a most promising state of development. A Watertown Arsenal 1 14-ton trailer can be towed across ditches with steep banks without difficulty and, though it slips laterally on a 25-degree side-slope, it takes a stiff side-slope with ease.

Cross-country vehicles have a wide field of usefulness in construction work and, as contractors awake to their possibilities, we may look forward to their constantly increased employment, with a resulting diminution of the necessity for planking or otherwise maintaining roads capable of sustaining heavy track about large engineering projects during their construction. This development will add to the possibility of the extended use of such vehicles in warfare.

Water-proof motors are one of the latest developments. At Aberdeen Proving Ground, the motor of a Mack VII caterpillar gun mount for a 75-millimeter gun was water-proofed and run for more than two hours under water.

Much remains to be done, and cross-country transportation is yet in its infancy, but we may look forward to great strides in this promising field.

Summary and Conclusions

As the telegraph did not displace the letter; nor the telephone eliminate the telegraph; nor the radio dispense with the necessity for either of its predecessors; it may safely be predicted that standard gauge railroads, highways, light railways and cross-country vehicles will each have a part to play in future transportation in battle areas. The standard gauge is the backbone of the system, but its very importance leads to the utmost effort on the part of the enemy to put it out of commission. Its vulnerability makes it largely unavailable at the battle-front, Highways are not only destroyed by the enemy they go to pieces under the very heavy traffic they are designed to take. Their repair is burdensome ; advance construction slow. Our road engineers must get away from much that they practice in civil life, and adapt themselves to the exigencies of combat conditions. The light railway is a most valuable auxiliary, but it is essential to design the track and rolling stock so that vastly greater rapidity of construction may be attained. Cross-country transportation is in its infancy, but has great promise. Improved design of caterpillar track, enabling it to stand up better on improved roads, is One great desideratum.

Fig. IO. Mark VII 75-Millimeter Gun, Self-Propelled Mount. Courtesy of the Ordnance Department, U. S. A.

The proper development of each of these modes of transportation, their coordination and the adaptation of the whole to the exigencies of the rough and tumble conditions prevailing in battle areas is the task, and that nation which best accomplishes this task in time of peace will have an immense advantage in future wars.

Grinding Gears: The AEF and Motor Transportation in the First World War

By Matthew G. McCoy

War in History Vol. II No. 2 April 2004

One significant problem that commanders of the American Expeditionary Force encountered was the use of motor transportation. The Americans faced a variety of difficulties, some of which were unavoidable; others were self-inflicted, and still others could have been avoided by closer study of the experiences of the British and French in the war. The war ended before the Americans could put the lessons they had learned about motor transportation into practice, but the experiences with motor vehicles demonstrated that these new weapons of war demanded considerable planning and organization to be effective.

The First World War awakened the United States Army, as well asthe rest of the western world, to the demands of industrialized warfare. The weapons of the industrial revolution forced militar thinkers to make a significant change in the way they approached military operations. Just as new machines in manufacturing had created a demand for trained engineers and managers, so too had the increasingly complex machines of war forced armies to create new bureaucracies to keep them functioning. Perhaps no area better reveals the difficulty American commanders had with the transition from the old infantry-cavalry-artillery army to the modern age of warfare than the use of motor vehicles.

One must be judicious in criticizing American leaders. The United States Army of the early twentieth century was designed for low-intensity frontier wars, rather than trench warfare in Europe. The army had experience in using railroads, having used them during the Civil War and subsequent conflicts, and understood the necessity of rail transportation. Truck transportation, conversely, was a relatively new tool and did not fit into the plans of American military thinkers who worried primarily about small-scale operations in Latin America. Furthermore, casualties, rather than motor vehicle problems, halted advances, though serious shortcomings in transportation appeared. This article will examine important organizational, maintenance a personnel issues to demonstrate what the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) commanders realistically could have done to improve motor transportation, while also identifying problems that were beyond their control.

Of all the major combatants, the US Army relied more heavily on motor transportation than any other. The AEF made trucks an integral part of the force's logistical system, despite having only about 40000 at the armistice. The French never put significant emphasis on vehicles, though they did have 95000 by the war's end. French commanders viewed the truck as a stopgap, useful only when railroads and horses could not meet demands. The numbers of trucks available to the French did not lessen their dependence on animals. As one officer wrote after the war, 'The number of horses employed in the fightin zones were not appreciably reduced.'¹

The French army enjoyed the advantage of close proximity to supplies of both horses and motor vehicles. The British and America forces had to transport both to France, with horses often being in short supply. Consequently, both armies relied more heavily on motor transportation than did the French. The British had mechanized some ammunition supply for artillery as early as 1912, with the idea that trucks could link railheads and ammunition columns more quick than horse-drawn wagons. The idea did not extend to mechanizing artillery; the guns remained horse-drawn throughout the war. At the armistice, the British had about 45000 trucks in France. Many in the British army saw the potential for motor transportation, but conservative elements favoured keeping the horse, and the argument would not be settled until after the war. The Americans, facing a severe shortage of horses and a desire to explore the possibilities of the new technology, would put much greater importance on using motor vehicle as a key component of the logistical system.²

The AEF could draw on numerous examples for divining the challenges that trucks had to overcome in a major campaign. Both the Allies and the Germans used motor transportation from the war beginning, providing lessons for American observers. Martin van Creveld examines the Germans' use of trucks in their march through Belgium and France in 1914, pointing out that the German forces on the extreme right used trucks almost exclusively to maintain the flow of ammunition. The Germans suffered from a number of serious problems, including a lack of vehicles and spare parts, poor leadership and overuse of vehicles; 60% of the vehicles broke down within one month of combat. Van Creveld concludes that these problems were largely the result of a poor organization and bureaucratic mismanagement, while downplaying the difficulties imposed by distance. The AEF would repeat many of these same mistakes four years later.³

No evidence suggests that American military leaders knew of the Germans' problems with trucks until after the war, but the same cannot be said for the US Army's relations with its soon-to-be allies. In 1915 the United States War Department examined the organization of French army motor vehicles. The French had determined already that motor transportation had to be pooled and organized at high levels to be effective. The Commission Régulatrice Automobile (CRA) held authority over the supply and traffic flow of mechanized transportation at the corps level. In studying the CRA, the War Department concluded, in part, 'The corps trains, for instance, in the French organization correspond to our divisional trains,' a statement that contained a key misunderstanding. Leaving truck transportation to divisions worked as long as the army operated only in division strength. When the AEF made the jump into corps- and army-sized operations in autumn 1918, it found that divisional control of motor vehicles hindered the flexibility of the larger entities. Keeping control at the divisional level may have made sense for the small American army of 1915, but that policy should have been eliminated at the outset of the St Mihiel offensive in September 1918. The AEF did eventually adopt a system that provided for control of vehicles at the army level, but did not implement it until after the armistice.⁴

America's British allies had learned the importance of motor transportation during their own experiences in France. The first two years of the war presented little difficulty for the relatively small British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in terms of motor vehicle operation, but the tremendous growth of the force after Britain instituted conscription in 1916 strained British truck transportation to the utmost. The larger size of the BEF caused greater congestion on rail lines, and the British called upon motor transportation to relieve some of the pressure. The BEF also learned that trucks were often more useful in combat situations than light railroads, since wheeled vehicles could manoeuvre around shell craters, while destroyed rail lines stopped trains completely. Damage to roads and vehicles created by this increased tempo, coupled with a petrol shortage caused by the Germans' resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917, forced British commanders to reassess their motor transportation organization.⁵

Early in 1918 the BEF overhauled its transportation system, expanding rail lines during the winter months to save wear on the roads for the campaigning season, and creating new general-purpose motor transportation companies at the General Headquarters level. These new companies provided greater flexibility when divisional transportation proved insufficient. The BEF also prevailed upon the War Office to create two additional companies, which were quickly dispatched for service in France. Once again, American commanders needed look no further than their allies to see the importance of organizing at least some motor transportation units in pools available to any unit and commanded at the corps or army level.⁶

The US Army could also look to lessons of the recent Punitive Expedition against Mexico in 1916, which featured the army's first use of motor vehicles on campaign. The size of General John J. Pershing's force in Mexico did not approach the numbers consumed by the war in Europe, and consequently the difficulties of large-scale operations did not reveal themselves. However, the importance of proper maintenance of motor vehicles became very clear. The desolate, dusty Chihuahuan desert, where rutted-out animal trails were considered roads, provided a stiff testing-ground for the new technology. Trucks and drivers both took a fearful pounding under the conditions, but the army was encouraged enough by the results to order more vehicles. The army also began developing two standard truck models, a Class A I2 ton and a Class Β or Liberty 3 ton truck.⁷

AEF commanders may not have concerned themselves with motor transportation upon entering the war, but they were keenly aware of the logistical demands they would face. Strategists spent a great deal of time designing a rail transportation system to meet the demands of a million-man force. President Woodrow Wilson insisted that the AEF should operate as an independent force, which meant that the Americans would have to handle their own supply problems. When General John J. Pershing left for Europe in May 1917, a five-man committee went with him to begin the process of establishing the AEF's logistic base. At the war's outset, the army had no officers trained in railroad operations, so civilian railroad experts entered the army to fulfil these functions. Among these was William J. Wilgus, who had distinguished himself in the area of railroad construction for the New York Central Railroad. The commission spent 28 days in France determining what the AEF needed to create a workable railroad system. The French told their American counterparts that an American rail network would require 'Many miles of rail; hundreds of locomotives; 800 work-shop operators; 5,000 trained railroad men; and 20,000 laborers merely to start with.' The commission made these requests and the War Department filled the order.⁸

Commissioned as a major, Wilgus became head of the transportation branch of the AEF and produced an outline for a transportation network that emphasized centralized control. The AEF did not agree to greater centralization, but did implement most of Wilgus's plan in General Order No. 8 of 5 July 1917. The rail transportation network underwent numerous reorganizations as the size of the force grew, but rail transport remained a vital consideration for the commanders.⁹

Motor transport organization did not receive the same attention from the AEF. Commanders saw the need for an extensive maintenance and resupply system, but believed that operating motor vehicle was a divisional issue. To ensure that the individual divisions had sufficient trucks, commanders established the Motor Transport Service (MTS) on 8 December 1917 as a branch of the Quartermaster Corps, with the responsibility for supplying motor vehicles, spare parts, tools and accessories, as well as petrol and lubricants. The MTS was also placed in charge of repair and technical supervision of motor vehicles. On the other hand, responsibility for operating motor vehicles remained with each division.¹⁰

As the AEF continued to grow, its transportation system evolved. For a time in 1918, both rail and motor transport were part of the newly created Service of Utilities, which soon proved so restrictive that the AEF abolished it. American commanders renamed the MTS the Motor Transport Corps (MTC) and made it part of the Services of Supply (SOS) on 11 May. Two months later, the AEF made the MTC a separate corps, which included the important position of chief motor transport officer for each field army. Through his subordinates at the corps and division levels, the chief motor transport officer was responsible for the inspection and repair of all MTC vehicles. These changes reflected American commanders' growing awareness of the complexity of motor transportation, but in autumn 1918 the AEF entered large scale combat with motor vehicle operation still strictly under the auspices of individual divisions.¹¹

The AEF insisted on retaining divisional control of motor vehicles until nearly the war's end. This policy restricted the flexibility of the AEF's corps and army formations, because they could not count on having truck transportation at necessary times. The AEF rectified the problem on 6 November by ordering the establishment of an army level supply train along the same lines of the French CRA system, a change that came too late to affect operations, but revealed that the AEF's commanders were coming to understand the intricacies of motor transportation.¹²

The organizational adjustments in motor transportation revealed the important role that trucks played in the AEF's supply system. A chronic animal shortage required the Americans to invest significant resources in trucks. Early in the war, remount officers determined that the AEF would be unable to obtain the number of animals the Tables of Organization required. In September 1917, Army Chief of Staff Pey C. March ecommended that some artillery units, as well as amnition and regimental supply trains, be motorized, both to reduce number of horses required and to increase mobility.¹³

Despite these changes, the AEF still could not meet the dema for animals. In the new Tables of Organization of 14January 1918, AEF reduced the number of horses per division from 6522 to through the motorization of each division's 155 mm howitzer regim and trench mortar battery. But even this was not enough, and March, Pershing ordered:

A division should be provided with only the animals that are abslutely necessary to preserve its mobility as a fighting force and enable its full fighting strength to be brought into play during advance in open warfare. With this view in mind, any animals that might be regarded as conveniences rather than necessities should be reported as not required.¹⁴

Pershing also suggested that horses should be pooled for divisional use rather than being issued to individual officers. The general pointed out that bicycles could also be used for many of the duties for which officers required horses, such as inspection trips. While base pragmatic concerns, this move also symbolized the nature of industrial age warfare. For centuries, the horse had been a symbol of an officer's authority, but just as the First World War swept away so many trappings of the Old World, so too did the war mark the end of the traditional idea of the aristocratic officer keeping an eye on his troops from horseback.

Some forward-thinking officers enthusiastically welcomed die greater emphasis on motor transportation, but necessity forced the changes as much as a willingness to embrace new technology. Animal supplies continued to fall short, and required further reductions in the animals allotted to divisions. In August 1918 the AEF again cut the number of animals per division, this time to 3772, barely half of what the AEF had initially thought necessary. This final reduction came on the eve of the AEF's introduction to large-scale offensives. The force of more than a million men assembled by the United States would rely heavily on motor vehicles for its transportation needs.¹⁵

The AEF fought two major engagements during the First World War, both in autumn 1918. The St Mihiel offensive was a limited operation designed to pinch out a German salient and witnessed the organization of 1st Army, signalling the beginning of AEF field army operations. The Germans assisted the American effort by withdrawing most of their forces before the attack began on 12 September, in an attempt to shorten their defensive positions in France. Within two days American troops drove the remaining German defenders from the salient. During the much longer Meuse-Argonne campaign, which began on 26 September and lasted until the signing of the armistice on 11 November, American troops fought through a heavily forested, underdeveloped region that seemed perfectly designed for defence. The only positive aspect of the AEF's slow advance was that it made resupply somewhat easier. During the Meuse-Argonne, the number of American troops in France grew to nearly 2 million, eventually resulting in the creation of the 2nd Army. These operations and the numbers of men involved revealed the administrative and operational shortcomings in the American motor transportation system.¹⁶

American strategists correctly worried a great deal about the flow of supplies, but did not foresee the problems that might occur when conducting large-scale operations. In earlier actions, American troops had been attached to British or French units and had utilized those armies' existing transportation systems. When the Americans embarked on army-level operations, as they did for the final two months of the war, the value of reliable transportation became clear. Although the St Mihiel offensive lasted only a few days, commanders complained that large-scale operations required at least a corps-level motor transportation system. The documents do not indicate that the large size of the American divisions played any particular role in motor vehicle shortages, but the supply of vehicles was uneven. Some divisions might have more than enough trucks, but others could be desperately short. Consequently, the corps or army might fail to meet its objectives, though individual divisions succeeded.¹⁷

Once the AEF entered large-scale operations, maintenance, personnel and roadway problems became primary concerns. In terms of maintenance, American commanders had ample precedents to study, but failed to use them. The AEF could have examined the maintenance records of its British and French allies, or referred to the US Army experiences with trucks in the Punitive Expedition against Mexico in 1916. In Mexico the Americans learned first-hand the toll that combat conditions took on trucks. Instead, AEF officers based their projected maintenance needs on manufacturers' recommendations for civilian use, an error that created serious shortages, since spare parts on hand never averaged more than 15 to 20% of the amount the MTC requisitioned during the Meuse-Argonne campaign. One officer stated after the war, 'It is conservatively estimated that had spare parts been available at least 80% of the vehicles evacuated could have been repaired at the mobile Repair Parks with the Army.'¹⁸

On the other hand, even when American factories produced vehicles and parts, transatlantic shipment could take months. Furthermore, the initial lack of centralized control in motor transportation discouraged vehicle standardization. The plans to develop two primary models disappeared, and units often ordered purpose-built vehicles, though a standard cargo truck would have sufficed in many cases. As a result, the army operated 294 different makes and body types at one point. The AEF established a programme to design a new 3 ton truck in April 1917, and about 8000 of these vehicles reached France, though the army placed orders for 43000 of them. Furthermore, the War Department could not find dependable suppliers to manufacture the parts for the new standardized model.¹⁹

In The Neck of the Bottle, Phyllis A. Zimmerman uses the above example to support her statement that 'During World War I the U.S. Army never received reliable motor transportation from the industry of a nation that led the world in creating automobile assembly lines.' Zimmerman overstates her point, however. The army's statistician, Leonard Ayres, wrote after the war, At practically all times there were quantities of trucks at the ports of embarkation', but the lack of shipping space and the difficulty in loading the large vehicles prevented them from going to France. American promises to give precedence to sending infantrymen to support the battered Allied armies, as well as disputes between Britain and the United States regarding how much tonnage the British should supply, only made the problem worse. Ayres also explained that in October and November 1918 trucks received priority over many other supplies, indicating the reliance the AEF placed on motor transportation. In the meantime, the AEF turned to British and French suppliers, adding yet more models and specific parts to the logistical system.²⁰

Maintenance demands on such a diverse collection of vehicles would have been difficult under any circumstances, but manufacturers often made conditions even more exasperating. Spare-part problems in France began as soon as the boxes arrived at the main spare-part depot at Verneuil. Many boxes arrived from America without markings, meaning each carton had to be opened and examined to see what parts it contained. Furthermore, manufacturers would often ship a variety of parts in one box, which meant that the parts had to be sorted, rather than the carton simply being opened and the contents dumped into the appropriate bin. Companies took these actions in an attempt to meet the pressing demands for replacement parts as quickly as possible, but these short cuts often slowed the flow of supplies. The situation became so acute that the AEF ordered that 50% of the parts received at Verneuil be shipped to the forward depots at Langres and Sampigny immediately, without regard for what might be in the boxes. In the short run, this practice eased the shortage, but such an unorganized system could function only as an emergency stopgap measure and not as the basis for a rational supply organization.²¹

Lack of adequate storage bins at the depots created a final difficulty in the spare-parts supply system. The AEF did not make sufficient provisions for storing parts, and as a result the items were stored wherever space could be found. The AEF simplified its equipment to 34 different models of trucks and 18 models of cars, a far cry from the army's former total of 294. But these improvements still left the AEF with the difficult responsibility of replacing the average 3500 parts on a given vehicle, of which 80% were unique to that particular make. This ad hoc system of spare-part shipment and storage greatly slowed vehicle repair and maintenance.²²

Among the trucks, the AEF found that some models provided better service than others. Riker, Mack and Liberty trucks performed best, while the Nash Quad was the least satisfactory model. The steering knuckles on the Nash Quad were troublesome, and the AEF resorted to milling these parts because they wore out more quickly than new ones could be shipped from the United States. Such chronic weaknesses in particular models only exacerbated the difficulties in providing transportation.²³

With the trucks being driven so hard, breakdowns inevitably occurred. The AEF realized that repairs would be necessary and devised a basic triage system to handle any repairs that a driver could not make himself. Minor repair was work that a light plant could accomplish in one day. Major repair or overhaul required a more elaborate plant and the replacement of not more than 30% of the vehicle's parts. Reconstruction meant extensive work and required that the vehicle be salvaged, and often also included manufacturing parts.²⁴

The system was well conceived and workable in theory. In practice, however, repairing vehicles was a nightmare. The first problem was finding the right parts among the unsorted boxes arriving from America. More significantly, the AEF failed to provide suitable repair es for 1st Army. The army established two overhaul parks in June 1918, but the park at Neufcháteau, which was designated to serve 1st Army, was not ready for significant work even by the signing of the armistice.²⁵

Even when 1st Army salvaged broken-down vehicles and brought them to their meagre repair facilities, and assuming the proper spare parts were available, the mechanics still had to contend with a chronic tool shortage. Again, this problem was caused by a lack of forethought. The AEF had not thought to requisition sufficient hand tools for the motor vehicle repair.²⁶

As if the repair situation was not bad enough, replacements for vehicles failed to arrive. Out of necessity, mechanics often cannibalized parts from badly damaged vehicles to keep others in service. In his report, the chief motor transport officer for 1st Army complained:

It is an interesting fact that to the date of this report, it has never been possible to have the motor vehicle equipment, or any part thereof, of any organization connected with the army turned in to an overhaul park for complete overhauling. Nor has there, although paper credit existed, ever been a vehicle issued to the army as a replacement.²⁷

Mechanical problems certainly played an important role in the problems of truck transportation in the Meuse-Argonne, but the army also suffered from serious personnel problems. Because the AEF did not give motor transportation a high priority early in the war, no attempt was made to separate trained drivers and mechanics from the mass of draftees and volunteers. The Motor Transport Corps quickly learned that such men were vital to maintaining a constant flow of supplies, but did not begin scouring the AEF for experienced personnel until late in September 1918. The AEF thus embarked on the great battles of 1918 without identifying trained mechanics or drivers within its ranks, further exacerbating the difficulties in keeping the motor transportation system flowing.²⁸

During the war, the AEF created two training facilities specifically for motor transportation, Camp Joseph E.Johnston, near Jacksonville, Florida, and Camp Meigs in Washington, DC. The AEF also designed a programme to expand training operations to five inore camps and produce more than 20000 trained personnel per month by mid-1919. But these steps could not bear fruit in time for the 1918 offensives. When the Meuse-Argonne offensive began, it was much too late for the MTC to find enough trained drivers and mechanics to handle the flood of work. To make matters worse, the mechanics were often the only men qualified to sort the unmarked boxes of parts, which meant that they spent their time digging through cartons instead of performing much-needed repairs.²⁹

Despite these obstacles, the mechanics of 1st Army performed their duties admirably. Between 2 October and 10 November 1918, one repair unit handled 590 jobs, with only 16 vehicles still in the shop. The men used whatever parts they could get their hands on, often using great ingenuity in devising ways to keep trucks running. Such improvised repair procedures could well do more harm than good in the long run, but in the short-term crisis of the Meuse-Argonne, such drastic steps were necessary. In fact, the Services of Supply abandoned or classified as unusable only 8% of vehicles salvaged during the Meuse-Argonne campaign.³⁰

While the mechanics of 1st Army were a welcome surprise, the drivers were a disappointment. Since no one thought to separate trained truck-drivers, many of the men behind the wheels of 1st Army's trucks had never driven a vehicle. These inexperienced troops caused significant delays because of their unfamiliarity with their vehicles and driving in general, underscoring the need for trained personnel. The MTC gave specific instructions to drivers in the hope that some problems could be avoided. Drivers were told to keep their truck on the right side of the road, whether moving or standing still, unless passing, to facilitate the flow of traffic in both directions. However, these important rules were not always heeded, resulting in terrible traffic jams. The following report reveals how these snarls began.

1. This evening between 6:30 and 8:30 seven traffic jams were noted on the Nationale Highway between Neuvilly and Varennes as follows: Two caused by bent steering rods, the result it was claimed by careless driving of French chauffeurs. The M.P.s. and chauffeurs were inexperienced and apparently helpless to take the necessary action required to get the trucks out of the way and clear the jam. Five other traffic jams by inexcusable doubling. In only one case was there an M.P. to be found and he was instructed to take down and report the name of the officer in charge of a convoy of five empty trucks found standing on the left side of the road, a plain case of doubling in spite of repeated orders. The name of this officer was Lieut. Unger of the 103rd Ammunition.

2. In another case a loaded ammunition train was under charge of Sergeant Kyle of the 56th Heavy Artillery. He claimed that his leading truck had started the doubling before he could prevent it, but as he should have been on the leading truck this excuse is not considered a valid one. In one other case the doubling was by a French chauffeur and he was followed by several American trucks. In the other two cases the names of the truck drivers that had started the block could not be ascertained as it was claimed that the leading truck had found a way to enter into the right-hand moving traffic but other trucks had followed them and were unable to adopt the same expedient.

3. In a couple of these blockades there were a number of staff cars with officers in them complacently waiting for somebody to relieve the jam.

4. It is suggested that it be made the positive duty of staff officers in a blockade to immediately go on ahead and use every endeavor to rectify the blunder; also that it be made their duty and the duty of all M.P.s. to take down the name and organization of every chauffeur found on the left-hand side of the road when a jam occurs. It is believed that if these two rules can be made effective that traffic blocks will be caught in their incipient stages and that all chauffeurs found on the left-hand side of the road can be disciplined and that the practice of doubling be shortly broken up.³¹

Undisciplined truckers played a significant role in causing the seemingly endless 1st Army traffic jams. One traffic tie-up stopped the movement of supplies for 12 hours. On 29 September, French Premier Georges Clemenceau tried to reach Montfaucon, liberated by the AEF the day before. Traffic in the rear area was so congested that Clemenceau never made it to the town. Doughboys considered Clemenceau just another goddam [sic] politician blocking a lifeline with a black limousine'. When Clemenceau gave up and decided to leave, troops picked up his car and faced it in the other direction. The situation so disgusted Clemenceau that he told Foch that the Americans clearly were not capable of a major offensive. On 9 October, the I Corps Motor Transport Section requested the relief of 'incompetent' truck and motorcycle drivers. The early stages of Meuse-Argonne demon strated the necessity for trained truck-drivers to keep traffic moving.³²

More disturbing than the truck drivers was the failure of officers to assert their authority and get traffic moving again. The report cited above was correct in criticizing the performance of officers present and recommending more detailed instructions for handling traffic jams. Although the AEF had to deal with many transportation problems that pre-dated the Meuse-Argonne, this situation could have been rectified during the offensive. Officers needed to use more initiative in breaking up traffic snarls. The AEF also would have benefited by determining exactly where responsibility for traffic control lay. Under the French system, the CRA regulated traffic in the rear areas, but again, the divisional system of truck operation created problems for the Americans. The AEF needed either to assign sufficient military policemen to traffic control duties, or give the MTC the duty of finding men to direct the long lines of trucks moving from the railheads to the front. Leaving traffic control in the hands of the neophyte drivers and unassertive officers, however, guaranteed problems.

The MTC also issued important directives regarding vehicle maintenance. Orders stipulated that every time a vehicle stopped, the three crew-members were to perform routine checks, such as filling the gas tanks and oil crankcases. Commanders further admonished that:

Repairs must be kept up continuously. This will require constant attention on the part of the crew assigned to the vehicle. It should be made an invariable rule that none of the truck crew should be allowed to remain in the seat while the vehicle is stopped, be should devote their time to cleaning mechanism, tightening up nuts, screws, rivets, screwing up grease cups, examining bearings tires, lubrication, adjustments, water, gas, and looking to the gene condition of the vehicle. Particular attention should be given keeping nuts on the U bolts on springs quite tight. A heavy wrench with a long handle should be used, and plenty of pressure applied in order to keep these as tight as possible. See that no loose ends of chain are dangling, as these are dangerous to passing men and animals.

Tool boxes should be kept dry and clean, and free of useless impedimenta. Tools should be kept clean and carried neatly packed in tool boxes.³³

These instructions made a great deal of sense and showed that the AEF did not completely disregard the importance of vehicle management. Determining how closely these regulations were followed is impossible, but given the attitude of drivers toward driving regulations, truck crews probably did not pay a great deal of attention to their vehicles' condition. Still, the archives do not contain reports criticizing poor maintenance by drivers, so perhaps truck crews did not completely neglect basic maintenance.

Inexperienced operators often caused significant wear and tear on vehicles and roads. Drivers used four-wheel drive trucks in rear areas where their four-wheel capabilities were not needed and often tore up the road surface. Further up, as the roads deteriorated into a mass of mud and ruts, 3 ton trucks simply sank into the quagmire or worsene the road as they slipped around, grinding traffic to a halt. Drivers also misused trailers, which seemed like an easy answer to alleviate the truck shortage, but proved much more complicated to operate than imagined. The trailers were difficult to control on the narrow, slippery and crowded roads of the Meuse-Argonne. They also made it impossible for drivers to turn around on a road without disconnecting the trailer, adding to delays. Finally, the trailers forced trucks to work harder going up hills, increasing engine wear.³⁴

Inexperience and lack of vehicles created serious problems, but the MTC also found that vehicles made tempting targets for light-fingered soldiers. The situation became so serious that it prompted a general order:

1. The theft and promiscuous picking up of motorcycles, passenger cars and trucks by individuals and organizations is becoming of frequent occurrence.

2. When a unit is found with motor transport in its possession that is not regularly assigned it, a presumption arises that the immediate Commanding Officer of that unit is an accessory to the theft, and charges will be preferred against him.

3. Inspectors have been instructed to check the motor transportation of different units at frequent and irregular intervals for the purpose of bringing offenders to trial.³⁵

Like so many other issues concerning motor transportation, no one had considered theft to be a potential problem. The MTC did not take steps before the Meuse-Argonne campaign to prevent troops from taking vehicles that were not assigned to them. Sometimes units desperately short of transportation took whatever vehicles they could find, pointing out the seriousness of the truck shortage. Other times, troops simply grabbed a handy vehicle because they did not want to walk. Regardless, unauthorized truck use made the transportation shortage even more acute.

A final personnel problem was a lack of qualified inspectors who were responsible for examining the vehicles of 1st Army and determining which ones needed repair. Because not enough inspectors were available, examinations of individual divisions' vehicles were delayed, and because the divisions themselves had few experts in motor transport, maintenance problems were more severe by the the MTC inspectors arrived. In his final report on the Meus-Argpmme. 1st Army's chief motor transport officer stated, 'Practically every Division was visited and recommendations made looking toward repair, adjustment and lubrication of vehicles which could be used and evacuation of those which interfered with the mobility of the Division.' Prompt attention by qualified personnel would have found problems earlier and improved overall maintenance. But again, the die had been cast. By the time the Meuse-Argonne offensive began, it was much too late to find qualified inspectors.³⁶

Given all of these problems, as well as the horrible roads and torrential rains of the Meuse-Argonne, the AEF might have stopped moving completely. But the men of the MTC and those operating the vehicles within the divisions kept supplies moving. Stubborn German resistance in the Meuse-Argonne kept the lines of communication from becoming too stretched, and exhaustion rather than lack of supplies forced the advance to pause on several occasions. None the less, the afore mentioned difficulties revealed themselves so clearly that the AEF designed a new motor transportation system and prepared to implement it for subsequent operations. That this system was quite similar to those already in use by America's allies reveals that the American commanders could have prevented some of the problems that plagued motor transportation.

Of even greater disappointment, the US Army did not take to heart all the lessons learned during the war. The idea of a separate transportation branch died with America's postwar military cuts, and would not be resurrected until a new war demanded it in 1942. While the interwar army's small size forced such reductions, the military establishment also failed to heed the problems of operating many different vehicle models. When the army embarked on a major motorization programme in 1926, it adopted 360 vehicle types. Not until 1939 did the army finally decide on just six models, greatly simplifying maintenance.³⁷

American commanders would have had difficulty managing truck transportation during the final offensives under the best of circumstances. The poor condition of roads and the constant rains during the Meuse-Argonne campaign would have plagued the AEF regardless of pre-war planning. However, American commanders had ample opportunity to examine motor vehicle vise by their European allies. During the 15 months between American entry and the commencement of the St Mihiel offensive, leaders should have drawn lessons from the Punitive Expedition of 1916 and the French and British armies, as well as the AEF's own train transportation system, particularly given the emphasis that the AEF placed on motor vehicles. The demand for motor transportation revealed how warfare had changed as a result of the industrial revolution. Industrial age armies needed the same trained professionals, systems and long-range plans as businesses to manage the complicated and technical aspects of the new machines of war.

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

¹ 'Horse and Motor: A French View', Journal of the Royal United Service Institution LXIII (May 1928), p. 280. This article is translated extracts from an article written by Chef d'Escadron Janssen for the October 1927 edition of the Revue Militaire Française.

² I.M. Brown, British Logistics on the Western Front, 1914-1919 (Westport, CT, 1996), p. 34; 'Horse and Motor', p. 280. Brown's book contains little information on moto transportation, but focuses a great deal on standard-gauge railroads and artillery supply, as well as the development of the British organization for transportation. Brown also reaches the conclusion that the British did not enter the war with a clear realization of the organizational demands of motor transport.

³ Μ. van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (New York, 1977), pp. 125-7; H. Strachan, The First World War, vol. 1, To Arms (New York, 2001), p. 240.

⁴ 'General Report March 11th, 1918 - November 11th, 1918. Transportation Branch, 4th Section, General Staff [subsequently 'General Report'], National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC [NARA], record group 120, entry 24, box 3390, file 405.01; Army War College, Motor Transport in Campaign (Washington, 1916), p. 6. NARA record group 120 is the archives of the American Expeditionary Force. Documents covering transportation in the AEF are rather sparse and not always where one might expect. The researcher should be aware that the most productive records detailing problems with transportation are engineering reports covering construction and final reports of the various transportation branches. Records of little value include the correspondence of both the Director General of Transportation and the Deputy Director of Transportation. Furthermore, the records of the Operations (G-3) staffs of various commands have little to say about the effect of transportation on operations.

⁵ Colonel M.G. Taylor, 'Land Transportation in the Late War' Journal of the Royal United Service Institution LXVI (February 1921), pp. 706-7.

⁶ Op. cit., p. 708.

⁷ B. Crowell, America's Munitions, 1917-1918 (Washington, DC, 1919), pp. 496-7.

⁸ US Department of the Army, Historical Division, The United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919 XIV (Washington, DC, 1948), p. 205 [subsequently: United States Army in the World War].

⁹ W.J. Wilgus, Transporting the A.E.F. in Western Europe, 1917-1919 (New York, 1931), p. 18; United States Army in the World War XIV, p. 61. General Order No. 8 divided the General Staff into three sections: Intelligence, Operations and Administration. Within the General Staff was an administration, technical and supply staff consisting of a judge advocate, inspector general, chief quartermaster, adjutant general, chief engineer, chief ordnance officer, chief surgeon, chief signal officer and aviation officer. However, transportation remained under the control of the chief engineer rather than gaining its own individual status at this time.

¹⁰ United States Army in the World War XIV, p. 150.

¹¹ Op. cit., p. 151.

¹² 'Report of Chief Motor Transport Officer St. Mihiel Operation, Argonne-Meuse Operations', NARA, record group 120, entry 24, file 407.

¹³ March memo to General James G. Harbord, 19 Sept. 1917. NARA, record group box 3203, file 6.219, folder 1782.

¹⁴ Pershing memo to Commanding General, 1st Division, 21 March 1918. NARA, record group 120, box 3203, file 6.219, folder 1782.

¹⁵ Colonel Fox Conner, Head of G-3, memo to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, 21 Aug. 1918. NARA, record group 120, box 3203, file 6.219, folder 1782.

¹⁶ The best account of American involvement in the First World War is E.M. Coffman,The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I (New York, 1968). For a detailed study of the Meuse-Argonne campaign, consult P.F. Braim, The Test of Battle: The American Expeditionary Force in the Meuse-Argonne Campaign (Newark, DE, 1987).

¹⁷ 'Report of Chief Motor Transport Officer'.

¹⁸ United States Army in the World War χiv, p. 156; 'General Report'; J.C. Speedy III, 'From Mules to Motors: Development of Maintenance Doctrine for Motor Vehicles by the U.S. Army, 1896-1918', PhD diss. (Duke University, 1977), p. 341. Speedy's dissertation contains a wealth of information on maintenance, though somewhat less on organizational or operational details. Speedy does find that organizational shortcomings played a key role in the maintenance difficulties of the AEF.

¹⁹ J.A. Huston, The Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 1775-1953 (Washington, DC, 1966), pp. 324-5; D.R. Beaver, 'Politics and Policy: The War Department Motorization and Standardization Program for Wheeled Transport Vehicles, 1920-1940', Military Affairs XLVII (October 1983), p. 103.

²⁰ P.A. Zimmerman, The Neck of the Bottle: George W. Goethals and the Reorganization of the U.S. Army Supply System, 1917-1918 (College Station, TX, 1992), p. 69; L. Ayres, The War with Germany: A Statistical Summary (Washington, DC. 1919), p. 55. A thorough explanation of the myriad obstacles to transatlantic shipping is beyond the scope of this article. For an excellent discussion, see D.R. Beaver, Newton D. Baker and the American War Effort, 1917-1919 (Lincoln, NB, 1966); Speedy refers to the lack of shipping numerous times in his dissertation.

²¹ Lt-Col W.F. Heringshaw, memo G-4, 1st Army, 5 Oct. NARA, record group 120, entry 24, box 3390, file 405.01; United States Army in the World War XIV, p. 157.

²² Lt-Col L.D. Gasser, memo to A.C. of S., G-4, GHQ, NARA, record group 120, entry 24, box 3390, file 405.0 [subsequently Gasser memo]; 'General Report'; United States Army in the World War XIV, p. 156.

²³ 'Report of Chief Motor Transport Officer', Appendix 5E, 'Report on Mechanical Defects Developed in the Various Makes and Types of Vehicles Employed in the First Army'; United States Army in the World War XIV, p. 156.

²⁴ United States Army in the World War XIV, p. 158.

²⁵ 'General Report'.

²⁶ Gasser memo.

²⁷ 'Report of Chief Motor Transport Officer.' The original is all in capital letters, perhaps for emphasis. It is also in parentheses, indicating that it was a fact known to headquarters and not an integral part of the report.

²⁸ Lt-Col W.F. Heringshaw, 'Notes on Organization and Operation of Motor Transportation, 22 September 1918', Nx\RA, record group 120, entry 24, file 407.

²⁹ Major E.A. Powell, The Army Behind the Army (New York, 1919), p. 431; Gasser memo.

³⁰ Major W.J. Hanington to 601st C.O. A.A. Park, NARA, record group 120, entry 830, box 20; 'The Demobilization of the Army's Motor Transport Fleet', NARA, record group 165, entry 310, box 174.

³¹ Colonel G.M. Hoffman to Chief of Staff First Army, 6 October 1918, NARA, record group 120, entry 1012. box 149.

³² J. Terraine, To Win a War: 1918, the Year of Victory (New York, 1981), p. 157; L. Stallings, The Story of the Doughboys: The A.E.F. in World War I (New York, 1963), pp. 294-5; I Corps, Motor Transport Section, Communications Book, NARA, record group 120, entry 830, box 20.

³³ 'Report of Operations of Chief Motor Transport Officer, 1st Army. From May 30 to November 11, 1918', Appendix 3-D, 1st Army Bulletin No. 14, 17 September, NARA, record group 120, entry 24, file 407; Heringshaw, 'Notes on Organization and Operation of Motor Transportation.'

³⁴ 2nd Lt J.H. Pearson, 46th Telephone Battalion to Chief Motor Transport Officer, 1st Army, 19 October 1918, NARA, record group 120, entry 1014, box 123; 'Report of Chief Motor Transport Officer', Appendix 5E.

³⁵ Extract of General Order No. 27, NARA, record group 120, entry 24, file 407.

³⁶ 'Report of Chief Motor Transport Officer'.

³⁷ A.R. Millett and P. Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America, rev. edn (New York, 1994), p.400.